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Abstract 
Research has shown that organised crime (OC) is a powerful and wealthy enterprise 
with strong ties to politics, businesses and the civil society. A significant portion of 
organised crime remains invisible to the public, law enforcement and the criminal 
justice system. Evidently, it is in the interests of political scientists to investigate if this 
portion of OC that remains invisible (or the portion that becomes exposed) is related to 
any power structures, bureaucratic predispositions and inequalities. This thesis tackles 
the following question: Is the visibility of organized crime determined by the social 
power of the groups and actors that participate in illegal activities? To answer this 
question, we investigate three criminal networks from Greece. 
First, we examine a network of cocaine smugglers (Cocaine Barons), who belong to the 
shipping community, with high social power and very low visibility. Second, we 
examine a case study of a group that participates in protection rackets, drug trafficking, 
smuggling and murders (Godfathers of the night). This group is linked to the Athenian 
nightlife community and has an average level of social power and visibility. Finally, we 
have selected to examine the Greek Urban Guerrilla movement as an example with low 
level of social power and high level of visibility. Although, crimes committed by Urban 
Guerrilla groups have in most instances political motives, Greek penal law regards such 
groups as ‘criminal organisations’. We focus our investigation in Greece, because of a 
very interesting paradox. Although the political, economic and socio-cultural 
environments in Greece indicate that the country should face similar levels of OC as in 
Italy, Latin America and the Balkans, the public discourse about the problem of 
organised crime in Greece is inexistent and politically driven. Our comparative analysis 
indicates a strong relationship between power, visibility, origin, organisational structure 
and the degree of symbiosis of the criminal groups with the polity. 
10 




‘Sicilians are Greeks, and have most of the vices of the Greek 
character, and among these chiefly that of an exaggerated 
individualism, and indifference to the general good so long as the 
individual advantage is found nearer at hand, and none of their 
Governments, down to the Garibaldian, had any higher idea of 
government than to make use of the vices of the people to keep them 
under’. 
(The New York Times, 1891) 
1.1 Introduction 
Criminologists and other experts have a trained tendency to underplay the 
political nature of organised crime by exaggerating the economic and 
rational motives of the actors involved in criminal networks. The present 
research attempts to contribute to the sparse body of knowledge that focuses 
explicitly on the politicised facets of organised crime. The aim of this thesis 
is to examine the political nature of OC in Greece by focusing on the 
notions of conflict, power and visibility. But, first we need to deal with 
some conceptual issues at hand. What do we mean when we talk about 
Greek organised crime? What is Greek organised crime? How to we know 
that Greek organised crime exists and how can we study it? 
The answer to these questions is ambivalent. On the one hand, the deficit of 
publicly available sources and the lack of public discourse, suggests that 
Greek organised crime has very low ‘visibility’ in both Greece and Europe. 
On the other hand, the situational environment in the country indicates that 
a serious native organised crime problem must exist. It is exactly this 
11 Chapter 1: The Greek paradox 
paradoxical lack of ‘visibility’ that has captured our attention and has 
motivated this research. Greece is a country were organised crime should 
flourish, but it does not. Is there a political agenda? Is organised crime in 
Greece protected? These are valid concerns that emerge when looking at the 
evidence at hand. 
Before the 2001 terrorist attacks in United States, and the subsequent 
internationalisation of organised crime and terrorism as ‘security problems’, 
the public debate in Greece seldom perceived organised crime and terrorism 
as security issues (Hellenic Parliament 2001: 1; Lambropoulou, 2005: 211; 
Xenakis, 2004). Furthermore, the absence of well known and reputable 
Greek criminal organisations in the annual reports on organised crime 
produced by the Greek and European law enforcement authorities, also 
exposes the invisibility of Greek organised crime (see for example Europol 
annual reports on organised crime from 1990 to 2005; MPO from 2000 to 
2006, OCTA-SEE, 2009; OCTA-Hellenic Contribution, 2009). Evidently, 
native Greek organised crime is virtually absent from the parliamentary 
reports and discussions that took place throughout Europe in the last two 
decades (HAC, 1995, 2008; Fijnaut and Paoli, 2004). Moreover, 
information from secondary sources is also scarce. Less than a dozen of 
academic and newspaper articles have been published in the English 
literature on this topic (Lamboropoulou, 2005; Xenakis, 2004; 
Antonopoulos, 2004, 2007, 2008, 2010; Antonopoulos and Winterdyx 2006, 
Kostakos and Antonopoulos, 2010). The fact that native organised crime in 
Greece has such a low visibility, in our view, constitutes an anomaly or a 
paradox. Indeed, a comparative investigation across countries with similar 
cultural, political and economic context with Greece reveals an anomaly in 
the explanations in which native organised crime can emerge (Williams and 
Godson, 2002; Gambetta, 1993: 75-99). This ‘Greek paradox’ is well 
captured in a number of contradictions. 
First, it seems fairly contradictory that despite the strong geographical, 
cultural, political and historical connections that Greece has with other 
12 1.1 Introduction 
countries/regions with an internationally recognised native organised crime 
problem, such as Southern Europe, Latin America, the Balkans and the 
wider Mediterranean region, Greek organised crime rarely appears in the 
public discourse (Legg and Roberts, 1997: 3, see also: Braudel, 1995a, 
1995b). Second, corruption in Greece is perceived to be systematic and 
endemic at all levels of the government, the public sector as well as in 
private businesses. Latest data, for instance, shows that Greece ranks fifth in 
the EU corruption perception index for the year 2008 (Transparency 
International, 2009: 338-43). Third, the underground economy in Greece 
has always been thriving. According to a number of studies, it is estimated 
that Greece (like Italy) has an ‘underground economy almost one third as 
large as the officially measured GNP’ (Katsiotis, 2006: 67). Fourth, Greece 
has one of the strongest left-wing terrorist movements and a rich history of 
para-state organisations in Europe, indicating a social reality within the 
country that may nurture other forms of organised deviance, namely 
organised crime (Europol TE SAT, 2007: 13). Fifth, the geographical 
location of the country, with the largest coastline and shipping industry in 
Europe, is also suggestive that illegal trade and smuggling could flourish. 
Finally, the Greek Diaspora and entrepreneurial networks have been one of 
the largest and prosperous communities throughout the world that could 
facilitate the establishment of transnational ties (Panagakos, 2004; Clogg, 
1999; Pepelasis-Minoglou, 2005; Harlaftis, 2005). Hence, Greek criminal 
groups are apparently mostly noticeable in foreign countries, namely in the 
USA, Canada and Australia, where Greek Diaspora communities are 
particularly affluent (US v. Iodice, 525 F. 3d 179, 2008: 182; US v. Philip 
A. Chance, 306 F.3d 356 [6th Cir. 2002]; US v. Anthony Disalvo, US v. 
Robert F. Simone, 34 F.3d 1204 [3rd Cir. 1994] Pappas: 2009; Moor, 2007). 
Consequently, all these contradictions, in our view, create a ‘Greek paradox’ 
that logically leads us to pose the following questions: Is there a native 
organised crime in Greece? If so, why does it remain invisible? What are its 
causes and manifestations? 
13 Chapter 1: The Greek paradox 
The short answer would be that there is native organised crime in Greece 
and that the reason it remains invisible is because it constitutes a normal 
phenomenon, an obvious part of everyday life. That is to say, it is embedded 
into the everyday functioning of society and culture as well as in the 
infrastructure of the economy and the state, and therefore, it is not 
considered to be a problem. In other words, it is as Greek as the feta cheese, 
and as normal as olive oil dressing in a Greek salad. However, that is not to 
say that Greece is a crime-free society. Cases of what can be defined as 
‘native organised crime’ emerge in the public domain when excessive 
violence is employed and/or when Greek authorities receive requests for 
International cooperation from foreign police forces (mainly from America 
and the EU). Additionally, when core societal norms are undermined, the 
role of the media and local communities is central in exposing the workings 
of native criminal groups (Kyriakopoulos, 2010). This explanation draws on 
several criminological theories that perceive deviance as a normal behaviour 
that emerges from everyday routines and practices (Cohen and Felson, 
1979). Also, our account is influenced by the work of cultural 
criminologists, like Sutherland (1941; 1945; 1983) and Sellin (1938), who 
stress the role of power and cultural conflict in understanding crime and 
criminality. 
The fact that Greek organised crime is ‘invisible’ does not mean that it does 
not exist. Here, we put forward a holistic explanation suggesting that this 
lack of visibility is related to the nature and manifestation of OC as an 
everyday, normal phenomenon. Before moving on, we will first look at how 
organised crime is defined and discuss a number of competing explanations 
that may apply in the case of Greece. This information will help us put the 
research problem we are trying to address, in a more theoretical and 
conceptual context. 
14 1.2 What is organised crime? 
1.2 What is organised crime? 
1.2.1 An essentially contested concept 
Any meaningful discussion about the definition of organised crime, should 
foremost acknowledge that organised crime is an ‘essentially contested 
concept’ (Gallie, 1956). There might be a widespread agreement that 
organised crime exists, but the way this problem is defined depends heavily 
on individual and professional predispositions, norms, ideology and 
motivations that prompted the need for such definition in the first instance. 
Suffice to say that ‘where one comes out, depends on where one goes in’ 
(Smith, 1991: 135). 
Professor W.B. Gallie originally formulated the notion of ‘essentially 
contest concepts’, in a lecture given to the Aristotelian Society in 1956 
(Gray, 1977: 332). According to Gallie (1956), essentially contested 
concepts are ‘concepts the proper use of which inevitably involves endless 
disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users’ (p. 169). Taking 
as examples the terms ‘work or art’, ‘democracy’ and ‘Christian doctrine’, 
Gallie shows that these concepts ‘subserve different [...] functions for 
different schools or movements of artists and critics, for different political 
groups and parties, for different religious communities and sects’ (p. 168). 
Disputes about the ‘proper’ use of an ‘essentially contested concept’ cannot 
be resolved because each party will maintain that their own interpretation ‘is 
the correct or proper or primary, or the only important, function which the 
term in question can plainly be said to fulfil’ (p. 168). Consequently, 
‘disputes over contested concepts, are disputes which in their nature cannot 
be settled by appeal to empirical evidence, linguistic usage, or the canons of 
logic alone. They are disputes which if they are resolved rationally, must be 
conducted by a species of argument which has a distinctively philosophical-
that is to say, metaphysical-character’ (Grey, 1977: 343). 
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Organised crime is an ‘essentially contested concept’ on the ground that ‘it 
has become commonplace to observe that the term “organised crime”, is 
frequently used but difficult to define’ (Levi, 1998: 335). Since the term was 
firstly introduced during the Prohibition era of the 1920s into the public 
discourse (Woodiwiss, 2001; Woodiwiss and Hobbs, 2009), its definition 
has sparked a heated debate in both academic and professional circles 
(Albanese, 2000; Albini, 1971; Block, 1983; Block and Chambliss, 1981; 
Halstead, 1998; Ianni and Ianni, 1972; Lupsha, 1996; Maltz, 1994, 1976; 
Mastrofski and Potter, 1987; Naylor, 1997, 1993; Potter, 1994; Smith, 1975, 
1980, 1978, 1994; Williams and Godson, 2002; Paoli, 2003, 2004). A 
significant part of the literature deals with the laborious task of defining 
organised crime. The explanations and rationales put forward regarding the 
need for a ‘clear’ definition are in our view, prima facie evidence of the 
essentially contested nature of organised crime. The remaining of this 
section will briefly review some of these explanations. 
First, the social and political implications involved in the formation of new 
crime categories are tremendous, wide-reaching and could not be ignored. 
For instance, it has been argued that the conflicting images of ‘organised 
crime’ as proposed by legal scholars, politicians, law enforcement, 
sociologists, historians, criminologist and journalists, have contributed to a 
semantic confusion ‘which oscillates dangerously between self-serving 
myth and radical scepticism’ (Paoli, 2003:3). Moreover, the way organised 
crime is defined, determines to a great extent, how organised crime is 
studied and analysed as a phenomenon. Consequently, having a clear and 
precise definition of the problem ‘is essential to rigorous research, and thus, 
to clear understanding’ (Cressey 1972: 7). Second, there are also practical 
and policy related issues to consider. Halstead, for instance argues that ‘the 
model used by a particular agency, explicitly or implicitly, will be reflected 
in the work of analysts, whose efforts will determine, at least in part, 
operational and strategic responses and allocation of resources to addressing 
the phenomenon [organised crime]’ (1998: 1). Third, given that large sums 
of money are spent on combating OC, having a definition of the problem 
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indicates ‘how resources should be allocated and how effective they have 
been expended in attacking it’ (Maltz, 1994: 22). Fourth, with a clear 
definition of the problem, the penal and justice systems become able to 
distinguish between organised crimes that carry heavier sentences, and other 
types of organised criminality that are less serious, and therefore, require 
less severe sentencing (Cressey, 1972: 6-10; Naylor, 1997: 1-6). Similarly, 
Naylor (1997: 2) points out the necessity to develop typologies that can help 
us distinguish ‘organised’ from 'ordinary' criminality. Lastly, the agreement 
on one definition is vital for the harmonisation of legislation across 
territorial boarders that will work most effectively for prosecuting OC; a 
problem that is usually cross-border in nature (Halstead, 1998: 1-2). 
Consequently, it becomes apparent that definitions should not be taken at 
face value- they reflect a purpose, consciously or unconsciously, and they 
‘vary according to their source’ (Wright, 2006: 3). For example, a US 
Justice Department report that reviewed the literature, in order to identify 
reoccurring problems related to the investigation and prosecution of 
organised crime, concludes that: 
Most often, the content of the definition [of OC] reflects the 
perspective of the discipline or profession of the author, and 
different perspectives have led to different definitions. 
Definitions, too, reflect purpose. To meet varying needs, 
organized crime may, of course, be quite legitimately defined by 
members of the same profession in quite different fashions; for 
example, to limit or expand investigative jurisdiction, create 
special crimes, or to assess extra punishment for those who 
engage in certain kinds of criminal behaviour. 
(Blakey, Goldstock, and Rogovin, 1978: 3) 
Thus, the contestability of ‘organised crime’ derives primarily from the 
purpose and motivation that frames any definitional efforts. Having this at 
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the back of our mind, we now proceed to examine the conceptual struggle 
involved in the definition of ‘organised crime’. Afterwards, we will sift our 
attention to the ongoing academic efforts to develop theories and analytical 
models of organised crime in various parts of the world. Finally, before 
presenting our holistic model, we will try to expose the conceptual 
differences and limitations in explaining the Greek Paradox. 
1.2.2. The problem with semantics: actor vs. activity 
Since the Second World War and following the overthrow of Communism, 
organised crime is represented in the political, bureaucratic and media 
discourses as a high priority security problem. There is a general consensus 
amongst researchers (Maltz, 1976; Halstead, 1998: 1; Levi, 1998: 335; 
Cohen, 1977: 98), that most definitions of organised crime focus either on 
the characteristics of a group (structures of association with a focus on 
offenders), or on the characteristics of the activities (structures of activities 
with a focus on illicit markets). A recent cross-national review of sixty six 
(N=66) scholarly publications further support this claim, concluding that: 
‘one issue that runs as a common thread through the conceptual debate on 
organised crime is whether the focal concern should be on structures of 
activity or structures of association’ (Von Lampe et. al., 2006: 28). 
Since the 1950s, the debate over the definition and the causes of ‘organised 
crime’ has triggered a fruitful theoretical discussion, especially between 
American academics. In particular, there is an ongoing tension between two 
schools of thought or paradigms, each one placing a greater emphasis on the 
actor or the activity, respectively (Halstead, 1998; Von Lampe et al., 2006; 
Mastrofski and Potter, 1987; Paoli, 2003; Albanese, 2000: 412; Hagan, 
2006: 129-31).1 The point of departure for actor based models rests on the 
idea that the role of ‘foreign’ or ‘deviant’ organisation has a fundamental 
part in explaining organised crime (Ianni and Ianni, 1972; Albini, 1971, 
1 Within this broad division there are further tendencies between scholars whose theoretical 
models place a greater emphasis on the role of culture, economics, politics and 
organisation. 
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1975). Within this paradigm, official and government circles have been 
strong exponents of OC as an ‘alien conspiracy’, imported into a host 
society by criminal structures originating from foreign lands. 
Correspondingly, activity based models that focus on the structure of 
activities, maintain that organised crime is a product of market forces. This 
approach emphasizes the entrepreneurial nature of organised crime and 
looks closer at its economic determinants (Smith, 1994, 1980, 1978, 1975; 
Schelling, 1967; Gambetta, 1993). Although the debate now seems to have 
shifted towards anticipating threats and harms caused by OC, the actors 
versus activity dilemma, remains relevant. 
In addition, a number of scholars claim that the emergence and proliferation 
of OC definitions derive primarily from the semantic and normative 
difficulties involved in the process of labelling, categorising and 
distinguishing the nature or criminal behaviour as well as the severity of 
their punishment (Maltz, 1976: 339; Cressey, 1967: 106, Naylor, 1997: 2). 
According to Maltz (1976), the central problem in reaching to a commonly 
agreed definition is the way in which the idiom ‘organised crime’ has been 
used by the public and the professional and academic communities over the 
past years. The former mentioned academic notes that the word “crime” is 
most often associated with a specific behaviour or act. Besides, common 
sense suggests that 'organised crime' can refer to a specific set of behaviour 
or act. So, we could conclude that, “OC is a crime that is organized” (1976: 
339). However, this definition is a tautology, regarded in formal logic as 
empty, or vacuous of any factual or empirical content (Tomassi, 1999: 142). 
Accordingly, it has no further analytical utility and therefore cannot serve as 
an empirical definition (Schelling, 1984: 180, Maltz, 1994: 25, Allum, 
2006; Wright, 2006: 2-3). In order to eschew this tautology, ‘when we talk 
of organised crime in the generic sense we usually refer not to a set of 
behaviours but to an entity, a group of (unspecified) people, a disease, a 
bogeyman’ (Maltz, 1979: 339). This semantic problem has created tension, 
or an analytical dilemma, between the activities and the behaviours that 
should be defined as organised crime. 
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The characteristics of organised crime groups as recorded in the academic 
literature are shown in Table 1. The list below is indicative of the most 
commonly mentioned group characteristics included in ‘academic’ 
perspectives. Different legal systems have different characteristics that may 
define a criminal organisation. 
Table 1.1 Characteristics commonly cited in the English literature on OC 
Characteristics Number of Authors 
Organized hierarchy 15 
continuing 
Rational profit through 12 
crime 
Use of force or threat 11 
Corruption to maintain 11 
immunity 
Public demand for 6 
services 
Monopoly over particular 5 
market 
Restricted membership 3 
Non-ideological 3 
Specialization 3 
Code of Secrecy 3 
Extensive planning 2 
Source: Taken from Albanese, 2000: 412 
Subsequently, the characteristics of the activities that define ‘organised 
crime’ are subject to a continuous revision and expansion from criminal 
law. Cybercrime, for one, is one example. A cross-national survey produced 
a list of the activities most commonly discussed by researchers in relation to 
‘organised crime’. A summary of the illegal activities recorded in the 
literature is provided in Table 2. 
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Table 1.2 Most commonly cited crime activities in the literature 
Types of Crime N % 
Drugs 53 80.3 
Fraud: all 39 59.1 
Fraud: private funds (incl. credit cart fraud, investment fraud, 
insurance) 31 47 
Fraud: public funds (incl. health care fraud, VAT fraud, subsidy 
fraud) 24 36.4 
Extortion (incl. racketeering, kidnapping) 29 43.9 
Property crimes (incl. theft, burglary, robbery) 25 37.9 
Sex industry (incl. illegal prostitution, pimping, illegal 
pornography) 24 36.4 
Money laundering 23 34.8 
Cars (incl. theft, trafficking) 22 33.3 
Smuggling (incl. alcohol, cigarettes, fuel, gold, currency, 
gemstones) 22 33.3 
Human trafficking 21 31.8 
Arms 18 27.3 
Gambling 17 25.8 
Economic crime (excl. fraud and money laund., illegal labour, 
price fixing) 16 24.2 
Environment (incl. poaching, illegal waste management) 16 24.2 
Alien smuggling 13 19.7 
Counterfeiting 13 19.7 
Product piracy 9 13.6 
Fencing 8 12.1 
False documents/forgery 7 10.6 
Forgery 4 6.1 
Load sharking 4 6.1 
Art/cultural property 3 4.5 
Bootlegging 3 4.5 
Nuclear material 3 4.5 
Steroids/hormones 3 4.5 
Source: Lampe et al, 2006: 33-34. 
Consequently, it appears that among the academic literature, a definition of 
‘organised crime’, is very wide and captures a large number of activities and 
actors that may be involved in serious criminal activities. These activities 
and actors can be further expanded, including groups with political motives 
that nevertheless, participate in illegal activities. So, anything from white-
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collar crime to state organised crime to terrorism could fit under the 
umbrella term ‘organised crime’. 
As it was suggested in the previous section, organised crime is an 
essentially contested concept. The disputes that may arise over what 
consists organised crime and the opposite could not be solved by appeal to 
empirical evidence (Grey, 1997: 343). So the question remains: how can we 
best understand and study this phenomenon? The next section reviews the 
academic literature and offers a mental map of the major works based on the 
notion of metaphors. The logic behind our choice to categorise the literature 
according to metaphors is fairly simple. In our everyday life we use 
metaphors and analogies to explain, understand and gain new knowledge 
about complex ideas and processes. Here we will try to make sense of a 
fluid and contested concept such as “organised crime” by drawing 
metaphors with something more tangible, concrete and hopefully less 
contested concepts. 
1.3 Competing metaphors 
Organised crime can be interpreted through different prisms and theoretical 
lenses (Williams and Godson, 2002; Halstead, 1998; Mastrofski and Potter, 
1987; Potter, 1994). Overall, we have identified four core 
hypotheses/metaphors put forward by scholars to explain the various 
dimensions of organised crime and mafia phenomena. As it is demonstrated 
in Table 3, each thesis is composed by at least four different conceptual 
elements that are central in understanding organised crime: origin, structure, 
interaction and control. 
First, the weak state thesis, suggest that weak and/or failed states provide 
safe heavens for the emergence of mafia-like groups that supply goods and 
services that the state is not capable of providing. When the state cannot or 
is not willing to provide goods and services, criminal groups tent to fill that 
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vacuum replacing the role of the State. We use the ‘organised crime as a 
state’ metaphor to better understand this situation. 
Table 1.3 Overview of theoretical concepts and metaphors 
Theses Origin Structure Systemic Cooperation Systemic Conflict 
Metaphor 1 Transformation; State emancipation; 
Organised crime exchange; dispute Firms Parasitic formal control; law 























Capitalist economy Systems Fusion Political agenda and interests 
Source: Author’s own elaboration 
Second, the globalist thesis, stresses the benefits and opportunities created 
for transnational criminal groups by the ever-expanding global trade and 
ever-increasing free flow of capital, goods, ideas and people. Third, a more 
socio-cultural perspective is provided by the ‘dirty culture’ thesis. 
Communities that are often defined by a general tendency towards 
lawlessness, host within their value system traces of dirty cultural 
underpinnings that provide an important incubator for the growth of 
criminal groups. Critical dimensions of ‘dirty culture’ thesis appear to be the 
archaic codes and the normative structure of the social system that facilitate 
the emergence of patron-client relations, family and kinship ties, as well as 
informal exchange networks. Additionally, issues of trust and suspicion of 
outsiders, and other codes of secrecy and revenge, are important dimension 
of this thesis. Fourth, the ‘enemy within’ thesis is a critical approach that 
looks at esoteric threats vested in the political economy of the capitalist 
system. Rather than perceiving organised crime as an alien entity or 
phenomenon, scholars from this tradition often take note of the symbiotic 
links between legality and illegality, arguing that the real threat is from 
within the advanced capitalist systems and the nation state. The 
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understanding of the crimes of the powerful, such as, white-collar crime and 
state organised crime is of crucial importance within this research tradition.  
The review of the four theses will add the notion of metaphors that we think 
improves the explanatory power of each thesis. 
1.3.1 The ‘organised crime as a state’ metaphor 
Thomas Schelling’s (1967, 1984) approach to organised crime is considered 
by many scholars as the reference point in the subsequent development of 
the 'weak state' hypothesis (Allum and Sands, 2004: 134). The point of 
departure in Schelling’s analysis is the notion that organised crime, works 
on the same economic principles as legitimate enterprises. In particular, he 
argues that a distinction should be made between the large number of well-
organised criminal organisations that operate within any illegal market, and 
the real ‘organised crime’, composed by firms that seek to govern, control, 
monopolize and protect that economic structure of the underworld. Acting 
like ‘criminal government’, mafia groups attempt to exert a monopoly over 
the provision of illegal protection, within a given territory (see also: Hill, 
2003:8-10; Gambetta, 1993:31,226-8). It is worth noting that Fiorentini and 
Peltzman (1995) summarise the core assumptions in Schelling’s argument 
as follows: 
Schelling’s argument is built in two distinct logical steps. First, 
it is argued that the very notion of organised crime brings in 
itself an idea of ‘exclusivity, or to use a more focused term, [of] 
monopoly’ [...] the very core of the business of criminal 
organisation is to acquire a acquire a rule-making role in a given 
area (be it geographical or economic) so as to levy taxes and 
impose regulations over legitimate and/or illicit businesses [...] 
Second, the rule-making role necessarily requires the organised 
use of violence, either through threat or actions [...] to impose a 
monopoly of violence over a given area. 
(Fiorentini and Peltzman, 1995: 4) 
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Applying these economic principles to a broader and comparative empirical 
perspective, it has been argued that organised crime is more likely to 
develop in countries where the institutional environment is weak and 
corrupted. In such countries, criminal groupings or ‘firms’ will emerge to 
fill the ‘protection vacuum’ caused by the lack of an accountable 
hierarchical authority, and thereby establish favourable conditions for the 
subsequent development of serious organised crime (Thoumi, 1995; 
Gambeta, 1993; Varese, 2001; Hill, 2003; Tzvetkova, 2010). This thesis 
claims that the transition from Feudalism to Capitalism can be illustrated 
with the representative cases of Southern Italy, Japan and in parts of China. 
In particular, the model that Gambetta created to explain the Sicily mafia 
has been very influential. A major transformation of the economic structure 
in Sicily, at the begging of the 19th century, created the supply of two 
commodities, private property and manpower. Adding to this, the absence 
of an institutional framework to deal with dispute settlement on one hand, 
and the excessive supply of bravi on the other, created fertile market 
conditions for an organisation to surface and 'sell' protection. Additionally, 
this economic theory has gained further empirical support and strength with 
the subsequent fading of the Communist ideology in Europe. In the cases of 
Russia, Albania and Bulgaria the need for extra legal protection that was 
met by a supplying apparatus has shown that the economic theory seems to 
match with the available evidence (Varese, 2001; Tzvetkova, 2010). 
1.3.2 The ‘illicit enterprise’ metaphor 
By comparison, the illicit enterprise metaphor maintains that over the past 
years, the nature of mafias and organised crime has changed due to global 
changes in the political, economic and technological structures. 
Increasingly, organised crime is perceived as a lucrative global illicit 
enterprise, run by networked entrepreneurs who are motivated by both 
power and financial gains (Sterling, 1994; Freemantle, 1995; Saviano, 2007; 
Glenny, 2008). From this perspective, organised crime is often seen as ‘the 
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continuation of business through illegal means (Williams, 2006: 195). 
Moreover, the growth of global financial infrastructures that ‘consist of a 
finance system that links nation-states, huge banks, and their correspondents 
(affiliates and subsidiaries) with brokerage houses, stock markets, and 
investment and currency portfolios in a system that operates twenty-four 
hours a day’, provide more opportunities for mixing dirty and clean money 
(Kelly et al., 2005: 7). Likewise, 'ill' gotten profits can be circulated all over 
the planet via the global financial system that afterwards, can be used with 
impunity. In short, globalisation had a tremendous impact in both the 
activities and the structure of groups that now operate as horizontal 
networks (Williams, 1998). 
The nature of crime has changed significantly in a single 
generation. Just 20 years ago, crime was organized in a 
hierarchy of operations. It was “industrial” in that it contained 
the division of labour and the specialization of operations. This 
structure extended internationally, as organized crime mirrored 
the business world. Then, just as it happened in the business 
world, the vertical and horizontal hierarchies of organized crime 
dissolved into a large number of loosely connected networks. 
Each node within a network would be involved in any number 
of licit and illicit operations. Networked systems spanned the 
globe. An event in one place might have a significant impact on 
the other side of the world. In short, crime became globalized. 
Organized crime involves the illicit flow of goods and services 
in one direction and the flow of the proceeds of crime in the 
other. Just as the business world has benefited from 
globalization, so has organized crime. 
(Aguilar-Millan et al., 2008:42) 
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1.3.3 The ‘dirty culture’ metaphor 
According to Williams and Godson (2002), sociological explanations 
consider the cultural basis of organised crime and deal with the important 
notions of trust, bonding, social perceptions and attitudes in the formation of 
criminal networks. So, whereas the rational explanations proposed by the 
previous metaphors focus on the opportunities and market dynamics that 
empower criminal structures, socio-cultural explanations ‘focus on the 
grass-roots level, the cultural conditions that encourage and facilitate 
criminality, as well as the way in which crime is actually organized’ (2002: 
328). Traditional cultural systems, such as those found in the Balkans and in 
the greater Mediterranean region, that put certain ‘codes of honour’ like 
omerta, revenge and turf protection above the law, are more likely to 
facilitate the growth of criminal organisations. Besides, family ties and clan 
relationships as well as patron-client networks have been central in exposing 
the socio-cultural origins and manifestations of organised crime (Ianni and 
Ianni, 1979). Block (1998), who draws his analysis of the Mafia from this 
approach, explains: 
Formulated through patron-client cliques and coalitions, 
organised crime is a system composed of under- and upperworld 
individuals in complicated relations of reciprocity. [...] The 
historical development of organized crime as a social system is 
fairly well known. In the United States it was created from the 
entrepreneurial politics of the nineteenth century, which through 
patronage, controlled criminal justice institutions; from the 
actions and activities of industrial “Robber Barons” fearful of 
labor agitators; and from the successful agitations of 
Temperance groups. Professional criminals provided services 
for politicians, particularly at election time, and for Robber 
Barons as “agent provocateurs” and strikbreakers. They also 
manufactured and/or distributed commodities outlawed by 
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moral reformers. Naturally they received protection from 
criminal justice, and often a great deal of money in return. 
(Block, 1998: 4-5) 
In simple terms, the cultural approach challenges the theory that views OC 
as a market by demonstrating the analytical relevance of institutions, 
interpersonal networks, tradition and learning (Allum and Sanders, 2004; 
Allum, 2005). It is indicative that societies known to have mafias, also have 
unique esoteric cultural codes and values, such as kinship trust, vendetta, 
revenge and a much wider leniency towards lawlessness. However, the 
cultural model fails to take into account the role of power within society. In 
such cases, controlling organised crime comes from grassroots movements 
as well as from the wider civil society, and often necessitates pioneering 
educational and cultural projects that will foster reformations against these 
well established, archaic cultural codes. 
1.3.4 The ‘state as organised crime’ metaphor 
Contrary to the belief that organised crime and/or the mafia is an external 
threat to society, the ‘enemy within’ thesis states that the real organised 
crime is the very same social, political and economic system that has set the 
anti- organised crime agenda; that is to say, the nation-state. 
The nation state that has set the organized crime control agenda 
has a long history of protecting and sometimes even 
encouraging organized criminal activity […] the systematic 
criminal activity of the powerful and the respectable - or those 
on their way to power and respectability-in those societies, 
both ancient and early modern, that we usually associate with 
the centre of 'civilized' development. From earliest times, 
landlords, merchants, and holders of administrative and 
executive power have used the relative immunity that their 
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status gave them to engage in or sponsor activity that today 
would be described as organized crime. 
(Woodiwiss, 2001:6) 
A central theme in this theoretical perspective is the notion that with the 
development of capitalist economies a large number of organised crime 
activities, such as piracy, smuggling, extortion, fraud, labour slave and 
murder, are part of the history of virtually every nation and empire’. 
Moreover, Charles Tilly (1985), tracing back the history and development 
of the nation states, provides similar assumptions regarding the links 
between the state and organised crime. Tilly notes that ‘predation, coercion, 
piracy, banditry, and racketeering share a home with their upright cousins in 
responsible government’ (1985: 175). More specifically, he explains that: 
The uncertain, elastic line between "legitimate" and 
"illegitimate" violence appeared in the upper reaches of power. 
Early in the state-making process, many parties shared the right 
to use violence, its actual employment, or both at once. The 
long love-hate affair between aspiring state makers and pirates 
or bandits illustrates the division. "Behind piracy or the seas 
acted cities and city-states," writes Fernand Braudel of the 
sixteenth century. "Behind banditry, that terrestrial piracy, 
appeared the continual aid of lords." In times of war, indeed, 
the managers of full-fledged states often commissioned 
privateers, hired sometime bandits to raid them enemies, and 
encouraged their regular troops to take booty. In royal service, 
soldiers and sailors were often expected to provide for 
themselves by preying on the civilian population: 
commandeering, raping, looting, taking prizes. When 
demobilized, they commonly continued the same practices, but 
without the same royal protection; demobilized ships became 
pirate vessels, demobilized troops bandits. 
(Tilly, 1985: 173) 
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The 'enemy within' thesis shares indeed, many similarities with the 'weak 
state' and the 'dirty culture' theses. In the past, it seems that political and 
economic elites engaged in mafia-like activities and shared many of the 
'dirty' norms that are now perceived as backward and uncivil. The issue 
appears to be the protection of the political order, irrespectively of the 
ethical nature of that order. Moreover, Andreas and Nadelmann's (2006) 
historical evidence reveal that the formation of the first transnational 
policing networks, that began taking shape towards the second part of the 
nineteenth century in Europe, ‘focused principally on the transnational 
mobility of professional criminals and anarchists (and other political 
agitators)’ (p. 60). Therefore, what has now become a fight against the 
‘uncivil’ society seems to boil down to a new kind of war with strong 
political goals. 
Naylor (1995) argues that it is not clear that ‘organised crime’, in the form 
advocated by the state authorities, is the ‘most pressing criminal problem 
facing the West’ (p. 50). Nevertheless, he points out that the main threat 
against the social and economic fabric of western society may actually come 
from two different directions: white-collar crime and from a general 
deterioration of social attitudes. 
Still, as a social threat, the seriousness of current crime is not in 
question […]. However, what is in question is the precise nature 
of the threat and therefore the usefulness of some of the practical 
measures –criminalization of association, civil-law based asset 
forfeiture, expanded domestic intelligence, international 
paramilitary action ect – being advocated in many countries of 
the West in response to it. [...]. Granted sometimes ‘organized 
crime’ groups are involved in bank fraud, securities swindles 
and corporate embezzlement. But the vast majority of such 
instances, involving by far the greatest amount of financial 
losses, are the work of individuals or small groups with no 
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relationship whatsoever to traditional or emergent ‘organized 
crime’. Mob-run penny stock swindles are pittance in 
comparison to the take from huge insider-trading schemes […]. 
(Naylor, 1995:50-1) 
The core issue in the 'enemy within' thesis is the moral relativity with which 
scholars have approached issues of legality and illegality. There is a 
plethora of empirical evidence suggesting that the lines between legal and 
illegal practices are blurring (Heyman, 1999). 
However, are these explanations applicable in the case of Greece? The 
answer is ambivalent and contradictory. From one side, models that focus 
on the structure of organised crime, such as those presented here, are indeed 
relevant to the research question presented in the introduction of this thesis. 
Both the ‘dirty culture’ and the ‘enemy within’ (State as organised crime) 
theses have a tendency to view organised crime as a normal product of 
everyday life with strong political characteristics. Yet, they are both 
reductionist, in their scope and in their conception, of the human nature. 
Social interaction and organisation emerge from simple rules of behaviour 
related to symbolism, culture, norms, codes of conduct, and complex 
patterns of group behaviours, which cannot be condensed in their simple 
components in the same way a tree forest, cannot be reduced to a handful of 
seeds. There must be additional factors involved in the shaping of the final 
observed outcome that we define as ‘organised crime’. On the other hand, 
economic models subscribe to the same reductionist logic. There is no doubt 
that organised crime is driven by market forces created by structural 
contradictions, asymmetries and conflicts (Passas, 1993; 1994; 1998). It 
makes sense to argue that organised crime is becoming more globalised, as 
the everyday context has also been changing. However, besides the rational 
economic logic that people may or may not follow, there are additional rules 
that actors adopt, and follow mechanically in the everyday context. This 
leads us back to the role of culture and social structure that until now, the 
economic models seem not to have addressed adequately. The proposed 
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thesis requires a more dialectical and complex analytical framework. More 
specifically, in order to capture the complexity of the everyday context, 
ideational, esoteric, cultural drives as well as exoteric, materialistic and 
systemic forces should also be taken into account. In the next section, we 
provide a holistic model that we think represents best our view of organised 
crime as an everyday politicised phenomenon.  
1.4 A Holistic framework of analysis 
In our view, the lack of native organised crime in Greece constitutes a 
paradox. The aim of this project is to address this paradox and gain a better 
understanding of the phenomenon, both in Greece and in general. We do not 
attempt here to explicitly test an existing theory or evaluate an established 
definition, since research in Greece is practically non-existence. 
Nevertheless, there are some variables worth exploring in order to develop a 
meaningful answer to our research question (Diagram 1.1). 
First, systemic forces linked to the establishment, formation and 
development of the Greek states are considered. Such forces have the power 
to create and instigate conflicts within society that and are critical for 
exposing the origins of organised crime in the country. 
Second, emphasis is given to the role of structure, organisation and critical 
infrastructure that facilitates criminal activities. It is evident that despite the 
theoretical debate (or in the case of Greece the lack of it), organised crime is 
indeed ‘organised’. In order for a group of people to engage in activities 
broadly defined as ‘organised crime’, human resources, social, political and 
economic capital are required. In practical terms, we are seeking to identify 
the structures used by criminal groups and the nature of their interpersonal 
relations. 
Third, the role of culture is considered. We have already argued that any 
meaningful analysis of social action should take into consideration the role 
of social structure as a set of rules that people follow, often mechanically. In 
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our case, we are interested in those rules that might trigger conflicts within 
society, especially in relation to state formation. Thus, in order to explore 
the role of norms and culture we will search for evidence suggesting that 
OC is ‘acceptable’ within the wider social system. In particular, we will 
look for data suggesting that the economic, social and political systems are 
cooperating with groups defined by law, as criminal organisations. 
Moreover, we will search for evidence supporting the opposite side of the 
coin. Official records indicate that the law enforcement authorities prosecute 
some organised crime groups. Here, the question is why them and not 
others. 
Sociological research has shown that there is a positive correlation between 
social trust and deviant behaviour (Halpern, 2001). The issue of trust (or the 
lack of trust) has also been central to the development of organised crime 
theory (Gambetta, 1994; Veresse, 2005: 23, 187; Veresse, 2010; Denton and 
O’Malley, 1999; Von Lampe and Johansen, 2004; Kleemans and Van De 
Bunt, 1999; Maltz, 1976; 1994). Overall, lack of interpersonal trust and 
stagnation of social capital indicates a negative attitude towards society that 
in turn, may weaken the moral strength and compromise society's 
organisation against crime (Shaw and McKay, 1942). It could be that low 
levels of interpersonal and institutional trust, lead to low social capital, force 
people to act in accordance to their personal needs, motives and interests 
whilst employing all available harmful, anti-social, illegal means in order to 
achieve these individualistic ends. Societies and communities that 
experience this condition may tend to tolerate illegal and anti-social -l 
behaviour and therefore, undermine important mechanisms of informal 
social control. Hence, deviant behaviour and a general disregard of rules, 
laws and regulations might become the norm. Coleman (1998: 98) notes 
that: ‘Social capital is defined by its functions. It is not a single entity, but a 
variety of different entities with two elements in common: they all consist of 
some aspects of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of actors 
whether persons or corporate actors-within the structure.’ Additionally, trust 
is a significant element for social capital (Fukuyama, 1995; Dasgupta and 
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Serageldin, 1999). High levels of social trust indicate people's ability to 
work together on a voluntary basis in order to achieve common goals and 
objectives. By all means, interpersonal trust, presupposes trust towards 
formal institutions related to centres of power such as the police, judiciary, 
education system, and political institutions to name a few. The more trust 
among a group, the more likely to work together for the common good. 
Thus, a higher social capital, will predict a stronger organisation of society 
against crime. However, the human agency that is required for establishing 
a strong civil society and elevated interpersonal trust is triggered by people's 
perceptions, attitudes, culture and values. To put it simple, people should 
believe in the idea and have confidence in the outcomes that interpersonal 
trust might produce for the next generations. Additionally, in order to 
achieve this confidence, people should have confidence in outcomes 
produced by long run strategies and be characterized by patience and lack 
of short term goals. When the culture of a social system does not support 
this voluntaristic approach towards social organisation, it is very likely that 
the agency that brings into existence this reality will also be deficient. 
Diagram 1.1 A Holistic conceptual model 
Source: Author’s own elaboration 
34 1.5 Methodology and data 
1.5 Methodology and data 
The analytical model is applied into three different criminal 
systems/networks involving criminal groups that are based and operate 
mainly in Athens that nevertheless, have international contacts and 
networks. In order to gather data and evaluate the strength and the 
explanatory power of the existing theories of organised crime, the case 
study method was used. A number of factors were considered for selecting 
this method. In particular, the case study method allows the researcher to 
gather data from a variety of sources and throughout different historical 
periods (Yin, 2003). Given that organised crime is a very secretive and 
relatively new phenomenon, it is very difficult to apply most of the 
convenient sociological research methods. 
Also, Yin (2003) notes that a case study seems more appropriate a research 
strategy, in the case where ‘how or why questions are being posed, when the 
investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a 
contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context’ (p. 1). Indeed, 
organised crime is by definition a secret phenomenon that ‘precludes the use 
of many, if not all of the usual instruments for gathering data’ (Kelly, 1982: 
220). 
Additionally, an important element for the selection of the case method was 
its comparative nature. The case analysis allows the comparison between 
empirical evidence from various criminal and terrorist groups that 
consequently, lead to the development of stronger analytical tools and 
theories (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). However, it is widely acknowledged 
that the use of case studies in the social inquiry has serious limitations, 
linked to the selective nature of the examples (cases). Subsequently, there is 
an argument in relation to the extent to which a limited number of examples 
can produce sound conclusions when studying complex human affairs. In 
defence of the case study methodology, it has been argued that the 
application of case studies ‘may be epistemologically in harmony with the 
reader’s experience and thus to that person a natural basis for 
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generalization’ (Stake, 1978: 5). Since crime is a subjective phenomenon, 
constructed by the penal law, that reflects specific norms and ethics within a 
given legal-political system (Chambliss, 1979; Moskos, 2008), we believe 
that the reader's experience should also be taken into account when 
explanations are provided. In any case, this method has been widely used by 
many OC scholars (Potter, 1994; Chambliss, 1979; Thoumi, 1995; 
Gambeta, 1993; Varese, 2001; Hill, 2003;Tzvetkova, 2010; Allum, 2005). 
The criteria for selecting the case studies were the degree of visibility and 
exposure to the media and law enforcement interference. In Figure 1.2 we 
provide the rationale for selecting the cases. At the core of the figure the 
reader will find groups, networks and communities whose workings rarely 
appear in legal proceedings. In simple words the groups at the core have 
impunity from the law. As we move at the outer layers of the circles we 
encounter communities with a high level of exposure and visibility to both 
the penal law but also to the public and political discourse. 
Diagram 1.2 Cases and visibility circles 
Source: Author’s own elaboration 
The selection of Greece, as the country of investigation was based on the 
paradoxical nature of the lack of reported native organised crime, 
considering that many of the neighbouring countries have developed such 
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illegal groupings. Historically, Greece is a country with a strong tradition in 
liberal/radical thinking and activism where social struggles, revolution, 
anarchy and disobedience to western norms and authority are widespread. 
The geographical, economic and cultural connectivity of the country with 
many non-Western, as well as Western regions, are some of the key 
attributes that have supported our selection of this case study. Legg and 
Roberts (1997) explain, for example, that: 
The political history of Greece in the nineteenth century and 
much of the twentieth century-with “revolutions”, dynastic 
change, and general governmental instability- set the country 
apart from most other western European states. More recently, 
the military interlude of the late 1960s and early 1970s cast 
doubt on the contemporary classification of Greece as 
“European Country”. In fact, on many economic, social and 
political indicators during the 1960s and 1970s, Greece looked 
more like the Latin America states, many of which had also 
gained political independence in the early nineteenth century but 
remained relatively underdeveloped in economic terms. 
(Legg and Roberts, 1997: 3). 
Although Greece is a relatively small country (11 million), its geography 
and location in the Balkans and the Mediterranean has been a key factor in 
fostering multiculturalism, and ethnic and cultural diversity. The Ottoman 
rule, as well as the Greece’s Orthodox heritage had a detrimental effect on 
people’s political culture and identity. Greece was practically isolated from 
the most significant world movements such as the Renaissance, the 
Reformation, the Scientific Revolution, the Enlightenment and the French 
and Industrial Revolutions. It is worth noting that institutions such as 
localism, patronage networks, clientelistic relations, syndicalism and a 
general distrust against authority are very prominent characteristics of 
Greekness (Clogg, 2002: 3). Moreover, tax evasion and smuggling are, by 
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far, the most serious instances that illuminate the weakness of the Greek 
state to impose a cultural hegemony. Even to this regard, the laws and 
controlling mechanisms change each time the party in power changes. The 
view that organised criminality, such as social theft, piracy, smuggling and 
protection, is a form of primitive social movement by sub-state actors, has 
been adopted by a number of Greek social historians, particularly in the 
historical, socio-political and economic context of the previous century, 
indicating that Greece is a representative example (Dermentzopoulos, 2000: 
85; 2001; Damianakos, 2003: 68). 
Adding to this, the Greek educational system has always been struggling to 
achieve its goals and objectives. Synergies between political parties and 
teachers’ syndicalist organisation as well as a poor record of public funds 
have contributed, to almost yearly reforms and changes in the educational 
level, particularly in relation to university entry examinations. Nonetheless, 
Greek Universities have also been greatly affected from the constant 
political changes, revolutions and counter-revolutions on a political level. It 
could be argued, that even at the present times, the Greek state is struggling 
to control and exercise political influence over Universities. As a result, the 
higher educational system is defined by three core characteristics: over-
bureaucratization of activities, related to pressure and control from the 
state; competition in order to gain political merits and political capital rather 
than cultural and intellectual achievements; and introversion and isolation 
from its external environment (Mouzelis, 1997). Hence, the problem with 
the educational reform leads back to the issue of cultural norms and 
attitudes towards the clientalistic mentality of the public, cultivated by the 
political system itself. 
These historical, political and socio-cultural forces and the weakness of the 
Greek state to achieve cultural hegemony, have contributed greatly to the 
formation of various counter movements within the Greek society. Since, at 
least, the creation of the Greek state in 1821, two interlinked manifestations 
of such counter-hegemonic movements have captured the public's attention 
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and imagination: left wing terrorist groups and social theft 
(Dermentzopoulos, 2000; Damianakos, 2003). The line between crime and 
‘terrorism’ has never been clearly distinguishable. In particular, the theory 
that organised crime and terrorism are interlined phenomena has always 
been expressed by the political establishment. Furthermore, the way law-
makers have legislated on these two issues also demonstrates how strong the 
belief, that those two are a similar or overlapping phenomena, is (Allum 
and Kostakos, 2010; Xenakis, 2004. 
Per contra, the most recent presidential degrees against organised crime 
attempt to provide a more globalist perspective of the problem. The idea 
that organised crime is something new and imported by the forces of 
globalisation is evident in the following opening statement issues by the 
Greek Parliament, in support of the harmonisation of Greek law to 
international standards. 
It is now common knowledge that organised crime has become 
a major threat to our society. Over the past years, it is 
commonly accepted that criminality has undergone a 
qualitative change. The traditional image of the ‘common 
thief’ has been replaced by the organised perpetrator, the 
entrepreneurial-criminal; and crime has become from a chiefly 
individualist behaviour to a profitable enterprise with an 
organised structure and with additional people each one having 
responsibilities within a clear division of labour. These 
criminal organisations are also increasingly using advanced 
technological methods for the growth of their activities. 
Usually, these criminal organisations do not operate only with 
national borders, but engage in cross border activities and 
operate as transnational corporations. Organized crime is not 
only a challenge to its immediate victims, but it also 
undermines social cohesion, erodes institutions and undermines 
the rule of law especially when the perpetrators escape justice. 
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The control of this phenomenon has captured the interest of the 
international community […]. The pick of this international 
cooperation was the United Nations Declaration against 
Transnational Organized Crime, signed by 120 states in 
December 2000 in Palermo, Italy. 
(Hellenic Parliament, 2001: 1) 
The official Greek view on organised is in line with the globalist thesis, and 
focuses primarily on structured groups. That is to say, on groups with an 
organisation that can provide some degree of continuity and duration. 
Although, the issue of terrorism is not explicitly mentioned in the document, 
there has been some criticism, especially from the Communist party and 
other leftish parties, who voted against this decree, on the ground that it 
targets social movements. These issues in our view make the study of Greek 
organised crime exceptionally interesting, not to repeat that the existing 
literature on the topic is inexistent. 
1.6 Sources and data 
A key strength of the case-study method is the relative freedom to 
synthesize from various sources, using a range of data collection 
instruments (Yin, 2003). An exhaustive list of sources has been consulted 
for this thesis. Yet, where does information about organised crime come 
from? Are there any consequences and limitations involved? Kelly (1982: 
220) comments that most information about organised crime available to 
law enforcement agencies and academics, comes from two main sources: 
participants and eavesdropping devices. Here, we could probably expand 
this list by also considering the identity of the ‘participant’. Therefore, we 
could also identify sources of written or oral statements that derive from: 
family witnesses, victims, surveillance officers, unnamed informants, paid 
informants, turncoats, undercover officers, journalists, ethnographers. 
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There are a number of implications associated with these primary sources. 
First, the social scientist often relies on secondary, tertiary accounts or 
hearsay, while it is not permissible to perform independent checks on the 
validity and reliability of the source data. Furthermore, official sources have 
internal biases. Chambliss (1971), for instance, notes the bureaucratic, legal-
political and personal biases presented in police documents, distort the 
image of organised crime. Also, Moskos’ (2009) research is indicative of 
the degree to which official data can be altered depending on the way 
crime has been policed. Moreover, a vicious circle is created that maintains 
these official biases, since most social scientists draw their information from 
the same ‘primary’ and secondary sources (Kelly, 1982: 221; Chambliss, 
1971). Second, official investigations are anthropocentric (focus on crime 
and criminal) and therefore, often ignore the wider complicity of upper-
world structures and networks that are not directly visible from a limited 
investigation. In addition to that, there are time constrains, limited resources 
and political interference that may have an impact on the way cases of 
organised crime are portrayed by the authorities (Saxionis, 2006; Cressey, 
1967). 
For this study the following data collection techniques were consulted: 
Statistical indexes (since 1928), court files, police files, phone interception 
transcripts, participatory observation, interviews, surveys, election results 
archives, newspaper archives (since 1900), historical archives, official 
reports, special reports. Our additional sources include, journalistic 
accounts, leaked documents containing personal conversation from police 
surveillance, police reports and other special reports. Additionally, the 
author conducted a number of informal and unstructured interviews with 
actors from both sides of the law (see appendix 1 and bibliography). More 
specifically, interviews were conducted with police analysts and officers 
from all ranks who had first- hand knowledge on the three case studies 
examined. Furthermore, professionals, businessmen and civilians related to 
the shipping and/or night economy were also interviewed. Also, a number 
of field visits to a prison near Athens took place, in order to interview prison 
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guards and inmates. In addition, interviews were conducted with people 
who have been directly related with such criminal activities. Moreover,,  
interview material from such actors was also collected from open sources, 
such as personal blogs, publications, and publicised interviews (see 
appendix 1). 
Against this backdrop, a number of scholars turned to ethnography and used 
participatory observation as a method to gain access to fresh and original 
information from the ‘streets’. However, Kelly (1982) argues, that the 
application of such methodologies, may entail significant data manipulation, 
especially when statements about the design of the study is 'little more than 
laudable sentiments disguised in the language of science’ (p. 221). As a 
result, ideological and emotional biases become enveloped into the research 
effort. From this research, it was found that overt participant observation, 
especially in a relatively small capital, like Athens, is extremely challenging 
and poses security and ethical considerations. To begin with, the very notion 
that a criminal group will open its ranks to an external researcher seems 
contradictory. One will have to question the motives and the agenda of the 
criminal group that would allow for such collaboration. For instance, it 
could be the case that a criminal informant could use the researcher as a way 
of establishing more power and prestige. In any case, we need to consider 
what the ‘criminal’ could gain for talking and what he/she will tell 
(content). In short, there can be no agreement that the subject (i.e. criminal) 
participating in the research project would collaborate for ethical reasons 
only. Conversely, forming bonds of trust and friendship ties with criminal 
groups, could give power to the researcher, who is not only a player within a 
competitive academic market, but also a member of an organised crime 
network. Therefore, ethical and professional concerns should be examined. 
For instance, to what extent is the researcher willing to take a risk and 
facilitate or participate in criminal activities in order to gain or retain the 
trust of the group? This ethical issue should be considered in parallel with 
the ideological predisposition and emotions involved with ‘open air 
research’ (Kelly, 1982: 222). 
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From another point of view, covert observations seem more applicable for 
gaining an anecdotal perspective of the ‘inside’ reality of the matter. 
Spending time in places (bars, cafes, strip clubs, ghettos), where organised 
crime is visible, can indeed provide valuable information to the researcher. 
Additionally, informal conversations could provide, indirectly, fresh insight 
that could not emerge via conventional data gathering techniques. 
1.7 The organisation of the thesis 
The first part of the next chapter provides an overview of the historical 
evolution of what can be labelled as ‘organised crime’ phenomena in 
Greece, starting from the early days of the ancient Greek city-states to the 
rise and influence of the Ottoman Empire through the Greek region. 
Following that, the part of the chapter will investigate the contemporary 
political, economic and socio-cultural environments of Greece (Chapter 2). 
The following three chapters are case studies of criminal communities in 
Greece that exhibit different levels of visibility and social power. The first 
case study of a criminal community to be analysed in the thesis is the 
‘Godfathers of the night”. This is a castellation of a large number of sub-
groups that engage in a large number of night-life activities including 
murder, drugs, prostitution, extortion and smuggling (Chapter 3). Due to the 
nature of this community, we think that their visibility and social power is 
neither strong nor particularly low. The second community to be analysed, 
the 'Cocaine Barons', is composed mainly by actors from the shipping 
community. Those actors with high social power and low visibility are 
mainly involved in high-level cocaine smuggling to Greece, but also 
participate in other smuggling activities, including large bulk transportation 
of cocaine from Latin America to Europe (Chapter 4). The third 
community/network labelled the ‘Urban Guerrillas’ consists of 
revolutionary organisations (terrorist groups), traditionally with high 
visibility and low social power, that participate in bank robberies, theft, 
arsons, bombings and assassinations of local and foreign figures from the 
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political, intellectual and business establishment (Chapter 5). Consequently, 
an attempt to synthesise and discuss the empirical evidence will be made, 
particularly on the origins, the structure, interactions and the formal control 
of the groups examined (Chapter 6). Finally the concluding chapter will 
provide a short summery of the key findings of this project and will provide 
recommendations for future research (Chapter 7). 
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Chapter 2: Setting the scene:

culture, society and the State

Remove justice, and what are kingdoms but gangs of criminals 
on a large scale? What are criminal gangs but petty kingdoms? 
St. Augustine [1467] (2003): 139 
2.1 Introduction 
The key goal in this project is to expose and understand the political facet of 
organised crime in Greece. The explanation put forward in this thesis is that 
Greek organised crime emerges from the convergence of political, cultural 
and social forces. Drawing on a variety of empirical sources, ranging from 
historical documents to public surveys and official statistics, the aim of this 
chapter is to provide a more detailed examination of the key socio-political 
and economic factors relevant for understanding the nature and political 
aspects of OC in the country. In the first section, the chapter provides a 
historical background discussion of the evolution of the Greek State. 
Consequently, we map out the values of the Modern Greek cultural system, 
and expose the deviant aspect and ‘dirty’ codes of conduct that we believe 
are relevant for explaining the characteristics of native organised crime. In 
the conclusion of this chapter we will revisit the ‘everyday’ dimensions and 
‘Greekness’ organised crime that in our view apply in the case of Greece. 
2.2 The Greek State 
Organised crime is a political phenomenon and with this research we hope 
to expose the power relations that underpin organised crime in the case of 
Greece. A critical aspect in our explanation is that the formation, 
emancipation and development of the Greek State, instigates conflicts and 
opportunities for illegal activities. The weaker the ability of the State to 
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achieve control and monopolistic hegemony, the greater the opportunities 
and incentives of the people to cheat and deviate from ill-imposed norms. 
Moreover, the weakness of the Greek State does not only indicates that 
prohibition and control regimes will create opportunities and new criminal 
markets (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006), but it also suggests that public 
resources, deriving from taxation and external loans, will be misused for 
gaining personal political and economic benefits. For these reasons, the 
nature, structure and development of the state require significant attention. 
However, what is the origin of the Greek State? 
Tracing the origin of political organization in Greece entails a number of 
conceptual problems regarding the periodization of the history of the Greek 
State. Although the modern Greek State gained de jure sovereignty and 
recognition by the international community in the 1830s, the issue of 
‘historical continuity’ has puzzled scholars and political historians for a 
number of years (Clogg, 2002: 2-3). Is the modern Greek State a 
continuation of the ancient socio-political groupings that inhabited Hellas 
centuries ago? Where does the history of the Hellenic (Greek) state begin? 
A leading contemporary Greek historian, Kostantinos Paparrigopoulos, first 
sought to produce a systematic historiography, placing the birth of the 
modern Greek State within a single historical continuum, linking the 
ancient, medieval and modern periods (Clogg, 2002: 3). ‘The poleis of 
classical antiquity, the states of the Hellenistic period that were under  
strong Hellenic influence, the Byzantine Empire and the states that came out 
of this empire, are all examples of state constructions which Greek romantic 
historiography has included in its narrative of the uninterrupted history of 
the Greek nation (Prevelakis, 2000: 171). Thus, as Braudel (657) notes, ‘we 
must go far back in time, to the beginning of a long process of political 
evolution, before we can achieve a valid perspective on the political reality 
of contemporary times. So, how this uninterrupted historiography can help 
us make sense of the relationship between native organised crime and the 
Greek State? 
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Wees (2009) notes that a comparison between ancient and modern mafias 
‘may seem eccentric at first, but the parallels turn out to be striking’ (p. 1). 
He goes on to argue that such a comparison is particularly interesting ‘when 
one looks at Sicily and its mafia-dominated rural elites, as they emerged in 
the 1860s, and survived for about a century, until the rise of the urban drug 
trafficking nueva mafia in the 1960s. The similarities are striking. 
Both the early Greek and transitional Sicilian regimes controlled 
agricultural communities; both used force and intimidation to 
acquire land, livestock, and other resources; both exploited 
labour and credit with extreme severity and provoked repeated 
outbreaks of social unrest. The mafia analogy casts a bleak new 
light on the history of archaic Greece: it helps us to make sense 
of the forms of oppression alluded to by ancient sources, and to 
explain what caused the crises which led to coups d’etat by 
tyrants all over Greece, to calls for the redistribution of land in 
Sparta and the reforms of Solon in Athens.  
(Wees, 2009: 1) 
Hence, for Wees (2009), the mafia phenomenon is a modern analogy that 
can be used by historians to explain in a more thorough way the political 
processes and events described in ancient texts. In our case the opposite 
logic seems to be more relevant. The political history of the Hellenic City 
States can be used as the starting point for the analysis of archaic forms of 
governance and political organization. The key lesson and principles are 
embedded into the history of the Hellenic and subsequently the Greek state. 
This principle can be summarised as an ongoing struggle to achieve a 
hegemonic status in economic and social affairs and control over the 
monopoly of violence. Here, we will briefly examine three historical eras 
(Ancient, Ottoman, Modern) that, according to Greek historiographers, have 
an impact on the contemporary formation and development of the Greek 
political thinking as well as the political culture and mentality. 
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2.2.1 The Ancient era: City-states and predatory ‘gangs’ 
A brief examination of the pre-political, pre-state societies, which 
constitutes a large part of political history, shows that organised crime and 
anti-organised crime (i.e. efforts to police and control illegal practices by 
sovereign political archons, rulers and leaders), have been two 
complimentary and accepted methods for the accumulation of power, 
wealth, sovereignty, and hegemony. Thus, war, piracy, theft, violence, 
smuggling, plundering, vendettas and kidnappings all served this purpose 
(Tilly, 1985; Gallant, 1999: 25; Woodiwiss, 2001: 3; Braudel, 1995a, 
1995b, 2002). Subsequently, those groups who successfully applied OC as a 
method for achieving their political goals, sought to establish a legal-
political hegemony aiming at suppressing, punishing and setting up police 
deviant tactics that would tip the established order and challenge their 
authority, hegemony and sovereignty. 
This reading of the origin and history of the nation-state is a radical 
departure from the contemporary, polarized and 'schizophrenic' perception  
about the benevolent nature of the state and the malevolent role of the 
‘global uncivil society’ in modern society (Annan, 2004). There are, 
however, some critical accounts produced by political scientists and social 
historians in particular, that resistors’, by exposing the empirical and 
conceptual intersection between legality and illegality, debunk the myth of 
the state as ‘crime resistors’.. Networks of armed predators, smugglers, 
bandits, pirates, military entrepreneur and many other actors, defined by 
states as ‘outlaws’, are not antithetical to the formation of a world order 
where the nation-state is the principal organisational mode or our polity. On 
the contrary, their role in the origin, development, diffusion and triumph of 
capitalism has been paramount (Tilly, 1985; Gallant, 1999: 25). Looking at 
the history of nation states from this prism, Woodiwiss (2001) argues that 
organised crime: 
[Is] as old as the first systems of law and government and as 
international as trade. Piracy, banditry, forgery, fraud, and 
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trading in stolen or illegal goods and services are all ancient 
occupation that often involved the active participation of 
landowners, merchants, and government officials. More 
recently, corporate business interests, and public and private 
professionals, have also been actively involved in organized 
crime. 
(Woodiwiss, 2001: 3) 
Of course, tracing the history of the archaic forms of political and social 
agitation, such as organised crime, is a notoriously difficult task as it entails 
myriad definitional, conceptual, historical and technical difficulties 
(Hobsbawm, 1971: 1-5). What we know, with a high degree of certainty, is 
that organised crime is a modern neologism, used for the first time in the 
Western World during the nineteenth century and yet, even today has no 
fixed meaning (Woodiwiss, 2001: 3; Allum, 2004: 1-4; see Chapter 1). 
Official historical records indicate that earlier references to 
activities/behaviours, now interpreted as ‘organised crime’, are dated back 
to 1838 and can be found in communication reports between state officials, 
regarding activities of the mafia in Italy (Paoli, 2003: 33). The powerful role 
of the official state view/discourse in the framing of perceptions about 
organised crime in absolute or dichotomous terms (us vs. them, good vs. 
evil), has been the topic of numerous academic debates, articles and books 
(Sutherland, 1940, 1945; Albini, 1971; Ianni and Ianni, 1972; Block, 1980, 
1992; Block and Chambliss, date; Smith, 1975; 1985; Mastrofski and Potter, 
1987; Potter, 1994; Naylor, 1997). Existing research strongly indicates that 
conceptualizations of organised crime are determined by their context and 
emerge from within specific historical frames and political, economic and 
socio-cultural contexts. 
The term ‘organised crime’, is a construct of the political and economic 
organisation of society, and the major shaping force in this context is surely 
the dominance of nation-states as the primary unit for organisation of the 
polity (Allum and Kostakos, 2010). Organised crime is mostly linked with 
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deviant groups, illicit market activities, gangsters and thugs, usually of a 
foreign origin and culture and, to a lesser extent, with white collar workers 
or any other more powerful players of the system (Woodiwiss, 2001: 3-4; 
Block, 1998: 2-3; Mastrofski and Potter, 1987; Potter, 1994; Woodiwiss and 
Hobbs, 2009; Paoli 2002). Given that contemporary perceptions emerge in 
specific politico-ideological environments, we have reason to believe that 
such perceptions distort some of the historical manifestations of organised 
crime (Woodiwiss, 2001: 3). 
Ideas that are relative, such as law, order, disorder, legality and illegality, 
have become absolute and politicized, as well as subject to manipulation 
according to the interest they serve (Sutherland, 1983; Cressey, 1972; 
Chambliss, 1988b). Yet, from a historical perspective, Chambliss (1975b) 
argues that, ‘acts are defined as criminal because it is in the interest of the 
ruling class to so define them’ (p. 152). It is very interesting to note that, 
when comparing modern organised crime with the primitive pre-political 
state structures as they can be found in the ancient past, one comes across 
with some striking similarities. 
The environment captured in the narratives offered by classical writers such 
as Homer, Thucydides, Hesiod, and Herodotus, represent a world where 
mistrust, extortion, protection, revenge, plundering, cheating, honour, 
steeling, piracy, kidnap, violence and rape are prevalent and endemic. 
Moreover, a predominant theme in these writings is the struggle for the 
control of violence, security, policing, territories and sovereignty as well as 
the control of financial resources and global trade routes. The similarities 
between the Protostates of the Classical period and organised crime in 
modern times, can be attributed to the fact that both phenomena emerge in a 
hostile, uncertain and anarchic environment (Eckstein, 2006: 37-118; 
Kleemans and Van De Bunt, 1999). However, the fundamental difference 
between Protostates and organised crime is that, the latter emerges in a 
structured legal-political order founded by modern nation-states, reflecting 
the interest of the ruling class and expressed through state institutions. We 
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can, therefore, conclude that both organised crime and the state share a very 
intimate and endemic historical and political relationship that this study 
seeks  to understand. 
Classic texts are perhaps the first primary historical documents that make 
explicit reference to organised criminality. Although, the concept obviously 
did not exist at that time the same way it is interpreted today, we can 
nevertheless, identify groups and networks that engaged in criminal 
activities either against private/community property, or against 
state/church/royal property. The classical period (or classical era of classical 
antiquity or the Greco-Roman world), is a historical block capturing a long 
period of political, economic and cultural accomplishments in early history 
of civilizations and cantered in the wider Mediterranean sea (Braudel, 
2002). The Classical period was chosen because it represents a time where 
law and order exist in their natural conditions, or in a state of anarchy where 
no legal overarching authority had yet been established to manipulate the 
rules of the game. The nature of the system during that period is often called 
anarchic, due to the absence of an archon or authority to govern the 
interaction between different political units (Eckstein, 2006: 37-118). 
Although the environment during that era is characterised by anarchy, we 
can nevertheless note that the development of culture and civilization in the 
wider Mediterranean region, has given presidency to a number of political 
units or archons to impose their will upon others. If one looks closely at the 
interaction between these early proto-states, one will note the importance of 
concepts such as extortion in the form of paying tributes and taxes for 
protection, violence, plundering, revenge killings in pursuing the 
accumulation of economic and political capital (see Herodotus). By looking 
this historical frame of the appearance of the proto-state, , we can see how 
the concepts of legality and illegality interact, and what has the role of 
organised criminality been before, or in the process of developing 
contemporary norms of conduct. According to few International Relations 
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scholars, the condition of anarchy has the following implications in the 
relations between states: 
With many sovereign states, with no system of law enforceable 
among them, with each state judging its grievances and 
ambitions according to the dictates of its own reason or desire-
conflict, sometime leading to war, is bound to occur. To achieve 
a favourable outcome from such conflict a state has to rely on its 
own devices, the relative efficiency of which must be its 
constant concern. 
(Waltz, 2001: 159) 
The devices that Waltz refers to, do not only include a protection or a 
defence army that we often encounter in political history, but also control of 
illegal or shadow organisations that challenge and compete for power (either 
political or economic). The control and influence of organised crime, is a 
method or a tool used in the state formation process. 
Tracing the historical routes of piracy, De Souza (1999) explains how 
Classic historians such as Thucydides and Herodotus present the concept. 
Moreover, De Souza claims that the earliest records about piracy can be 
found preserved in the legends maintained by Greeks. According to the 
historical records of ancient Greeks, Minos, who ruled Crete, , was the first 
to acquire a navy. 
It might be argued that the earliest records of piracy are the 
legends preserved by the Greeks and Minos, the powerful ruler 
of Crete. Both Herodotus and Thucydides claim that Minos 
ruled the seas, and the later says of him: “It is likely that he 
cleared the sea of piracy as far as he was able, to improve his 
revenues” (Thuc., 1.4.). Herodotus also associates the Karians 
with Minos, saying that they were his subjects and that they 
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manned his ships, thus acquiring a reputation for prowess in war 
(Hdt., 1.171) 
(De Souza, 1999: 15) 
Organised criminality, orchestrated by competing poleis and rulers in the 
wider Mediterranean region, was mainly routed in maritime theft and 
robbery. This was, perhaps, because sea lines were the major trading routes 
of valuable goods. According to prehistoric sources, piracy has always 
existed in many shores of the Mediterranean Basin, a sea that provides good 
‘hunting grounds’ against the affluent trading links and commerce of the 
time (Semple, 1916: 134, 138). A number of factors facilitated the 
continuing manifestation of piracy in that region. First, due to the 
configuration of the basin with the numerous narrow strips, trade traffic was 
confined to few narrow predetermined routes. The fact that trade was 
confined to, and restricted to fixed lines, facilitated the attacks by 
malevolent groups and sea hunters. Therefore, pirates and sea robbers, who 
were experienced mariners, had the advantage of surprise and were able to 
plan, premeditate and execute their attacks in a controlled environment. Of a 
particular interest is the part of the sea named by the pirates as the ‘Golden 
Sea’. The 'Golden Sea', forms a straight line between Create and 
Peloponnesos, and it's where pirates used to attack the Oriental commerce 
for luxuries (Semple, 1916: 135). As noted by Thucydides, the implications 
of piracy and plundering had a tremendous biopolitical impact on the local 
populations.  
‘The old towns, on account of the great prevalence of piracy, 
were built away from the sea, whether on the islands or the 
continent, and still remain in their old sites. For the pirates used 
to plunder one another, and indeed, all coast populations 
whether seafaring or not’. 
(Thucydides, 1910: 4) 
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Piracy constituted both a political act, a method of primitive warfare with 
the aim to extend territorial and maritime sovereignty (Tai, 2003), and an 
act against economic competition and market interests (Semple, 1916). One 
scholar explains the interaction or symbiosis between politics, trade, 
business interest and piracy: 
It constituted [piracy] a lawless combination of naval aggression 
and maritime commerce, seizure and sale without the formality 
of purchase. The blend of piracy and trade among early 
Phoenicians, Greeks, and Etruscans belonged to a primitive, 
undeveloped period when warfare was chronic, when stranger 
meant enemy, and when buccaneers executed a crude form of 
navigation act designed to crush competition in the markets of 
the home sea. 
(Semple, 1916: 134) 
Looking at the bygone eras of piracy and archaic forms of organised 
deviance, it becomes apparent that the then existing, political and legal 
context lacks the modern institutions, norms, laws and regulations that 
would differentiate criminal from non-criminal activities. It will take many 
centuries, and the rise and fall of the Roman (Tai, 2003), Ottoman (Inalcik, 
1969) and nowadays, the American (Woodiwiss, 2001) Empires for legal 
norms on organised criminality to finally gain a universal appeal. Indeed, 
the absence of a hegemonic power that could define and impose the ‘rules 
of the game’, is a problem that contemporary historians are trying to 
decipher. 
In any case, what does it mean to talk of piracy in this period? 
The scanty written sources for the history of the Mediterranean 
in the second millennium BC, contain no information on of 
piracy, because there was no such concept. Warfare and piracy 
had not come to be differentiated in this early period. Ormerod, 
and others, have taken Egyptian and Near Eastern records which 
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speak of groups like the Lukka and the Sea Peoples, as evidence 
of piracy in the fourteenth, thirteenth and twelfth centuries BC. 
Yet, it seems to me that, there is no distinction between piracy 
and warfare in these records [...]. While it is tempting to 
associate these references of fighting at the sea with an attempt 
to suppress piracy in the Eastern Mediterranean, it seems to me 
that the most appropriate term for this activity is warfare. It 
might help if some motivation could be established for these 
conflicts, whether there were attempts to obtain territory or just 
to plunder, but in general, the sources are not full enough to 
analyse them in such a fashion. 
(De Souza, 1999: 16) 
The phenomenon of Piracy dates back to the ancient times, when the World 
System was still characterized by a condition of anarchy and no single 
power, civilization, religion or Empire was able to impose the rules of the 
game. Piracy can be seen as a great opportunity to gain power and 
influence. By definition, acts of piracy against merchant ships constituted 
attacks against the political and economic interest of enemy or competing 
power centres. As already noted by Thucydides at the beginning of the 
section, with the case of Captain Minos of Crete, efforts to control piracy 
gave rise to ancient forms of policing. Accordingly, in his historical 
analysis, Thucydides concludes that Minos employed naval power to 
suppress piracy and protect his political and economic interests of his 
promising Empire. With the changing 'status quo' and the demise of Minos 
power, piracy will see a revival. The first person known to us, by tradition, 
as having established a navy, is Minos. What Minos managed to do, is to 
make himself a master of what is now called the Mediterranean sea, and rule 
over the Cyclades, where he set up the first colonies, expelling the Carians 
and appointing his own sons as governors (Thucydides, 1910: 4, 8). This 
was an effective effort to decrease piracy in those waters and a necessary 
step in order to secure the revenues for his own use. 
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Again, the earliest sea-fight in history was between the 
Corinthians and Corcyraeans; this was about two hundred and 
sixty years ago, dating from the same time. Planted on an 
isthmus, Corinth had from time out of mind been a commercial 
emporium; as formerly almost all communication between the 
Hellenes within and without Peloponnese was carried on 
overland, and the Corinthian territory was the highway through 
which it travelled. She had consequently great money resources, 
as is shown by the epithet “wealthy” bestowed by the old poets 
on the place, and this enabled her, when traffic by sea became 
more common, to procure her navy and put down piracy; and as 
she could offer a mart for both branches of the trade, she 
acquired for herself all the power which a large revenue affords 
(Thucydides, 1910: 7) 
The uncertainty and threat posed by piracy against the major economic 
interest of the powers in the region, led to an increase in efforts to police the 
sea and control piracy networks. As Thucydides notes, the accumulation of 
wealth was increasingly leading to Tyrannical regimes. If we may say the 
first power centres to the development of dependence on this accumulation 
of wealth,, with modern state infrastructures, including a navy force, with 
the primary concern being the control of organised criminality, particularly 
in the sea. 
But as the power of Hellas grew, and the acquisition of wealth 
became more an object, the revenues of the states increasing, 
tyrannies were by their means established almost everywhere— 
the old form of government being hereditary monarchy with 
definite prerogatives—and Hellas began to fit out fleets and 
apply herself more closely to the sea. It is said that the 
Corinthians were the first to approach the modern style of naval 
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architecture, and that Corinth was the first place in Hellas where 
galleys were built 
(Thucydides, 1910: 7) 
The ancient origins of the Greek State date back to a period characterized  
by cultural and political progress, but also anarchy and lawlessness. The 
lack of proper institutional structures instigated power vacuums that were 
filled by autonomous self-help systems of governance, often based on 
family and kinship networks. The accumulation of power and wealth was 
accomplished mainly through violent, deceitful and illegitimate means 
(Wees, 2009: 1). Thus, the political balance was a fragile one, based 
predominately on the norms of illegality, violence and deception. 
2.2.2 The rise of territorial state in the age of Empires 
The prevalence of the city-state as the primary form of political organisation 
in the wider Mediterranean and Southern European periphery was 
challenged by a new centralized form of political organisation. The rise of 
the, so called, territorial State, larger and more powerful in manpower and 
resources from the autonomous city states, was a considerable political and 
structural change that tipped the balance of power in the region. 
By the fifteenth century, the city-state was already losing 
ground; first signs of the crisis could be detected in Italy during 
the early years of the century. In fifty years, the map of the 
Peninsula was entirely redrawn, to the advantage of some cities 
and the detriment of others. Meanwhile, a similar crisis was 
becoming apparent throughout the rest of the Mediterranean. 
Everywhere the city-state, precarious and narrow-based, stood 
revealed inadequate to perform the political and financial tasks 
now facing it. It represented a fragile form of government, 
doomed to extinction, as was strikingly demonstrated by the 
capture o Constantinople in 1453, the fall of Barcelona in 1472 
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and the collapse of Granada in 1492. It was becoming clear that 
only the rival of the city-state, the territorial state, rich in land 
and manpower, would in future be able to meet the expense of 
modern warfare; it could maintain paid armies and afford costly 
artillery; it was soon to indulge in the added extravagance of the 
full-scale naval wars. And its advance was long to be 
irreversible. 
(Braudel, 1995b: 657-8) 
The triumph of the large territorial state reshaped the nexus and symbiosis 
between legality and illegality. The rise of the Roman, and later on, the 
Ottoman Empire, along with the political influence and control over Greek 
populated territories, signals a shift from ‘anarchy’ to ‘order’. Therefore, 
territories that were previously ruled by local gangs, clans, kinship networks 
and warlords were falling increasingly under the rule and political influence 
of a centralized governmental structure. However, the transition to 
institutionalized politics, under the rule of the Empires, was linear. 
Networks and centres of power were reformed to accommodate the needs 
and support the interests of the new Order. Furthermore, the previously 
established linkages between legality and illegality continued to play a key 
political role. Yet, they were adapted to the new political environment. In 
fact, the new political order impost by Empires (especially by the Ottoman 
one), contributed greatly to the professionalization, empowerment and 
sophistication of illegal networks. For instance, patronage will become the 
norm in areas were the rule of law of the Empire could not be extended. 
Additionally, a critical factor in this evolution was the development of 
competition in a flourishing global economy, based on property rights 
protected by State law. As a consequence, organised crime now becomes 
more organised, whereas the stakes become greater.  
While the ostensible objective of maritime predation is 
economic gain, I will argue that maritime theft should also be 
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understood in the context of this antagonism between land and 
sea as competitive interaction between political interests that 
seek to territorialize the sea, and commercial interests that resist 
this project of territorialisation. Thus, maritime theft should be 
understood as contention not merely over material resources, but 
for what I will call political capital: political advantage that may 
be utilized either to reinforce or to challenge territorial order. 
(Tai, E.S. 2003: 1) 
It becomes clear that control of illegal practices, such as piracy, enters into 
the realm of power politics. Organised crime, including piracy and 
smuggling, could potentially weaken or, equally, strengthen the power and 
dominance of the State or of the Empire. As the previous commentator 
notes, organised theft, in the context of political antagonism can be seen as a 
form of political capital. Hence, controlling organised crime is not simply a 
policing task aiming at stopping or reducing a specific phenomenon. In this 
context, the problem of ‘control’ has a political connotation and refers to the 
notion of the power a group has, so as to influence and direct these 
activities for  its own political and economic benefit. 
The unique parameters that exposed the operation of 
contingency in the definition of medieval maritime theft lay in 
the conditions of its practice among the various lordships, civic 
republics, and monarchies that adapted the legal formulations of 
the Roman imperium and the classical civitas to claim title to 
polity in medieval Europe. On the one hand, medieval jurists 
echoed the formulations of classical Roman law in terming the 
pirate 'hostis humani generis': ("enemy to all mankind)". Statutes 
enacted in the Genoese and Venetian colonies of Pera and 
Cataro duplicated legislation promulgated at these maritime 
republics in assigning capital penalties to individuals who 
robbed indiscriminately at sea, those I will term pirates. The 
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piracy these sea-robbers practiced was distinct, however, from 
selective maritime theft, conducted at the behest of a sovereign 
polity against merchant shipping flying the standard of that 
monarch or civic republic's political and economic rivals. In 
medieval statutes, this practice is alternately termed ire ad 
pirraticam-—to sail or go as a pirate-—and ire in cursum-— 
going "in cursum," from which may be derived a verb, 
corsairing, and a noun for those who undertook it, corsairs. 
(Tai, E.S. 2003: 1-2) 
Modernity is often discussed, by contemporary historians, as a historical 
block defined by dramatic and catalytic transformation of the global 
economic system. In particular, the role of a state-cantered legal-political 
order becomes more evident. Chambliss (1989), describes the dramatic 
effect this transformation had, on what most people will now define as 
organised crime. 
During the period from 1600 to 1900, capitalism was becoming 
firmly established as the dominant economic system of the 
world. The essential determinant of a nation’s ability to 
industrialise and to protect its borders was the accumulation of 
capital. Not only was another nation’s wealth a threat to the 
autonomy of neighbouring states, one nation’s gain was 
invariably another’s loss. Piracy helped to equalize the balance 
and reduce the tendency toward the monopolisation of capital 
accumulation. The need for capital accumulation does not end 
with the emergence of capitalism; it continues so long as the 
economy and a nation’s military and economic strength depend 
on it. When piracy ceased to be a viable method for 
accumulating capital, other forms of illegality were employed. 
In today’s world, there is evidence that some small city-states in 
the Far East (especially in Indonesia) still pursue a policy of 
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supporting pirates and sharing in their profits. But piracy no 
longer plays a major role in state-organized crime; today, the 
role is filled by smuggling. 
(Chambliss ,1989: 188) 
From a chronological perspective, the establishment of criminal networks in 
Greece and the larger Southern and Eastern European peripheries date back 
to the development of trade links and trade liberalization (Hozic, 2006; 
Inalcik, 1969). Of special interest is that illicit organised activities, capable 
of generating astronomical profits, date back to the birth of the modern 
Capitalist global economy. Moreover, the rise of regional and global trade 
during the Ottoman era (1299-1922) created informal economies, black 
markets and illicit trade, that flourished mainly along the Balkan trading 
routes and the Mediterranean region. Historians, who have devoted 
considerable attention to analyzing the impact of the capitalist roots of the 
Ottoman Empire, state that protectionism, that underlined the principles of 
the Ottoman economy, resulted in the criminalization of various economic 
transactions. From this standpoint, free trade and exports of cereals, for 
instance, was forbidden and highly regulated in order to avoid speculation 
(Inalcik, 1969: 199). This policy, historians claim, had a significant effect 
on the social organisation of trade. Inalcik (1969) argues that three groups 
of merchants operated in the Ottoman economy. He explains that: 
In the mid-seventeenth century, the first of these were the 
shipmasters transporting cargoes in their own ships [...]. They 
were divided into the ‘Captains of the Black Sea’, numbering 
2000, and the ‘Captains of the Mediterranean’, numbering 3000. 
They were Muslims or Greeks. The second group were ship-
owners [...] who equipped ships for overseas trade [...]. There 
was a third group that chartered ships for the import of cereals. 
These, according to Evliya were wicked profiteers, who would 
buy cheaply the grain which the captains brought, store it, and 
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then at a times of shortage would release it onto the market little 
by little and so make huge profits. Profiteering and contraband 
deal we common, especially when the central governments was 
weak. The coast and islands of the Aegean were alive with 
smugglers, and here many Greek shipmasters made fortunes. 
(Inalcik, 1969:120) 
Greek merchants extended their economic interests to the financial and 
banking sector, often competing with the established Jews and Armenian 
networks. Accounts of Greek merchants and bankers, in cooperation with 
the local authorities (Pasha) in the Diaspora, often acquired wealth (and 
power) by charging ‘arbitrary and excessive prices’ and by dealing in 
foreign currencies at disproportionate rates. Noteworthy, Stoianovich (1960) 
cites a letter produced by an anonymous writer who criticized the Greek 
merchants that controlled the flow of maritime trade in some key locations. 
The anonymous writer says: 
Every day the Greeks, and especially those of Vidin, conjointly 
with the Pasha, make....a true monopoly of the passage of poorly 
laden boats and frequently spoiled goods, increasing their 
cargoes at will, overloading the boats. 
(Quoted in: Stoianovich, 1960: 296) 
By looking through the history of the past centuries, it can be noted that 
actors who engage in systematic accumulation of capital and wealth cannot 
be distinguished from those interested in power and politics. Similarly, 
agitators and criminals, either at land or sea, belong to the same social 
networks with political and economic elites. According to Stoivanovich 
(1960), there is an evolutionary spectrum of historical roles that eventually 
will lead to the formation of the modern Capitalist nation states. More 
specifically, Stoianovich (1960: 312) claims that Balkan merchants passed 
through five stages of professional affiliation: Muleteers, peddler, or sailors, 
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with brigandage as a side line; commission agents or forwarders with 
money-lending as a side line; independent merchants; bankers with politics 
and political administration as a side line; and statesmen with business as a 
side line (Graph 2.1). The interaction between outlaw criminal groups, such 
as bandits and pirates, and business and politics, has not yet received the 
proper historical attention, although the evolutionary spectrum seems to be a 
reoccurring historical manifestation. Criminals struggle to gain a legitimate 
front and protect their economic interests by entering in the political system 
and politicians are looking to establish linkages with criminals for their own 
political and economic objectives. 
Diagram 2.1 Historical evolution of the criminal-political nexuses. 
Source: author’s own elaboration after Stoianovich, 1960. 
Bacon (2007), for example, notes that early-organised crime groups from 
the Balkan, such as outlaws and bandits, are traditional. Such illegal groups 
have acted as a catalyst for a number of revolutions and rebellions against 
the Ottoman Empire and ‘certainly were facilitators in the formulation of 
the modern Balkan states’ (p. 79). Furthermore, arms trafficking and 
smuggling of contraband amongst Balkan states in support of the 
revolutionary movements, contributed to the fall of the Ottoman Empire 
(Bacon 2007). Something similar is recorded in Italy and, to a lesser extent, 
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in France and the United Kingdom (Hobsbawm, 1959). This is exactly the 
reason why the thesis looks closely at the Urban Guerrilla movement in 
Greece (see Chapter 5). 
2.2.3 The Modern Greek nation- state (1821-2010) 
In order to gain a better understanding of the present-day context in Greece, 
we first need to examine and explain the stages in which the country passed 
through, in the process of becoming what it is now. Here, we focus on 
historical patterns of social change, continuity, transformation and 
revolution, taking into consideration changes in the manifestation of 
organised criminality. In the following section, we are interested in the 
codes of conduct and the Greek culture that, in our opinion, emerged from 
the development of the Greek polity. At this point, the focus is placed upon 
existing historical evidence suggesting that this trend has been with us 
longer than it was previously thought. Moreover, it is as old, as the first 
formations of political independent and sovereign political unites. 
To begin with, the Modern Greek State, which is historically the first 
nation-state to gain independence from the Ottoman Empire, was 
established in 1821 (Clogg, 2002). Furthermore, geographically is situated 
at the far southern end of the Balkan peninsula, which in general terms, is 
the meeting point of the East with the West and the South with the North. 
This has been both a curse and a blessing. Whilst the Ottoman rule on the 
region created fertile conditions for the spread of trade, many regions 
(including parts of Greece) remained under-developed. The geography of 
the region with its chaotic mountain ranges and a complex system of rivers 
and valleys creates the impression of a land of contrasts. Referring to these 
characteristic features, Charles Woodspeaks of his impressions during his 
travel in the Peninsula: 
In places the whole country appears to be perfectly European. In 
others the traveller passes for miles across bare country [...]. 
Again, as one wends his way by road or path which from the 
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map would appear to be centres of importance are made up of 
only a few houses located in the valley or halfway up some 
forbidding hillside. Thus, the prevailing impression left upon 
one’s mind is that Turkish misrule has been responsible for the 
creation of a state of rack and ruin [...]. 
(Wood, 1916: 266) 
A combination of geographical and morphological features, along with the 
political and economic reality in Greece, especially during the Ottoman rule, 
had a significant affect on peoples’ mentality, norms, culture and way of 
life. As a result, the agrarian mountainous population is easily distinguished 
from those who lived in the valleys. Likewise, the habitants of the many 
islands all have different mentality. Moreover, over the past years and with 
the constantly changing political environment, ethnic minorities and mixed 
ethnic groups have appeared, chiefly in the northern borders, but also in 
other parts of the country. It is worth noting that some of these traditionally 
Christian Orthodox groups include, Vlachs, Arvanites, Pomaks, Cham 
Albanians, Macedo-Slavs, Aroumani and Sarakatsans (Schein, 1975). In 
addition, lack of satisfactory transportation and communication technologies 
had a great impact on social communication and interaction among the 
population. An attempt to shed more light on this will be made in the next 
chapters. However, it is important to address that, at this stage, the 
development of localism, the lack of effective communication, the 
insufficient amounts of social capital and the low levels of trust prevailed in 
the country. That may take some verification but, it highlights the historical 
reality that exists even in our time, with the establishment of large 
Metropolitan cities and towns throughout the country. Hence, organised 
crime, in its historical and contemporary forms evolved within this 
historical and social context. This observation, , in our view, demonstrates 
that we are dealing with a local phenomenon. 
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Theftocracy (the rule of thieves or klephts) is a historical era following the 
modern (de jure) establishment of the Greek State. The activities and roles 
played by traditional organised crime groups ranging from rural bandits, 
outlaw peasants, pirates, smugglers, anarchists, and plunders are not being 
marginalized in contemporary Greek historiography. Due to the leftish 
tradition, the general cultural and political norms of Greeks, or even due to 
the folklore influence of traditional criminality, the activities of what we 
may call ‘old school’ or traditional organised crime are well preserved, and 
constitute an integral part of Greek history and folklore tradition. However, 
social historians who have examined such groupings, instead of developing 
a linear model, opt for more a sporadic or static analysis of traditional 
crime groups. According to a number of Greek scholars who have 
systematically analysed traditional forms of criminality, the reason why 
such a historical continuity is not forthcoming lays in the diverge political 
roles that these groups have played in contemporary history. Whereas, 
klephts and armatoloi [rural bandits] became heroes in their struggle against 
the Ottoman Empire or in opposition to foreign occupying forces, others 
have remained more marginalized in their political significance. Addressing 
the issue of historical continuity, Damianakos notes: 
Nevertheless, we should not sidetrack from real social impact of 
this historical continuity. Although theft and banditry operated 
within similar socio-economic and political conditions that 
could guaranty the continuity of traditional deviance [laiki 
paranomia] their social history does not conclude, as it was the 
case with the klefts and armatoloi in a single national and/or 
social revolution. On the contrary it is signified by ambiguity 
which is manifested as a fluctuation between rebellious 
behaviour and symbiosis with local worthies [prouxodes] or 
politicians whom for their personal effort to control their rural 
political cliental, they needed bravous [bodyguards] who know 
their ‘job’ very well. 
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(Damianakos, 2003: 70) 
In his detailed analysis of social banditry, Hobsbawm, whose model seems 
to explain well the Greek historical record (see Dermentzopoulos 2000, 
2001: 85), remarks: 
For the crucial fact about the bandit’s social situation is its 
ambiguity. He is an outsider and a rebel, a poor man who 
refuses to accept the normal role of poverty, and establishes his 
freedom by means of the only resources within reach of the 
poor, strength, bravery, cunning and determination. This draws 
him close to the poor: he is one of them. It sets him in 
opposition to the hierarchy of power, wealth and influence: he is 
not one of them. Nothing will make a peasant brigand into a 
‘gentleman’, for in the societies in which bandits flourish the 
nobility and gentry are not recruited from the ranks. At the same 
time the bandit is, inevitably, drawn into the web of wealth and 
power, because, unlike other peasants, he acquires wealth and 
exerts power. He is ‘one of us’ who is constantly in the process 
of becoming associated with ‘them’. The more successful he is 
as a bandit, the more he is both a representative and champion of 
the poor and a part of the system of the rich. 
(Hobsbawm, 1969: 76) 
Nevertheless, this problem is not an issue in this case. On the contrary, if we 
focus on the structures that are in place since the Roman Empire and  
guarantee the continuity of banditry or theft or any ‘necessary evil’, and not 
on the agent per se, then we immediately recognize a very familiar story.  
All the Balkan Orthodox ethnic groups except the Serbs were 
subjected to Hellenization after the Ottoman conquest of the 
Balkans, although the Hellenization process did not attain 
intensive proportions until the seventeenth and eighteenth 
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centuries, when Greek became the principle Balkan language of 
commerce and culture. By becoming “Greek” one acquired 
higher social status. Men of wealth thus took pride in being 
called “Greek” and Orthodox Albanian, Vlach, Macedo-Slav, 
and Bulgarian merchants of the eighteenth century normally 
identified themselves as such. Class-conscious Slavic peasants 
also applied the term “Greek” to most merchants, particularly if 
they considered them rogues, although a portion of the Balkan 
merchant class was no doubt enlightened. 
(Stoianovic, 1960: 310-1) 
The Hellenization of the upper social strata of the non-Greek 
Balkan Orthodox peoples made possible the emergence of a 
single, relatively united, inter-Balkan merchant class, which was 
of Greek, Vlach, Macedo-Slav, and Bulgarian ethnic origin, but 
called itself and was known to others as “Greek”. The only 
important group of Balkan Orthodox merchants which partly or 
wholly rejected identification as “Greek” was the Serbs, and 
even they began to undergo Hellenization before the tables were 
turned in 1821 and the process of the de-Hellenization began. 
(Stoianovic, 1960: 311) 
The Greek revolution in 1820s signalled the end of the Ottoman rule and the 
emergence of the Greek State, as an autonomous and sovereign entity. 
However, clientalism and patronage will become a core institution 
following the independence of Greece. 
Patronage in Greek society is endemic and rooted in the pre-capitalist era 
when the Ottoman Empire, with its institutional arrangements, promoted 
this political culture in the country. The merchant clash was by all means, 
the most beneficiary group. This was the case due to the capital they had in 
their hands. Furthermore, the role of the Sultan (regional ruler) was 
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important in establishing ties and business contacts on a national and 
international level. 
Slavs from Cattaro (Kotor), Zara, Zagreb, Medrusa, and Ragusa, 
began to settle in Ancona as merchants during the second half of 
the fourteenth century. Fear of Turkish over-lordship, soon 
drove many more Slavs to Ancona, where they were in 
sufficient number, around the middle of the following century to 
from their own commune or Universitas Slavorum. The 
relentless competition of the immigrant Slavs, who were now 
trading with the mainland where they had come from, hurt or 
ruined many of the Italian merchants, but the municipality of 
Ancona failed in its attempt to expel them from the province in 
1487. In 1514, Ancona was forced to grand special privileges to 
Ottoman merchants, including Greeks from Arta, Janina, and 
Avlona […] Towards the middle of the century, about two 
hundred Greek trading houses were established in cosmopolitan 
Ancona. 
(Stoianovic, 1960: 237) 
Weingrod (1968: 379) notes that in the vocabulary of political science, 
patronage' refers to 'the ways in which party politicians distribute public 
jobs or special favours in exchange for electoral support’. Patronage and 
clientelism take various forms and shapes. Interestingly, Mavrogordatos 
(1997: 2) adopts a broader scope and contents that ‘traditional clientelism 
refers to interpersonal patron-client relations'. The typical structural 
elements and characteristic building blocks form the patron-client dyad, 
linking two individuals or, at most, the two nuclear families that they 
represent. Thus, out of many such blocks, networks and pyramids are 
constructed with individual politicians at their apex. The finest designed 
political system to not only to maintain, but also reproduce such relations, 
is particracy. Again, a core notion in this system of governance is role of 
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family ties and nepotism. Data on Greek ministers, whose fathers or other 
relatives are involved in politics, indicate the extent to which family ties 
play a role in gaining a strong political position in the government. 
Table 2.1 Ministers whose father or other relative was involved in politics 
(%) 
Familial 1843- 1878- 1910- 1936- 1944-1967 1967- 1974-
involvement 1878 1910 1936 1941 1974 2001 
(I) (II) 
None 22.5 41.7 63.7 67.6 62.6 47 39.8 
Parent 40.1 47.9 21.3 14.7 15.6 0 2.4 
Other 6.8 10.4 15 17.6 21.7 24 6.5 
relative 
Unknown 30.6 29 51.3 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
N 147 96 300 34 230 107 411 
Source: Sotiropoulos and Bourikos, 2002: 194, Table 9. [Original source: Legg, 1969, p. 
307, Table 12.5 and our own research. Postwar sample (I) covers the period 1946-1965. A 
dash signifies that no data are available. In the column 1843-1878, we have included 
participants in the War of Independence (1821-1827) in our item “Unknown” as this 
category had no meaning or equivalent in any historical period beyond this first one. There 
is no data for the cabinets of the military regime of 1967-1974. By “involved in politics”, 
we mean that someone had at least one term in public office, including mayorship, general 
secretariat and/or ministerial position. By “relative”, we mean other members of kin except 
parents]. 
Particracy is a distinct form of regime that moves away from 
parliamentarism and presidentialism. According to Calise (1994: 444), 
particracy is a ‘form of government where a party holds monopolistic 
control over the governmental process, just as presidents and parliaments 
are supposed to do within their own regimes’. Also, Giannaras (2002) takes 
note that the political regime in Greece, even today, can very well be 
defined as a particratic, or kommatokratia. He explains how particratic 
politics shape society: 
The multiparty system is no longer representative, parties 
become autonomous from civil society by establishing a 
condition of oligarchy. A ruthless oligarchy of uncontrollable 
‘steering centres’, which gain legitimacy in every election. In 
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order to ‘seize’ people's’ votes a well financed system build on 
modern marketing techniques and brain wash is employed with 
the aim to construct false impressions. In oligarchy, social and 
public life, serve primarily party interests. The Constitution is 
written, elected and revised by the parties in the absence of the 
people. The President of the country is elected by the parties 
(with shadow and secret deals). The same applies for the 
president of the High Courts and the top leadership of the 
Armed Forced. Trade unionism is partisan and serves the 
interests of the parties and not the interest of the workers. The 
local ‘autonomous’ authorities receive directions from the 
parties. Media are interwoven with parties. The appointment of 
University Deans and Directors of departments are decided in 
political circles. The steering committees of scientific groups, 
chambers, national theatres, research institutes and the civil 
community are becoming highly partisan [...]. The state does not 
serve the people, it serves the party in power [...]. Particracy is 
the root cause of today's capricious, anomic and corruption 
behaviour. 
(Giannaras, 2002: 7-8) 
There are numerous indicators of particratic politics that exist at all levels 
and aspects of the Greek society. Indeed, particracy has deep historical 
roots in the Greek society. Not only does it have the power to shape 
people's behaviour, but it has also the power to shape people's culture, 
norms, values and attitudes. Furthermore, it is in the interest of the party to 
promote a normative system that will not question or challenge the regime, 
or the norms that legitimize its presence. Over the past decades, the two-
party system has dominated the politics of the country, acting as a guarantor 
that preserves the particracy and looks after (directly or indirectly) the 
powerful groups. It's worth emphasizing that whenever the two-party system 
is challenged by external forces, solidarity remains untouched and a 
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common strategy to expel the newcomers is formed instead. . In early 2007, 
the political arena was dominated by numerous political scandals involving 
both political parties. As a response to this political crisis, the electorates 
chose to shift their support to a fresh candidate from the Left. Within a few 
months, the party gathered significant attention. Therefore, from this 
perspective, Greek culture is highly ideological. Taken as a whole, a number 
of normative and cultural codes surface from this regime. 
2.3 Greek culture 
The explanation put forward to account for the Greek paradox is that 
organised crime in Greece, is embedded into the everyday functioning of 
the society and polity. As shown in the previous section, the weakness of 
the Greek State, is a catalytic factor in explaining this structural condition. 
In addition, the role of culture, shaped by the historical path taken is 
another correlated factor. . The history of the Greek State, as taught from 
generation to generation, plays a central role in the formation of world 
views, assumptions and orientations of the public regarding the nature of 
politics and the political system in Greece (see: Inglehart, 1988). 
Therefore, what exactly are these deep-seated, long-held values, 
characteristic of the Greek society? How do these values create tolerance 
against illegal practices? 
Clogg (2002), points out that: ‘The capriciousness of Ottoman rule and the 
weakness of the idea of the rule of law helped to shape the underlying 
values of Greek society and to determine attitudes to the state and to 
authority that have persisted in the present’ (p. 3). As a result, informal 
networks of exchange and patron-client relations based on the, so called 
rousfeti2, are institutionalised practices. Adding to this, the Greek culture 
is also shaped heavily by progonoplexia3 (Clogg, 2002: 2). The discourses 
produced by the nouveau nationalist intelligencia, have placed emphasis 
2 The term rousfeti means a favour (see New York Times, 2010). 
3 Progonoplexia or ‘ancestoritis’ is the excessive worship of the ancestors (see Clogg, 
2002: 2) 
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on the ‘burden of antiquity’ and are often ‘locked' into a “great past” 
(Christou, 2006: 74). Consequently, even if the Greek nation-state 
emerged almost two millennia since the city states of Ancient Greece, the 
discourses produced by contemporary intellectual elites had a significant 
effect on the cultural life (i.e. schools, arts, literature), as well as the 
identity of the Greeks. The idea of autonomy of the city state remains 
alive in the Greek political imagination. Even now, Greek values, 
expressed through localism, create a sense of belonging in a State within 
the State. For instance, Spartans, Macedonians and Cretans have a strong 
tendency to regard their birth place as the only sovereign political unit that 
can, nevertheless, unite with ‘others‘ in defence of the motherland.  
Overall, one can notice that endemic and systemic lack of trust is creating 
an internal need and demand for the established self-help system. Finally, 
the Europeanization of the Greek nation-state and the rise of legalism have 
also their share of influence on existing values and political orientation. 
The impact of legalism in public attitudes can be well summarised in the 
phrase ‘if certain behaviour is legal, then it is also ethical’.  
It is well understood that measuring public attitudes towards social and 
political life is a valid source of information. Public surveys can provide a 
broad perspective on the core norms and values of the contemporary Greek 
cultural system. Consequently, while acknowledging the complexity of the 
matter, here, the focus is on perceptions of the general public on three 
aspects of public attitudes: interpersonal trust, institutional confidence and 
disregard for law. 
2.3.1 Trust: Interpersonal and Institutional 
Lack of trust within society is a significant source of instability that nurtures 
a wider tendency towards illegal practices. In Italy, for instance, as well as 
in Russia, endemic lack of trust between people and towards institutions, are 
seen as the core factors for the development of extra legal protection 
markets (Varese, 2010). In terms of interpersonal trust and confidence to 
         
       
73 Chapter 2: Setting the scene: culture, society and the State 
institutions, the situation in Greece is at least similar, if not worse, that in 
Italy and Russia in terms of interpersonal trust and confidence to 
institutions. Generally, lack of trust and low social capital, leads to the 
formation of a negative attitude towards society, that in turn may weaken 
moral strength and organisation against crimes (see Sutherland, 1924). 
Additionally, trust is a significant element for social capital (Fukuyama, 
1995; Dasgupta and Serageldin, 1999). High levels of interpersonal and 
institutional trust indicate an ability of people to work together on a 
voluntary basis in order to achieve common goals and objectives. The more 
trust a group has, the more likely to work together and develop social 
capital. In the same manner, the higher the social capital, the stronger the 
organisation of the system against crime is. Additionally, in an organised 
society where, nevertheless, people cannot trust each other or many of the 
public institutions, is expected that people will turn to a self-help system, as 
a reaction to the endemic cheating and lack of trust. Data from surveys on 
public values provide a significant source of information on such indicators.  
Table 2.2 Level of interpersonal trust 
Question: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted, or that you can’t be 
too careful in dealing with people? 
Values Categories N % 
1 most people can be trusted 305 21.4% 
2 cannot be too careful 1122 78.6% 
-5 other missing 0 
-4 question not asked 0 
-3 nap 0 
-2 na 37 
-1 dk 34 
Source: European values survey, 2008 
The first indicator to be examined is the level of interpersonal trust, public 
perception on cheating as well as people's attitudes towards institutions. 
Table 1 shows that 78.6 per cent of Greek respondents think that people 
cannot be trusted, and that one needs to be careful when dealing with others. 
In order to acquire a comparative perspective, we note that the same 
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numbers for Italy and Russia are 67.4% and 70.1%, respectively (European 
Values Survey, 1999; 2008).4 
Table 2.3 Compatriots cheating on state benefits 
Question: According to you, how many of your compatriots claim state 
benefits to which they are not entitled 
Values Categories N % 
1 almost all 156 14.2% 
2 many 575 52.2% 
3 some 332 30.1% 
4 almost none 39 3.5% 
-5 missing source unknown 0 
-4 qna 0 
-3 nap 0 
-2 na 5 
-1 dk 35 
Source: European Values Survey, 1999 
Table 2.4 Compatriots cheating on tax 
Question: According to you, how many of your compatriots cheat on tax if 
they have the chance 
Values Categories N % 
1 almost all 400 35.4% 
2 many 584 51.7% 
3 some 135 12.0% 
4 almost none 10 0.9% 
-5 missing source unknown 0 
-4 qna 0 
-3 nap 0 
-2 na 5 
-1 dk 8 
Source: European Values Survey, 1999 
Besides the issue of trust, it is very interesting to examine the perception of 
the Greek public towards their compatriots. As it can be seen in table 2.2, 
only 3.5 per cent of the respondents believe that none of their compatriots 
claim state benefits to which they are not entitled. The majority of the 
4 Data for Italy are from the 1999 survey and for Russia are from the 2008 survey 
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interviewees thinks that almost, all or many of the Greek citizens cheat 
when claiming state benefits. 
Similar results can be noted in table 2.3, when considering the perception of 
the Greek public towards the level of tax evasion in the country. A very 
small minority of 0.9 per cent of the participants think that none of their 
fellow compatriots will cheat on taxes if they have the chance. On the 
contrary, a staggering 87% believes that almost all, or many, of their 
companions will cheat given that they had the opportunity to do so. 
Moreover, a very large proportion of the Greek respondents, believes that 
their fellow citizens are willing, whenever possible, to pay cash for goods 
and services. Paying cash for services means that there is no paper trail and 
thus, the company is able to avoid paying taxes on the income generated 
from this transaction. Besides, paying in cash, even when buying cars or 
other valuable goods, is a widespread practice in Greece and apart from the 
issue of tax evasion, this practice facilitates money laundering from other 
illegal activities. 
Table 2.5 Compatriots paying cash as a strategy to avoid tax payments 
Question: According to you, how many of your compatriots are paying cash 
for services to avoid paying taxes 
Values Categories N % 
1 almost all 176 16.3% 
2 many 504 46.5% 
3 some 367 33.9% 
4 almost none 36 3.3% 
-5 missing source unknown 0 
-4 qna 0 
-3 nap 0 
-2 na 11 
-1 dk 48 
Source: European Values Survey, 1999 
The lack of interpersonal trust is also related to a much broader negative 
attitude, and low levels of confidence, towards the representative political 
institutions and vice versa. 
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Table 2.6 Confidence in Institutions (Greece) 
Institution A great deal Quite a lot Not very much None at all 
Armed forces 17.80 50.40 24.10 7.70 
Church 14.80 40.00 32.70 12.60 
Justice system 6.20 37.50 38.90 2.80 
The press 3.80 27.20 44.50 24.50 
Education system 3.60 25.20 48.60 22.60 
United nations (UN) 3.20 15.50 36.30 45.00 
The police 2.90 25.20 49.00 22.90 
European Union (EU) 2.9 22.6 38.3 36.3 
Parliament 2.80 21.50 48.10 27.60 
Health care system 2.70 23.10 47.10 27.10 
Major Companies 2.7 17.2 36 44.2 
Trade unions 1.70 12.40 48.40 37.50 
Social Security 1.5 17.3 49.8 31.3 
System 
Civil Service 1.40 12.90 48.40 37.30 
Nato 1.3 5.7 22.3 70.7 
Source: European Values Survey, 1999-2000 
In other words, it seems that lack of interpersonal trust and negative attitude 
towards state institutions, are interlined phenomena. In table 2, an overview 
of the main political and financial institutions is presented, including local, 
national and international organizations, responsible for performing vital 
functions within the modern society. Overall, scores for Greece appear to be 
slightly lower in comparison to other Southern European countries such as 
Italy, Spain and Portugal. Interestingly, we note that the Armed forces and 
the Orthodox Church score the highest levels of confidence by the Greek 
society. In terms of public confidence in national institutions in Greece, the 
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data show that trade unions, the police, the Parliament, the healthcare 
system, the social security system and the Civil Service, achieve the lowest 
percentages of public confidence. Moreover, economic and international 
institutions, such as multinational companies, the United Nations, and the 
European Union and Nato, have by far, the lowest levels of confidence 
among the Greek public. 
As already noted, our hypothesis assumes that lack of interpersonal and 
institutional trust could lead to the formation of an informal self-help 
system. This system could eventually become the source of social capital, 
able to facilitate social and economic exchange within the Greek society. 
From the existing available data, it can be seen that family may play such a 
role. Evidence strongly suggests that the role of the nuclear family is central 
in the Greek society. 
The role of the nuclear family is best highlighted when looking at the 
economic system and the organization of businesses in the country. In 
comparison to other European countries, available data on the economic 
organization of Greece show that 56.5 per cent of all registered companies 
are categorized as micro enterprises. Again, this trend is indicative of the 
critical role of the family in the socio-economic life of the country. Notably, 
countries like, Italy, Portugal, Cyprus and Spain micro enterprises are also 
the predominate structure of the economic organization. Nevertheless, it has 
been argued that the presence of a large number of small enterprises within 
a country, facilitates various illegal activities (Lavezzia, 2008; see also: 
Baken, 2005; Klima, Benen and Daele, 2009). 
2.3.2 Respect for the rule of law 
Although Greek society seems to lack high levels of interpersonal and 
institutional trust, the interest in politics is comparatively higher in people's 
agenda. Thus, we are not referring to a society alienated from public life. In 
a World Values Survey conducted in 1999, a 21.1% per cent of Greeks 
claimed to frequently discuss politics with their friends. This is double the 
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percentage recorded in other European countries like France, Italy, Portugal 
and the U.K (WVS, 1999). Additionally, in comparison to other Europeans, 
Greeks seems to be ready to take strong political action in order to gain 
immediate results through extreme political activism. This, perhaps, reflects 
high levels in positive self-perception and individuality (i.e. strong desire to 
be agents of change). For instance, in the same cross-national survey, 8.4% 
of French, 7.4% of Italians, 1.1% of Portuguese and 2.7%t of Spanish 
people, claimed to have occupied buildings or factories, whereas the 
percentage for Greeks was significantly higher, with a 26 per cent declaring 
to have undertaken political activism through the same method (WVS, 
1999). This trend represents the norms and orientation of the Greek and 
political culture. Furthermore, the result points to the willingness of a large 
proportion of the population to take up extreme political activism. In fact, 
tolerance to extreme political activism extends to activities that go beyond 
the occupation of public buildings. As it can be seen in Table 2.7, many 
respondents justify in some way or another-the use of extreme activities, 
including even political assassinations, for achieving radical political 
change. Again, when looking at public attitudes in Greece, the idea of self-
help and extra-legal orientations seems to be a repeating 'justifiable norm'. , 
In general, public perceptions towards terrorism in Greece, as recorded by 
the 2009 European values survey, indicate that the public has very strong 
tolerance, compared to any other European country. According to the 2007 
Europol report on terrorism in Europe, Greece accounted for 25 attacks in 
businesses, government buildings and private properties; almost half of the 
total terrorist attacks related to leftish groups in Europe (TE- SAT, 2007: 
13). 
Similarly, Table 2.8 shows that 12.3% of all respondents from Greece, who 
took part in the 2008 European Values Study, agree that terrorism can be a 
justifiable course of action under certain circumstances. This figure suggests 
a stronger tolerance towards anti-authoritarian ideology and political action 
that is indicative of the Greek cultural system. 
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Table 2.7 Justifying Political assassinations 
Question: Do you justify: political assassinations? Please tell me for each of 
the following statements, whether you think it can always be justified, never 
be justified, or something in between. 
Values Categories N % 
1 never 689 63.9% 
2 131 12.1% 
3 67 6.2% 
4 34 3.2% 
5 65 6.0% 
6 24 2.2% 
7 18 1.7% 
8 20 1.9% 
9 8 0.7% 
10 always 23 2.1% 
-5 missing source unknown 3 
-4 qna 0 
-3 nap 0 
-2 na 48 
-1 dk 12 
Source: European Value Survey, 2000 
Table 2.8 Public attitudes towards terrorism in 39 European countries 
Question: Terrorism is everyday news. In principle, most people are against 
it, but there is still room for differences of opinion. Which of these two 
statements do you tend to agree with? 
Country Ranking Under certain Terrorism must Neither 
Greece 
circumstances always be 
Terrorism is condemned 
86.90% 
justified 
1 12.30% 0.70% 
Finland 2 10.90% 80.30% 8.80% 
Romania 3 8.80% 89.30% 1.90% 
Northern 
Ireland 
4 8.40% 88.30% 3.40% 
Cyprus 5 8.20% 87.70% 4.10% 
Albania 6 7.70% 89.20% 3.10% 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
7 7.40% 91.20% 1.40% 
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Country Ranking Under certain Terrorism must Neither 
circumstances always be 
Terrorism is condemned 
justified 
Austria 8 7.30% 89.10% 3.60% 
Slovenia 9 7.30% 90.40% 2.30% 
Republic of 
Montenegro 
10 7.20% 90.50% 2.30% 
Armenia 11 7.00% 91.90% 1.00% 
Netherlands 12 6.80% 91.90% 1.20% 
Luxembourg 13 6.70% 90.80% 2.50% 
Estonia 14 6.50% 92.20% 1.30% 
Czech 
Republic 
15 6.20% 87.10% 6.80% 
Ireland 16 6.20% 83.90% 9.90% 
France 17 6.10% 93.20% 0.70% 
Germany 18 5.60% 91.60% 2.80% 
Switzerland 19 5.50% 90.90% 3.60% 
Latvia 20 5.30% 91.80% 2.90% 
Hungary 21 5.20% 93.80% 0.90% 
Kosovo 22 5.00% 92.50% 2.50% 
Rep Of 
Moldova 
23 5.00% 93.40% 1.60% 
Poland 24 5.00% 93.20% 1.80% 
Denmark 25 4.90% 93.30% 1.70% 
Belgium 26 4.70% 94.50% 0.80% 
Malta 27 4.20% 95.10% 0.70% 
Portugal 28 4.10% 93.00% 2.80% 
Georgia 29 3.70% 94.20% 2.10% 
Bulgaria 30 3.50% 95.70% 0.90% 
Ukraine 31 3.30% 95.50% 1.20% 
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Country Ranking Under certain Terrorism must Neither 
circumstances always be 
Terrorism is condemned 
justified 
Belarus 32 2.90% 95.60% 1.50% 
Lithuania 33 2.90% 93.50% 3.60% 
Russian 
Federation 
34 2.90% 95.50% 1.60% 
Serbia 35 2.90% 95.50% 1.60% 
Spain 36 2.70% 96.30% 1.00% 
Slovak 
Republic 
37 2.10% 95.30% 2.60% 
Azerbaijan 38 1.40% 91.00% 7.70% 
Cyprus 
Northern 
39 1.40% 96.70% 1.80% 
Source: World Values Survey 2008 
This ideological predisposition amongst a large part of the Greek society, 
does not only support the surfacing of grassroots revolutionary movements, 
such as the student movement that struggled against the Military 
dictatorship, but it may also nurture an informal social control and justice 
system, based on revenge and retribution. One of the leaders of the 
notorious 'November 17' (N17) terrorist group, who claims that the activities 
of the '17N' were acceptable to the public, notes: 
You will not have it your way; I will not enter into your logic. 
Our moral codes do not accept cooperation and snitching. I will 
not talk about my role in the activities of the Organisation 
[November17]. I will not attempt to convince you in which 
activities I had no involvement. I will not talk about my co-
defendants. This is my position and I will defend it regardless of 
the costs. The '17N' has consistently proclaimed to be an 
organisation composed by proletarian fighters. It emerged from 
the bowels of the people, to listen to their voices, promote and 
82 2.4 Conclusion 
serve their interests and the Organisation [17N] will answer only 
to the people. Here [in the court] I will only say few simple 
worlds about the activities of our Organisation [17N], addressed 
to those who believed in us, supported us morally, and who felt 
that we were a hope and a spark [...] a relief where justice was 
served, something you [the judges], will never be able to 
provide to the ordinary people. 
(Koufontinas, 2003; see also BBC Greece, 2003; Indimedia, 
2007) 
Finally, the idea that ‘power struggle’ is a key cultural code of the Greek 
normative system, can be understood when considering the opinions of 
Greek public regarding the idea of giving more power and respect to the 
authorities. Surprisingly, only 17% of the survey participants in Greece 
claim that it is a good thing to have greater respect for authority, when the 
average for all other countries is 62.4% (WVS, 1999).  
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter provided a background reading on the political and cultural 
context of the current case study, so that the reader can approach the 
empirical case studies from a ‘Greek’ point of view. It is acknowledged that 
any attempt to give a convincing explanation about the presence or absence 
of organised crime in a specific country, entails myriad methodological and 
cultural obstacles (Kostakos and Antonopoulos, 2010). This is because the 
analysis, examination and presentation of the empirical data on a specific 
case study, is the product of the author’s own interpretation of other 
people’s behaviour in an ‘I think-he-thought’ manner (Asbury, 1990: xiii). 
Therefore, the reader is asked, in the best-case scenario, to read between the 
lines, based on what he or she thinks the ‘criminal’ is thinking when 
behaving in a certain deviant manner. Thus, this chapter aimed to introduce 
the reader (and the writer) to the ‘mentality’ and way of thinking of the 
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average Greek citizen, so as to, hopefully, approximate the mentality and 
way of thinking of the agents (criminals), who are the protagonists of our 
case studies. 
In order to achieve this goal, we sought to examine the historical 
development of the Greek State focusing on Greek culture, values and 
attitudes of the present-day. To sum up, we identified and examined three 
key stages in the development of the Greek State. Starting from the 
autonomous city states of Ancient Greece, we moved on to emergence of 
the territorial State and the rise of the Ottoman Empire, followed by the 
development of the modern European Greek nation-state. Subsequently, we 
turned our attention on the Greek culture and the values of the Greek public. 
Through an analysis of the public values surveys, we attempted to isolate 
and expose a number of interesting cultural codes. Overall, we found that 
Greek society is characterized by endemic lack of interpersonal trust, low 
levels of confidence in political and economic institutions, and great 
suspicion towards outsiders. Nevertheless, we also noted that Greek society 
is not characterized by political apathy. On the contrary, we found strong 
evidence suggesting that Greeks rely heavily on the role of the nuclear 
family, have a very active interest towards political developments and 
tolerate even extreme political activism. Additionally, this lack of trust is 
partly complimented by other self-help informal institutions and informal 
network based on patron-client relations. Taken as a whole, we point out 
that that the Greek society exhibits strong inertia towards hierarchy and 
authority which, in our view, explains a much wider disregard for the rule of 
law and the State. Furthermore, by reviewing the political history of the 
country, the weakness of the Greek State and its struggle to maintain a 
hegemonic position within a given territory, appears to be a reoccurring 
theme. 
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‘Godfathers of the night’ is a label often attached to the leaders and 
members of criminal groups that participate in both legal and illicit 
activities such as protection rackets, related to the nocturnal community and 
economy. In this chapter, we present evidence on the origin, structure and 
systemic interaction of such groups in Athens. First, we provide a historical 
overview of the origin and development of this community over the past 
decades. Second, we present our findings vis-à-vis the structure of the 
contemporary criminal groups that have received media and law 
enforcement attention. Finally, an effort is made to expose the systemic 
interaction of this criminal community with the wider social, political and 
economic system in Greece. 
3.2 The Evolution of the Athenian Underworld 
As suggested earlier in the introduction, the history of urban organised 
crime in Athens is coterminous with the history of the lumpen underclass 
and it is regarded as a ‘by-product’ of the country's path to modernity and 
capitalism (Damianakos, 2003). Organised crime for the general public and 
for the majority of the press is mainly related to those illegal activities and 
dirty businesses conducted during the ‘night’ and/or related to the nocturnal 
community and market (thus the term Godfathers of the night). It is 
indicative that in Modern Greek language, the word ‘night’ (η νύχτα) is a 
synonymous to the term ‘underworld’. 
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Table 3.1 Distribution of population in Greece 
Census Urban % Semi % Rural % Total 
urban 
1928 1,913,937 31.1 899,466 14.5 3,374,281 54.4 6,204,684 
1940 2,411,647 32.8 1,086,079 14.8 3,847,134 52.4 7,344,860 
1951 2,879,994 37.7 1,030,188 14.8 3,622,619 47.5 7,632,801 
1961 3,628,105 43.3 1,085,856 12.9 3,674,592 43.8 8,388,533 
1971 4,667,489 53.2 1,019,421 11.6 3,081,731 35.2 8,768,641 
1981 5,659,528 58.1 1,125,547 11.6 2,955,342 30.3 9,740,417 
1991 6,038,981 58.9 1,318,427 12.8 2,902,492 28.3 10,259,900 
Source: Pagkakis (2001: 166) 
The origins of urban organised crime in Athens date back to the beginning 
of the 20th century, and run in parallel with the urbanisation and 
industrialisation of the country (see table 3.1). It is during these social, 
political and economic transformations that we also note the appearance of 
the first lumpen groupings (labelled by others as ‘criminal groups’) that 
distinguish themselves from the rest of the society (Damianakos, 2003: 
115). In this context, gambling and drug use are the two main illegal 
activities the lumpen class will mostly be stigmatised with. However, 
between the late 1970s and early 1980s, a period during which general 
levels of criminality in Greece also began to raise substantially, new forms 
of organised crime become more visible. Hence, these changes created the 
necessary conditions for the inevitable formation of a ‘social world’ that 
functions as an informal institution, and supported all the necessary 
activities required for the operation of illegal markets. Additionally, the 
growth of the night market and the leisure and entertaining industry, with 
hundreds of bouzoukia5, cafes, bars and clubs, along with the improving 
financial condition in Athens, played a key role in the organisation of 
criminal activities. The social world that came out would progressively 
5 Night clubs in Greece playing folklore music that feature the Greek lute. 
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become more organised and better ‘connected’ over the years. Moreover, it 
would capitalise on those conduct norms embedded in the Greek culture, 
traditions and activities, which the state has prohibited and/or controls: 
gambling, drugs, guns, protection and dispute settlement. 
3.2.1 Phase 1: Organised crime and the Lumpenproletariat 
Gambling and card playing were imported to Greece decades after the 
proliferation of gambling in China, during the Che Hon Dynasty in the 12th 
century, and the rest of the west in the 14th century. Yet, over the passage of 
time, they became an integral part of the leisure time of many middle-aged 
and elder men in Greece. 
One of the earliest references on the delusion and practice of card-playing 
since the creation of the Greek State, is found in an essay titled “The 
military life in Greece”, written by an anonymous author in 1856. In this 
essay, the author discusses the impact of prohibition and provides valuable 
insight on the enforcement of the law. Moreover, the author implies that the 
gendarmes would often put the money in their pocket, rather that taking 
possession of the money on behalf of the state.     
Gambling with money was banned in public places and cafes 
(kafenia). Gendarmes would often raid the cafes and confiscated 
the money of those who were betting or those who were holding 
money during the game. 
(Anonymous author cited in Katsimardos, 2008) 
Along with other leisure activities such as tavli (backgammon), cards have 
always being part of the Greek culture and tradition. Card playing in public 
spaces or in the kafenion, located in village centres, constitutes a key 
socialising process and an integral part of the everyday life routine. 
Moreover, the concept of ‘betting’, ‘winning’ and challenging other male 
peers reflects neatly the stereotypes attached to the traditional Greek 
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masculine identity. Besides, card playing, betting and gambling (with real or 
imaginary currency such as beans) is an extensively practiced custom for 
most Greek families during Christmas time and New Years Eve. 
It is widely accepted that the Greek Diaspora, mariners, travellers, 
merchants and traders, contributed greatly to the establishment and diffusion 
of gambling in the Greek society. The Greeks of the Diaspora, who were 
involved in card playing and gambling since as late back as in the mid 
sixteenth century, had a reputation of cheaters (Picture 3). It is indicative 
that in some French and English dictionaries of the 19th century, the 
meaning given to grec or Greek also includes a metaphorical meaning of 
‘rook or swindler’ (Roumpanis, 2008). Nevertheless, this custom will find it 
easy to access the Greek society, and especially in Athens that host the 
Pereus port, the largest port in Greece and the Balkans. 
Similarly, Ange Goudar’s book published in 1658, titled "L’histoire des 
Grecs, ou de Ceux qui Corrigent la Fortune au Jeu", provides a similar 
example. Suggesting that in a large proportion of the western European 
world, the adjective 'Greek' was perceived to be synonymous with the 
sinister and malevolent attributions of men who cheat, in order to make a 
fortune out of gambling. The following quote, from the introduction of this 
book, shows how the adjective (Greek) was used in that context, and the 
explicit semantic link between ‘Greek’ and the terms gambling, gang, 
network, establishment or even a mafia (une espéce de corps): 
I begin this story not about the origin of the cheats, because it 
would have taken it back to the creation of the world, but the 
establishment of hotels & G�vres of Soissons to Paris; this 
period was that of their consolidation and thereafter they will 
lent mutual help, and formed a sort of body. It is true that the 
Greeks had emerge a few years ago in France, and that the most 
had made considerable fortunes in the game [gambling]. 
(Goudar, 1658: iv) 
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In addition, according to the French magician Jean Eugène Robert-Houdin, 
the reputation of Greeks is attributed to a historical figure named Apoulos, a 
Royal Knight of Greek origin connected to the royal circles, who became 
wealthy playing card games. Robert-Houdin explains: 
After writing the title of this chapter it is, I believe, necessary to 
explain to the reader why the compatriots of Homer and Plato 
reputations is so compromising, and in what circumstances the 
word Greek has become in our language synonym for crook or 
swindler. Here are the facts: By the end of the reign of Louis 
XIV, a Knight of Greek origin, named Apoulos, was admitted to 
the court. He soon realized the game of profits so large, it 
eventually arouse suspicions about the nature of his good 
fortune. Despite his amazing skill, the Knight was caught 
cheating and sentenced to twenty years in the galleys. 
(Robert-Houdin, 1863: 17-18) 
Gambling and card playing in Greece gained extensive popularity in cafes, 
at the centre of rural villages, an image that even today constitutes a 
powerful stereotype of life in rural communities. With the course of 
urbanisation, this tradition would also become a key part in the Athenian 
way of living. Today, the kafenio, is a key social institution and a social 
space populated chiefly by middle age or older men. The prohibition and 
control of gambling, although contributed greatly to the financial revenues 
of the state, nevertheless, ignored the customs, culture; conduct norms and 
practices of a large part of the Greek population. As a result, prohibition 
regimes and laws became ineffective and people became tolerant to 
illegality and foul playing (Katsimardos, 2008). 
Historically, the first law to prohibit gambling was introduced in 1833. 
Since the establishment of the Greek state, the rationale for controlling 
gambling fluctuated between prohibition regimes based on moral grounds, 
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as well as tax collection tactics. Therefore, on one hand, the State attempts 
to put in place strict prohibition regimes for card playing and gambling in 
general. On the other hand, efforts to regulate, control and monopolise this 
market in order to raise taxes and income for the State, take place. However, 
it seems that legalisation or semi-legalisation of gambling for tax-collection 
purposes is, by far, the most prevalent norm practiced by the State 
(Katsimardos, 2008). Additionally, the popularity gambling received within 
Greek society, indicates that some basic market forces were created. 
Reputable individualists, who were involved in that market, will slowly 
make an appearance in the public discourse and receive media attention. 
Subsequently, competition between those who provided access to illegal 
games and entertainment are expected to increase. 
However, attempts to prohibit gambling have been met with little success, 
not to mention unpredictable consequences (Table 3.2). In the 31 of May 
1905, the Prime Minister of Greece, Thodoros Deligianis, was assassinated 
by a man working as a bouncer and lookout in an Athenian illegal gambling 
house (mparmpoutiera). The man, named Kostas Gerakakis, aged 35, 
stabbed the PM in the stomach, causing his death. According to various 
newspapers of that time, the motives for the political assassination were 
related to the prohibition of gambling. The following passage is an original 
conversation between the assassin and a journalist published in the 
newspaper 'Empros', days after the assassination of the Greek PM. 
Gerakakis. Do you wish to ask me anything? 
Journalist. Yes, was it only your idea to kill the Prime Minster, 
or you acted on behalf of someone else? 
Gerakakis. I acted on my own accord. 
Journalist. What did the PM do to you and you wanted him 
killed? 
Gerakakis. He is the source of all my misery. From the day he 
became involved with public affairs, he had constantly been 
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repositioning my father. In 1981, he fired him from the 
Customs. 
Journalist. And is this why you had to kill him? 
Gerakakis. I never liked him. Now, that he became Prime 
Minister, he prohibited gambling. I was initially betting at 
Mitseas’ place, he [Mitseas] was aware that I didn’t have much 
money to bet on, so he asked me to work in the door as a 
bouncer and that gave me 3-4 drachmas a night. And this is what 
I did, but now that they are combating gambling, Mitseas could 
not give me any more money and I couldn't provide for my 
family. 
(Empros, 1905: 2) 
The authorities speculated that the assassination was the work a much larger 
and organised group. The court transcripts of the group of people involved 
in the assassination of the Greek MP, that were subsequently published in 
the press, provide extensive information on the very first criminal networks 
involved in the gambling market as well as information on their wealth, 
power, protection rackets and turf wars. The subsequent, is a conversation 
between the Judge who investigated the murders of Deligianis and Aimilios 
Drakos, and the editor of the newspaper “Xronos”. The conversation shows 
that the Businessmen involved in Gambling had significant power and ties 
with the political establishment. Mitseas, who was charged in 1903, later on 
was also acquitted for murdering Mr. Kalfakakos (Empros, 22-3-1903: 2). 
-Did Mitseas ever send people to protect your offices?

-Yes. I went to see Mr.Mitseas because I wanted his support, as

Mr. Kalfakakos’s people threatened us. Indeed, Mitseas sent two 

men to escort the General Director and I to our houses.  





-I remember very well that he was not amongst those who came. 

But I cannot know if a third person [him] came in nighttime. 
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-Why did you not ask protection from the police but you went to 
ask help from the gambling places instead? 
-This depends on the perception of the General Director. 
Anyway, what is that the police can do? 
(Empros, 1906: 23; February: 2) 
The conflicts between gamblers, usually due to personal financial reasons 
and dispute settlement will consist a permanent feature in the Athenian 
society. Besides, resolving personal economic differences without the 
interference of the state authorities is also practiced today in various 
industries. In June 1912, Mitseas and Pantelakos had planned to meet in 
order to result their differences. When the tension between the men 
escalated, they started shooting at each other in the daylight. Moreover, a 
five years old boy, who happened to be close to that incident, was fatally 
wounded, triggering public and media outrage (Empros, 1912: 3). 








Source: National Greek Statistics Organisation 
3.2.2 Phase 2: Organised crime, the Athenian petty-
bourgeoisie and the new-rich 
The outbreak of illegal gambling, particularly among wealthy circles, 
provided fertile ground for the growth and the establishment of criminal 
networks in Athens (Table 3.2). The money involved in illegal gambling 
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was astronomical. In 1983, for example, the police confiscated 28.250.000 
Greece Drachmas (GRD). What is more, only in November of 1983, the 
police raided 71 gambling safe houses, arrested 482 individuals and 
confiscated 6.743.000 GRD 2.700 dollars and 300 marks. Considering that 
the basic wage in 1983 was about 21.000 GRD6, these numbers indicate that 
illegal gambling was becoming a thriving industry. Furthermore, the 
political stakes were also high. A large portion of those who practiced 
systematic illegal gambling, were well connected and respectable 
businessmen, traders, merchants, actors and singers. 
To provide an example, in April 1981, the police raided the offices of the 
Cultural Association of Manufacturers. About 28 individuals were arrested 
and the police confiscated 454,850 GRD. According to press reports, the 
offices of the Association that was located in Palio Psixiko, a suburb of the 
Athenian petty bourgeoisie, were transformed into a ‘fortress’, with bars 
behinds doors as a protection from external raids  (Rizospastis, 1981a). 
Consequently, the prohibition of gambling resulted in the growth of an 
illegal market, where some kind of protection was needed. In a way, that 
illegal industry created the need for a ‘social world’ that would provide such 
protection. The social network that was materialize to provide ‘protection’ 
for a market that clearly was still alive, despite the prohibition by the Greek 
government, was initially composed by carrier criminals, the police, 
businessmen and club owners. National and local politicians remain 
invisible, albeit logic suggests the contrary. 
Police officers involved in the fight against illegal gambling, will often 
request from the owners of the cafes where gambling was taking place, to 
provide them with small, ‘gifts’ and ‘donations’, in order to postpone their 
inspections. For instance, in 1983 a high-ranking officer was arrested and 
prosecuted for requesting 40.000 GRD from a cafe owner for this reason 
(Rizospastis, 1983a). Moreover, another case shows the role of club owners 
6 This was the lowest minimum monthly wage for skilled workers with less than 1 year 
working experiences and the maximum minimum monthly wage did not exceeded 26.281 
GRD per month (For more details see GSEE, 1983: 3). 
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and businessmen in the illicit gambling. In 1981, the police raided a Vila in 
Palio Faliro, an affluent high-class area of Athens, owned by two well-
known club owners (Rizospastis, 1981b). Two years after this raid, in 1983, 
the police raided again the Vila and arrested a number of people, including a 
businessman and a couple of traders, confiscating 1.128.400 GRD 
(Rizospastis, 1983b). 
The improving organisation and sophistication of the first gambling 
networks can also be seen in the first manifestations of violence between 
rival groups that protected gambling houses, and other illegal enterprises. In 
1982, for example, a bomb exploded destroying a gambling house and the 
press reported that this was an act of dispute settlement between figures of 
the Athenian underworld (Rizospastis, 1982). And in 1983, the reported an 
incident were a bouncer (bravos) murdered a “godfather” (Rizospastis, 
1983c). Along with the bars and cafes that provided a safe place for 
gambling, small business establishments with arcades and pools attracted 
the interest of the majority of the youth. It is from within these semi-legal 
enterprises that the first serious and visible crime cabals will emerge 
(Informant 8, 2010). 
3.2.3 Phase 3: The ‘control’ of the night 
The third phase in the development of the urban organised crime in Athens, 
is marked by a struggle to control and dominate the ‘night’ between 
criminal groups, as well as between criminal groups and the State. It is 
worth mentioning that membership, social and economic context as well as 
actors involved in this community, had increased. Thus, the new crowd that 
is now involved in the nigh market and the improving economic conditions 
and opportunities, has played a fundamental role in the transformation of the 
political role and the significance of the ‘night’. 
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3.3 The case of the Haidari cabal 
The goal in this section is to have a closer look at the organisation and 
structure of the Haidari cabal. The Haidari cabal is a group that engaged in 
various illegal activities in the area of Haidari, in the western parts of 
Athens. The group's activities have attracted much media attention. 
Additionally, we will examine how the Athenian underworld is organised, 
by focusing on the structure and organisation of the community (macro 
level), as manifested by the nature of the relations among its groups as well 
as, on a group level, by analyzing the inner group dynamics and the 
interpersonal relations of its members. 
3.3.1 Macro level: The night 
Organised crime in Athens and, Greece in general, is strongly associated 
with groups that provide ‘protection’. Most of the criminal groups that 
mainly engage in protection related activities in Athens have strong local 
characteristics and tend to operate within specific territorial zones of 
interest. For instance, one gang member, when asked in the court to 
comment on the popularity and power of an alleged gang leader, said: ‘he is 
a ‘king’; half of the Haidari is owned by him’ (3765/2006: 144). 
However, police sources and other empirical evidence suggest that the so 
called ‘turfs’ of the criminal groups should be considered as ‘zones of 
influence’ rather than be rigidly divided by territory amongst the groups 
(Eleytherotipia, 1996). Still, territories are neither fixed nor rigidly protected 
turfs where specific gangs have a ‘monopoly of power’ and sovereignty. 
Thus, although the local professional, business, and social ties do play a role 
in defining the scope and operational arena of a group, we can observe that 
groups tend to exercise relative sovereignty instead of absolute sovereignty 
over a given territory. Special police reports and information licked to the 
Greek press indicate that so far, there are twenty known groups with more 
than 314 people as regular members (Eleytherotipia, 1996). Furthermore, 
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the geographical influence of these groups is often located in more than one 
territory. Some groups, for example, in the wintertime will operate in one 
area while in the summer time they move to another. Given that a 
significant number of well established nightlife bars and clubs brands 
operate close to the centre of Athens in the winter, during the summer they 
migrate to the southern parts of Athens, closer to the coast line, to a great 
extent,  this mobility is required (3765/2006). 
Additionally, there is no conclusive evidence suggesting the existence of an 
overarching ruling body that monopolizes the night in Athens. Nevertheless, 
there have been some media reports, citing confidential police reports, that 
suggest that in two occasions, the leaders of criminal groups held meetings 
to discuss their zones of influence (Lampropoulos, 2000; Eleytherotipia, 
1996). Besides, sensational media reports, supporting the idea that 
protection is monopolised by a single market, are fairly weak. For example, 
John who has been involved in extortion rackets in Athens, states: ‘The 
actual number of the groups is not known. Besides, anyone can form a 
group’ (Nesfyge and Mpailis, 2008). 
Based on numerous media articles, citing special (secret) police reports and 
interviews with law enforcement officers working on extortionist networks, 
the following zones of influence can be identified. 
West Athens: This is a region that has received considerable media and 
police attention. Most of the leaders of the groups of Haidari (and Eleysina) 
are imprisoned or killed. Moreover, it is believed that there are few 
remaining businesses that continue to pay money for protection, mainly 
because of the reputation of the established criminal groups. Also, it appears 
that the main group leaders have now turned to more profitable, and 
perhaps, less risky and visible legal and illegal activities and are no longer 
involved in the ‘night’. 
North West Athens: The group that operates in this zone is very active in 
the prostitution market, mainly at the centre of Athens. The leaders appear 
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to be ruthless and along with protection rackets, they are particularly 
interested in providing escort services through newspaper advertisements. 
Bournazi and Psiri: The present leader of this group used to be the left 
hand of a renowned criminal figure, who is now dead. Newspaper sources 
do not reveal the identities of the members, but claim that few years ago, 
more than 12 members were exposed by police operations. 
Centre of Athens (Kypseli, Sepolia, Peristeri, Kolonos): The only group 
that provides protection in that region is headed by a bouncer, described by 
media reports, as one of the last remaining godfathers who exercise control 
in that region. Although the centre of Athens is a hot spot for various OC 
related activities, mainly prostitution and drugs, it seems that those markets 
are not controlled or protected by any single group. 
East Athens (Paiania-Spata-Markopoulo-Pallini): Two brothers compose 
the core leadership of a gang that is active in that zone. In the past, the 
police investigated them for arms possession and extortion. 
South-Centre Athens: 1. The groups that engage in protection rackets in 
the wider Piraeus region are thought to be chiefly controlled by four 
individuals. 
3.3.2 Group level: Interpersonal relations and trust 
The structure of the underworld groups in Athens is disorganised and lacks 
hierarchy. Groups are easily dissolved and new partnerships are formed. 
There is a general fluidity in the number, size and scope of the native OC 
groups in Athens. Nevertheless, the activities in question require some form 
of automaticity, organisation and coordination. Therefore, perhaps this is 
why groups tend to develop atypical hierarchical relations among them. 
Following the directions from the leading core of the group, the 
members were acting as collectors and participated in threats 
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against businessmen within the location they were controlling. 
The leaders of each group that controlled the businesses in the 
regions of Haidari and Eleysina were A.L and I.S. The modus 
operandi of each member was indicated by V.S. The protection 
rackets generated from each establishment 30.000 to 50.000 
GDR per week and V.S was the final recipient. 
(3765/2006: 174) 
An informant who owned various bars and other businesses and had ties 
with various criminal figures expressed the same view. When he was 
questioned on the nature and structure of the criminal groups in Athens, he 
also noted that having an accurate estimate is next to impossible: 
There are what you call ‘bosses’, who are wealthy people and 
have significant power in the community. These people have 
their crews who take care of ‘business’. If there is information 
that someone is looking for a crew, the leader of a crew will go 
and ask them if they would like to work together. It’s not what 
you see in the movies, things are more fluid and partnerships 
break up very easily. 
(Informant 6., 2006) 
The ideal scenario is to have your own contacts, then, no one 
will bother you. ‘Good’ contacts though...with the police, for 
example. It will cost you much less. Otherwise, you have to 
choose between two alternatives. Either you will pay protection, 
so you can go on with your business without problems...or if 
you make good money, you can employ few guys as stuff, and 
form your own crew. You will then have to spread it to the word 
so others will know; if they decide to come for protection 
money, there will be fighting and shooting. 
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(Eleytherotipia, 1996) 
A former military officer, who had opened a bar around the Piraeus area, 
expressed a similar view. When he was asked about protection money, he 
replied: 
Yes, they had come for money, but they soon found out that I 
was in the military, and they were not very persistent. 
Eventually everyone knew that the ‘pilot’ owns this bar, so it 
was kind of outside their scope. I was very well connected and 
had powerful friends, even before I opened this bar. 
(Informant 4, 2007) 
This view that organised crime in Athens lacks durability, that is, people do 
not adhere to a overarching hierarchy for prolonged periods of time, can 
also be collaborated with the view of an incarcerate professional criminal, 
interviewed by a researcher in the Koridallos Prisons of Athens. 
How did you become involved with the ‘night’? 
It was my bad luck. One evening when I was 19, a friend of 
mine and I decided to go somewhere for a drink [...]. Even back 
then, I was well connected but I was not using (alcohol and 
drug). Anyway, the bouncers of that place would not allow us to 
enter. I got angry and we started fighting. I beat them…took 
their guns...and embarrassed them in front of everyone. I was 
not looking for a fight, but they were very provocative. 
Kalimoros and Maniabos [two well know bouncers-protectors] 
were also there and they showed everything...they liked me.... 
they said that I’ve got ‘soul’ and I don’t take no crap [...]. That 
was it! I was immediately introduced into the world of the 
‘night’. I got into the group and operated in the Kypseli area. I 
made load s of money...Just imagine that I would make about 
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30.000 per night, I had to work one month in construction in 
order to make such money [...]. I got power...everyone respected 
me. But after the first phase of excitement, that comes with a 
sense of leadership, it becomes much more difficult to cope with 
the harsh reality... I soon realized that you have no friends...only 
snakes. Nothing counts more that money, control of clubs and 
cocaine. I was shot three times...by my best friend...Such were 
the deeds of ‘my guys’...Not to mention that they also rated me 
to the police for murders that I have never committed. We are 
killing each other. This is why there is no organised crime...how 
can it possibly exist with so much snitching? 
(Svourdakoy, 2003: 181-2) 
Another person convicted for similar offences, explains how teachers of 
martial arts recruit their students. A process with often devastating results. 
It is a vicious circle...a reoccurring pattern: They (martial art 
teachers) recruit ‘muscle’ for the ‘night’. They feed their 
students with promises and incentives...they use them to make 
more money, gain power and a better foothold. This way, the 
leader (teacher), who is not a fighter, gains more power and 
influence. Leaders use their brain, they don’t need to fight. They 
use the fighters to risk their lives and struggle every night. But 
at some point the fighters also want to become leaders...then like 
that...it becomes their goal. They get irrational...and it is at this 
point when the conflict and back stubbing start. They kill each 
other and whoever survives becomes the leader, for a short 
period of time, and so forth. This is why there is no organised 
crime. They all start together as a group and they end up alone 
and with many enemies and competitors. 
(Svourdakoy, 2003: 172) 
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Overall, the evidence, in terms of the degree of hierarchy and continuity of 
organised crime in Athens, is contradictory. This is perhaps related to the 
specific type of activity under investigation. The large majority of the actors 
are young men, muscular and athletic, with leadership ambitions and 
involved in drugs trade, prostitution and whatever goods and service is 
required by the night economy (Svourdakoy, 2003; Court of Appeal case 
3765/2006). Yet, there is a need to point out that these are only the front-
runners, or those who are mostly visible to the public. 
And it’s not only about muscular power. They are the ones who 
often ‘pay the prize’. They go and start troubles but at some 
point, they will be arrested. Those who have good protection 
rackets are the ones who remain invisible. 
(Nesfyge and Mpailis, 2000) 
Table 3.3 Number of male and female offenders convicted for extortion 
(1957-2004) 
Date Male Female 
1957 28 1 
1995 15 0 
1996 27 3 
1997 25 2 
1998 12 1 
1999 10 1 
2000 16 4 
2001 11 0 
2002 17 0 
2003 27 1 
2004 28 0 
National Greek Statistics Organization 
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As we will also see in the following section, organised crime in Athens is 
linked with the police and underworld figures that have cooperated with the 
state officials in the past. Both economic and private interests motivate such 
cooperation but also it often reflects the patrimonial structure that defines 
the Greek political system. As a result of the protection OC groups enjoy by 
the police, it is very hard to rely solely on official evidence in order to 
provide an accurate image of the size and structure of the underworld. 
Hence, we expect that any information about the real extent and size of the 
Athenian underworld constitutes a form of silent data that either do not 
exist, or are not accessible to the researcher. Those groups and verification 
we have about the ‘active’ groups are gathered primarily from the press, and 
are linked with revenge and killings between members. Thus, we know that 
a criminal cabal exists, mainly from violent activities in the form of 
assassinations that become known to the general public. 
3.3.3 Positions within the group 
The structure of the groups is often conceptualised by the law enforcement 
authorities as a volatile hierarchical structure with a cluster of leaders and 
bosses at the top of the pyramid (graph 3.1). We have identified the 
following positions. 
Boss: There are three different career paths for actors who manage to 
establish themselves as such, within the well-established criminal groups. 
First, as already mentioned by one of our informants, a boss can be anyone 
who has significant economic and social (as well as political) resources. 
Typically, entrepreneurs who participate in legal markets where protection 
and extra-legal persuasion is required (legitimate bar owner) in order to 
complete economic transactions are more likely to also become the 
perpetrators of protection rackets. In such cases, the boss of a group can be 
an independent businessman who engages in various legal economic 
activities, such as construction, car dealerships, bar ownership or other 
activities related to the public sector, and decides to make an investment in 
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private protection. The entrance into the night community can be in the 
form of financing other business structures. This can often lead the 
individual to become a co-owner and thus, slowly to become a player in that 
community with numerous bars, nightclubs and other related establishments 
in his control. A second possible career path, is for an actor to enter into the 
nigh community directly by investing money into new establishments. This 
path is motivated by a straight incentive of becoming a player into this legal 
lucrative market. Frequently, such incentives are driven by the easy 
opportunities to launder money from other economic activities. In general, 
the night economy in Athens is principally based on very large amounts of 
cash payments. Some informants, for example, claimed that rubbish bags 
were used at the end of every night, and the amount of cash was so great 
that they would not even bother to count it. Finally, another more risky and 
dangerous career path is for the lower members of a criminal group to gain 
more power and strength and subsequently, impose themselves into 
ownership of clubs and bars. 
Leader/Henchmen: The leaders and their Henchmen (πρωτοπαλίκαρα) are 
often childhood friends or very close and trusted friends of the bosses. 
Additionally, the relationships between the group leaders and the boss are 
often based on institutionalised social relations, such as god-fatherhood 
(Court of Appeal case 3765/2006: 142, 140), but direct blood and family 
ties also play a role. Their function is to operate as wingmen and supervise 
the day-to-day operations of the businesses. Also, the leaders are 
responsible for collecting protection money and engage in intimidation and 
threatening tactics. Their responsibility is the most visible one, and this is 
why a significant number of intra-group conflicts result into (their) death.  
Bravi, Bouncers/Security: Under the leaders of a given group, there are 
often young men who work either as bouncers in clubs and bars, or as 
security guards in a variety of establishments. The most active and dynamic 
ones, will often have the opportunity to participate in profitable activities, 
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and will undertake high-risk tasks such as intimidation, use of violence, and 
transportation of drugs. 
Diagram 3. 1 Advanced structure of criminal groups 
Source: Author’s own elaboration 
3.4 Systemic cooperation 
Organised crime, or the 'underworld', is defined as a social system that 
provides illegal services, protection and mobilises resources to 
accommodate the needs and demands of the market (Hellenic Parliament, 
2001; Court of Appeal case 3765/2006). The power and wealth accumulated 
by the above mentioned cabal indicates that the order they serve is 
becoming powerful. Consequently, the upper-world has all the incentives to 
collaborate with the underworld and vice versa. Moreover, the links 
between civil society, organised crime and the state, are both based on 
conflict and co-operation. However, most frequently it seems that co-
operation prevails. Cooperation between organised crime and the state 
takes various forms and shapes. Financial and personal gains are often 
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considered to be the prime motive. In addition, the police is, by far, the 
closest organism to interact with illegal acts on a daily basis. There are 
numerous cases that display the way the underworld interacts and co-
operates with the state. Besides, indicators of cooperation between the two 
worlds can be seen in cases in which the police provide protection for the 
protectors. 
I am a businessman, owner of two shops in Haidari, one 
restaurant and a coffee shop. My business partner gave money to 
someone who came to sell us protection. I believe that he [the 
partner] gave them ‘protection money’ in two occasions. The 
third time, my partner and I, had already made a report to the 
police, but they never came back to collect the protection money 
[...]. They were asking for money to look after the shops, just in 
case we ‘needed something’. Money was given two times only. 
We received threatening phone-calls, saying that ‘you will give 
us the money because we know your family and you have to 
pay’, this is what they were saying [...]. First Mr. X to collected 
the money and subsequently, threatening phone-calls began. 
Moreover, Mr. X said that he collected the money on behalf of 
Mr. L. After we went to the police and we had the bills marked, 
none came to ask for money anymore.  
(Court of Appeal case 3765/2006: 105) 
Your muscles only, cannot always help you. Those who stand 
against you should realize that you are not joking. I can see that 
the money I was making was significantly less than the leader of 
the group. So, I decided (I too, also had my connections) to 
form my own group. For eight years I've been through every 
place. I was interested in diverge business establishments. I 
managed to escape violent situations, although, I had to be 
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rough in many occasions. From these years of experience, I 
realized that when you go out you couldn’t be polite. Kiosks, 
cantinas and corner-shops have paid protection money to me. 
And yes, surely they can’t do anything. Where to go, to the 
police? Do they know to whom they are going to talk to? Don’t 
think that there are no cops who are connected with us. 
(Nesfyge and Mpailis, 2000) 
Additionally, there are various incentives for acquiring protection from 
criminal groups. A club owner, for example, notes: 
Nevertheless, I have to admit that once that I needed them, they 
were here within moments. A group of young people not only 
refused to pay, but they were also making damages. So, I called 
them. They were here in less than ten minutes. They restored the 
order. That night they stayed in all night. I didn't want any more 
fights in my club, so I asked them to be discrete. They followed 
my wish. They were behaving like they were part of my staff. 
This gave them freedom of movement, but also kept the police 
away from the club. So, this strange relationship goes on. As 
they say: “if you pay, you don’t have to worry about a thing”. I 
don’t know if you can do differently. But, all you care about is 
to secure your peace, even by paying them. 
(Cited in Nesfyge and Mpailis, 2000) 
The recruitment of marines and coast guard officers has been recorded in 
diverse occasions. The professionals receive extensive training in hand-to 
hand-combat, but they are also actors with considerable power, networks 
and access to valuable information.   
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I served in the Marine and, there at least, you exercise a lot. 
When I finished my time with the Marine, I tried to get a job as 
personal security guard. I didn't make it. In order to stay fit, I 
started going to the gym. I met different people there. At the 
beginning, they didn’t pay attention to me. One night, five of us 
form the gym went for a coffee. We had coffees and other 
beverages and we were drinking till late. We left the place 
without paying the bill. None from the shop said anything. That 
was puzzling to me. One guy from the group explained why this 
is the case and he also proposed me to work with them. I didn’t 
have many alternatives because my financial situation was very 
bad and my parents couldn't help me [...]. I perceived this offer 
as a job, and therefore, accepted. We arranged to meet the next 
day at 10 at night. We visited a bar at the Hilton area [in 
Athens]. We stayed there less than ten minutes. 
(Cited in Nesfyge and Mpailis, 2000) 
The most powerful member of the Haidari cabal explains his refusal to co-
operate with the police and those who work with them in the nocturnal 
economy. Retaliation takes different forms and in this case, the offender 
notes how the police decided to damage his reputation by interfering with 
his business. 
Once, I had 130 cars in the parking and 100 outside from a 
social event organised by the (political party) New Democracy. 
The police came and took all the keys and our customers had to 
go and take their keys back from the police station. 
(Court of Appeal case 3765/2006: 141) 
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One of the police officers, who was involved in surveillance operations 
against the Haidari cabal, attributes their involvement in the investigation 
against this network, after the assassination of a Mr.Kala, a key member of 
the Hlioupoli cabal. The officer vividly describes that although they had in 
numerous cases reliable information about an ongoing illegal deal, mainly 
related to smuggling, they never had results: 
After the death of Mr. Kala in June 2000, the police unit that 
investigates crimes, received information that a group of 
‘godfathers of the night’ headed by Mr. Laki, had something to 
do with the murder as revenge to the killing of Mr. Papama [of 
the Haidari cabal], by Mr.Kala. Our task was to collect and 
contribute information on Mr.Laki and his group. We found out 
that he is associated with some other people: Mr.Ste., Mr.Papa, 
Mr.Chatzi and Mr.Gaba. They all hang out in nightclubs and 
bars [...]. I didn’t know what they were doing there. On two 
occasions we had intelligence from SDOE, and with the help of 
the Coast Guard and the EKAM, we participated in a ‘bust’ that 
involved smuggling activities but with no results. Every time we 
organised a bust for smuggling, we never had results. Once we 
had information about a smuggling deal taking place and we 
stayed in Mr. Mell’s club till 5:30 in the morning, but the deal 
never took place. On our way back, a car with Mr. Ste, Mr. Ska 
and three others [from the Haidari cabal] over-passed our car, 
and were waiting for as ahead on the road. When we passed 
them, they were waiting outside of their car with opened jackets, 
showing as their guns. 
(3765/2006:) 
According to a confession by an ex-partner of Mr. Stef., in May 2003: 
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‘A police officer, who works in Zefyri, accompanied Mr. Stef. 
with two colleagues of his, in order to find a retired prosecutor 
to help him with his forthcoming criminal charges. He had been 
both in his house and the country house of another prosecutor, to 
threaten them about his case. Also, I was informed that they had 
purchased from a well known jewellery shop expensive jewels 
as a bribe to three women, who were in a committee, in order to 
help him with a case. They were talking about clearing him from 
all charges. 
(To Bhma, 2007) 
Overall the social world in which the groups participate and supply the by-
products of the nocturnal economy is ruled by violence, intimidation and 
hedonism. This environment however is not alien to the Greek way of life.  
We have already noted that the structure of the groups maybe hierarchical, 
but is also volatile. The following quote reveals how an insider views that 
environment. 
-The guys who work at night, do they have a good character? 
-The guys are good, but they drift easily...Whoever becomes 
involved with gangs cannot remain untouched. They develop a 
bad and violent temper with the extensive use of cocaine. In 
order to sell protection and use your gun, you must be 
aggressive, violent; and this can be achieved by using coke. 
They sniff and go out to work. However, when you take coke 
you want to have everything for yourself: money, clubs, women, 
guns, and cocaine. You are not fair and you have neither a clear 
mind nor judgment. You take forcefully clubs protected by 
others...and this is how fights and conflicts with other groups 
start. This is the beginning of the end. One kills the other, 
brothers rat each other and this is when you face the cold and 
109 Chapter 3: Godfathers of the Night 
brutal reality. You go to prison...if you are lucky...if not, bullets 
give you the passport for the ‘other world’. 
(Svourdakoy, 2003: 239) 
3.4.1 Organised crime and public opinion 
The popular social networking website Facebook, currently hosts a Fun 
Club of a renown and convicted OC figure. More than 300 Facebook users 
have joined this group, while there are about twenty messages (posts) left by 
members. Although the number of messages is fairly limited, some of these 
messages express in a clear manner, the support and endorsement towards 
this individual. 
-The only thing cops know how to do well, is to smoke spleefs 
(17 February 2010, by K.S) 
-That fucking whore [referring to a witness who is under the 
victim protection program] should be killed. The fucking cops 
even stay outside her house every night to protect her (15 
January 2010, by E.T) 
-Anyone who rats should be killed...you are very right boss (10 
January 2010, by D.T) 
-Happy New Year BOSS!!!!! (01 January 2010, by G.D) 
-OMERTA!!!! DON STEFANAKO (31 December 2009, by 
G.D) 
-Hi Boss (30 December 2009, by E.A) 
-The town of Eleusina is entirely by your side (29 December 
2009, by E.T) 
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-Hello king of the night! (30 December 2009, by P.M) 
-BRAVI FROM ALL AROUND GREECE UNITE TO MAKE 
A GOVERNMENT (11 September 2009, by N.L) 
-BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU SAY.... NOT ALL ARE TRUE 
MEN...YES IN THE UNION, BUT ONLY WITH OUR 
TRUSTED LADS (13 September 2009, by F.P) 
-He is simply the ‘god...(11 March 2009, P.S) 
(Facebook.com, Billy Stefanakos Fun Club) 
This instance may be indicative of a new trend. As social networking sites 
become popular, ‘criminals’ might begin to take more and more advantage 
of them in order to communicate with the public and friends, even from 
within prisons and perhaps even for intimidating purposes. However, what it 
is also noteworthy is the development of groups of appreciation and fun 
clubs. Moreover, another figure that has allegedly cooperated with Mr. Stef. 
to escape from Koridalos prison using a helicopter, has also been embraced 
with enthusiasm in the Facebook platform. Indicatively, a group called 
'Paleokostas Airlines' counts 10.6154 members (table 2). 
Table 3.4 Online discussion forums devoted to the Paleokostas Brothers 
Name of Facebook Group Number 
members 
of 
Paleokostas Airlines 10,613 
Palaiokostas airport: escape with security 547 
Support the pilot of 
Paleokostas jail-break 
the hijacked helicopter of 545 
Paleokostas: A Robin Hood 506 
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Vassilis Paleokostas Fan Club 367 
Paleokostas Imperial Airlines 356 
Paleokostas Fun Club 288 
Paleokostas.... give him Pardon from the state 246 
Basilis Palaiokostas !!!!Forever!!!! 169 
Paleokostas 131 
Hotel Koridalos, Paleokostas line 102 
Palaiokostas Check in!!! 85 
Vassilis Paleokostas is a Badass 59 
I was also in that Helicopter 35 
Vassilis Paleokostas: The BiggestBadass 33 
Paleokostas for Prime Minister 29 
Paleokostas-Rizai 27 
Prison Break or Paleokostas Jail Break? 11 
Source: facebook.com (data accessed May 2009) 
3.5 Systemic Conflict 
In the previous section it was suggested that cooperation between organised 
crime and the various sub-systems could be imminent. However, it is 
interesting to scrutinize the reason why, as well as the factors contributing 
to successful prosecutions of groups by the state. Interestingly, one of the 
main leaders of the Haidari cabal (Mr. Stef.), who is a well-established car 
dealer and owner of a number of clubs, narrates how the ‘system’ trapped 
him. He inclines that a woman, who was a key protection witness in one of 
the most significant maxi trials originally involving 44 suspects, until half of 
them were later acquitted, was acting in favour of the police or the system 
itself. According to his claims, the system tries to control the night market. 
112 3.5 Systemic Conflict 
He then goes on to explain the reason why he became involved with this 
case, in the first place: 
Nothing about my involvement in protection rackets is true [...]. 
The police is involved with protection rackets, they want to have 
control of the ‘night’. I was very surprised with these charges. 
Maybe I will create hatred against me with these thoughts, but 
they wanted a big case, they had already the warrants from the 
prosecutor. These are contacted containers, someone had the 
need to climb the hierarchy and he wanted a big case. Maybe my 
involvement with the nightclubs has caused concern to some 
people. When a newcomer enters into this business [it is 
inevitable to create conflicts]. I dare you all, to go and see for 
yourselves that ‘half’ of the secret police is working in 
nightclubs. I refused to let them come and work in my clubs. 
(Court of Appeal case 3765/2006: 141) 
It seems that attempts to control and prosecute these groups are not very 
promising for a number of reasons. First, there is an obvious practical 
difficulty regarding the information that can be used in courts. Given the 
nature of these criminal activities, that entail elements of extortion, 
blackmail and the use of violence, victims are not likely to give statements 
to the police. Consequently, without such statements the police is not in 
position to arrest or charge the individuals involved. In some occasions, 
where a person is charged charges and therefore, convicted, the penalty is 
trivial. Thus, it seems to be in the interest of both the victims and the 
offenders not to co-operate with the police. 
The public should know that, it’s not that we don’t know them 
[oc groups]. Indeed, we know them very well, at least most of 
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them, the ‘big’ names [...] Yet, we cannot arrest them because, 
according to the law, protection, that is to say extortion, is a 
crime that the police can only investigate following a report by 
the victim. It is the owner of a business establishment who 
should first come forward to make a named report and then we 
can start the investigation, otherwise our hands are tied. Most of 
the victims if not all, are intimidated to come forward and for 
very good reasons. From the side of the police, there is all the 
good will despite the problems we have within our service. But 
the public is not co-operating with us. We are forced to wait for 
the moment they start killing each other, in order to enter into 
the game. Indeed, we receive plenty of information, which 
however, cannot be sufficient if relying on the information 
provided by the general public only. Even when we press 
charges against them, most often these are on illegal use and 
possession of firearms, and not on extortion charges. We have 
proposed through our service, to change this legal framework. 
But above all, we need good co-operation with the victims. 
(Eleytherotipia, 1996) 
In the case we have examined involving a cabal from the west of Athens, 
the previous police officer's statement seems to also be true. Although the 
illegal activities of some people was known to the police and to the local 
communities for many years (Informant 8, 2010), the police could only start 
investigation the activities of this networks after the murder of a leader 
(T.K) of a rival network. 
In 25-7-2000, Mr. T.K., who had allegedly formed a group with 
others in order to engage in protection rackets, was murdered in 
the region of Sxinias-Marathonas, in Attica. Few days following 
his assassination, the security service received information 
indicating that Mr. T.K was killed by members of a rival 
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criminal group, also participating in extortion rackets in the 
regions of west Attica (Haidari, Aspropirgos-Eleysina). Mr 
T.K’s killing was an act of revenge, as he was allegedly 
responsible for the murder of T.P., who was a leading figure of 
the rival group that took place in early 2000. The information 
suggested that S.X, I.G, and A.K. were the main perpetrators 
and that V.S, A.L, I.S, S.P. and G.M. organised of the 
assassination. Despite the police investigation, a ruling by the 
Court of Appeals (1929/2004), concluded that the evidence were 
not sufficient to prove these accusations and this is why the 
investigation (for murder) was terminated. However, during the 
surveillance of these individuals in relation to the charges for the 
murder of T.K [...] the police officers had credible suspicion that 
the offenders [V.S, A.L, I.S, S.P. and G.M.] had formed a 
criminal organisation and extorted various businessmen in the 
region west of Attica, with the explicit aim to make economic 
gains. Moreover, in order to persuade the businessmen, they 
used intimidation and threats against them, their families and 
against their business establishments. However, the police could 
not gather sufficient confirmation to prove these suspicions. The 
businessmen will often admit, in personal and informal 
conversations with the police officers, that this criminal group 
extorted them, but they will not come forward to make an 
official accusation. By the end of May 2002, the suspicion of the 
police officers was further supported by more hard evidence 
[...]. The illegal activities of this criminal group are proven by 
the statements provided by the key witnesses in the civil action, 
the depositions of other witnesses and those provided by the 
police officers. 
(Court of Appeal case 3765/2006: 36-37) 
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3.6 Organised crime and Terrorism nexuses 
The theory that organised crime and terrorism are ‘connected containers’ is 
a very old theory, often expressed by the dominant political elite in Greece 
(Allum and Kostakos, 2010). The theory of the connected containers 
stipulates that organised crime groups that participate in various illegal 
activities, ranging from theft, armed robbery, assassinations, extortion and 
money laundering, are connected with other criminal groups that also 
participate in illegal activities but have a much stronger ideological agenda.  
Reliable journalist work suggests that these links are mostly formed within 
prisons (Lampropoulos, 2010). Many cases indicate that there are indeed 
links between ordinary crime, and terrorism. Also, there are a number of 
imprisoned offenders who have a very strong ideological appeal and 
popularity amongst the rest of the inmates. Those offenders are usually 
segregated and are not in contact with the general prison population. 
Therefore, it seems that criminals with a strong political identity can act as a 
means for the good, as they can be used both by the prison guards and the 
justice system, in order to maintain some kind of order within prisons. 
This particular discourse, in conjunction with the much more intense 
hegemonic discourse that emerged in the international community, 
especially after the end of the Cold War with the so called nexus between 
crime and terrorism and the war on terrorism, has given additional 
motivation and political power for the state authorities in Greece, to actively 
pursue policies and to pass laws against organised crime and terrorism. In 
fact, Greece is perhaps the only country within the EU, where there is no 
differentiation between organised crime and terrorism (Lambropoulou, 
2005; Symeonidou-Kastanidou, 2007; Xenakis, 2004). In other words, 
terrorist groups are treated by both the legal system and organised crime 
(Hellenic Parliament, 2001). The next quote is an extract from an interview 
with Mr. Stef from the Haidari cabal. Police circles are trying to link him 
and his group with the Urban Guerrillas and this is partly a response to such 
claims. 
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Q. Are there any links between organised crime and terrorism; 
the theory of the ‘connected containers’, is it true? 
A. I have seen people being terrorized by unemployment. It 
causes terror to the citizens when they cannot find a job, when 
they cannot provide the basic needs to their young children. The 
idea of becoming ill and not finding a free bed in the hospital 
generates fear. Uncertainty about the future is very fearful and 
modern-day slavery with the short-term employment contracts 
and Stage programmes is also terrorizing. Old people are also 
terrorized by the idea that their pensions are not secured. It is 
also terrifying when thugs do not hesitate to use firearms for 
personal financial gains. But, it is equally terrifying to see the 
Rambo-like figures, who are supposed to serve and protect the 
citizens (police officer) [...] especially when they have this 
weird look in their eyes and above all, the interlinked containers 
among the mass media, government and the opposition. Not 
only is this nexus terrifying, but it also deteriorates society. All 
these things that cause terror are generated by the system and he 
who causes the most terror, is the voter who maintains this 
system. 
Q. You are not answering the question... 
A. I do not accept the terms. I believe that I have given you an 
answer about who are the terrorists and what criminal offenses 
most Greeks commit, in a way that when some people talk to 
each other, at least in my logic, can be recorded as 
communication. Now, if I want to address those cheap police 
scenarios regarding the communication between some people 
with others, as the song says, when you are being forced by the 
conditions to be ‘classified with the damned’ inevitable in the 
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‘wet and sunless allays of the deceitful and unjust world’, you 
come across people with no tags and labels [...]. 
Q. Are you equating politicians with terrorists? 
A. I would prefer to share a house with those people the police 
label as terrorists, because they will not hurt my children. I 
wouldn't like to live with cops because they would round up my 
children, neither with journalists because they would nose 
around and then distort what was said; not to mention the 
politicians who would steal the household budget! 
Q. The word in the streets is that ‘people of the night’ supply 
arms to terrorists... 
A. The infamous AK 47 first appeared in Eastern Europe around 
1947. The state authorities have always controlled the arms 
industry. Therefore, it is from the hands of arm manufacturers, 
who are controlled by the authorities that these arms end up 
where they end up. 
(Stefanakos, 2009) 
The explanation put forward by Stefanakos, turns the crime-terror nexus 
theory around, suggesting more or less that such theories facilitate political 
and economic interests and agendas. In another occasion, during the same 
interview, Stefanakos states that: ‘Linked containers are probably their 
‘empty heads’ and their dirty pockets. Ideas and opinions do not need pipes 
to communicate’. This position suggests that by looking at the political 
economy behind the so-called crime-terror nexus, we can begin 
deconstructing this modern political discourse. 
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3.7 Conclusions and Implications: Beyond 
Greece 
In this chapter we have looked at the past and present dynamics of criminal 
groups in the capital of Greece, Athens. Our holist theoretical framework 
presented in the introductory chapter points out that there is a confluence of 
factors that affect the formation and evolution of organised crime (Diagram 
1.1). So, how close is the theory with the empirical data and what are the 
implications for the existing research? 
The structure of the groups that participate in the night-time economy is 
hierarchical, but the hedonistic environment and lack of trust renders them 
extremely volatile to police interference. This is in line with existing 
research findings that associate the task environment and social 
organisation with the organisation and structure of criminal enterprises 
(Hall and Winlow 2005; Smith, 1980, 1994, Hobbs, 1998). Additionally, 
social organisation seems to be a strong factor that influences the rise of 
some criminal activities, such as protection, dispute settlement, extortion, 
drug trafficking and prostitution. Thus criminal communities seem to be 
embedded into pre-existing social and economic structures. We have also 
found strong elements of symbiosis between the upperworld and the 
underworld. Cooperation and support by the police, civil society as well as 
from other businesses is forthcoming (Allum, 2010, 2006). More research is 
needed here to determine the nature of this symbiosis. We have also seen 
that the leaders of criminal groups not only adopt a more politicized defence 
line, but may have also established links with the Urban Guerrilla groups. 
This claim requires further investigation in order to established the extent 
and visibility of the nexus between crime and terrorist networks. 
Nevertheless, the key finding here is that criminal organisations tent to seek 
to form linkages with pre-existing structures. Organised crime in other 
words is not a sui generis phenomenon (Hill, 2003, Varese, 2005). It is an 
epiphenomenon of social organisation and a by-product of our everyday 
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life. This conclusion challenges the mainstream view that sees organised 
crime as an alien phenomenon closely associated with illegal migration. 
Penal statistics show that Greece, which is a relatively small and highly 
homogenous country, has historically the highest rates of foreign prisoners 
in Europe. In 2006, for example, foreign prisoners (including pre-trial 
detainees) accounted for 58.4 per cent (58.4%) of the total prison population 
in the country (Council of Europe, SPACE, 2006: 35).7 Therefore, official 
statistics on crimes committed by foreigners support the thesis that the 
rising rate of serious crime in Greece is caused by foreign mafias. Indeed, 
the perception that organised crime is an ‘imported phenomenon’ is 
prevalent in the Greek press and in the public opinion (Antonopoulos, 2009, 
2010). However, the evidence gathered on the role of Greek culture 
provides a good critique to the alien conspiracy argument. 
Culture is irrefutably an esoteric driver that enables people to behave in 
deviant ways (Allum and Sands, 2004). The control over territory and thus 
over legal, illegal and/or semi-legal enterprises often leads to violent 
confrontations between the groups as well as between the groups and police. 
Lack of trust to the Greek state as well as to institutions is also central in 
fostering deviant behaviour especially in terms of dispute settlement and 
protection rackets. The degradation of institutions and a much wider 
tendency to lawlessness (Varese, 2005, 2010; Gambetta, 1993, 2000) also 
provide opportunities for the emergence of various illegal activates in the 
Greek society. 
7 At the European level the median was 9.8, mean was 20.3, maximum was 97.3 (Monaco) 
and minimum 0.1 (Albania). 
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4.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter8 is to examine a number of case studies of groups 
the authorities investigated for cocaine smuggling activities. Over the past 
years, and more specifically, since the beginning of the 1990s, the Greek 
criminological map was expanded with the networks that imported and 
trafficked large amounts of cocaine in Greece and Europe (Hellenic 
Parliament, 2001: 1). The key actors behind these large-scale operations are 
widely known to the Greek public as the ‘Cocaine Barons’. This term 
implies a position of power, superiority and dominance over the rest of the 
criminal groups that operate in the country. Based on all available sources, 
our goal is to reconstruct the origin of illicit networks that import in Greece 
or transport throughout the world, large quantities of cocaine. Additionally, 
the chapter looks at the structure of these groups, the way the actors are 
connected with each other, and the kind of labour division these groups 
have. Following that, will investigate the ‘extent’ and features of this 
particular trade in the country, placing considerable emphasis on the ‘Greek 
legitimate connections’; Greek nationals from the ‘upper-world’, who have 
been heavily involved in the particular trade in Greece (and beyond). 
Finally, the policing of cocaine smuggling is analysed based on the cases 
examined, in an effort to scrutinize the fundamental factors that have led to 
arrests. If we assume that the cocaine market is part of the body of 
knowledge widely defined as ‘organised crime’ (von Lampe, 2001), then the 
empirical data provided in this chapter can shed more light on the 
theoretical understanding of ‘organised crime’ in Greece. 
An early version of this chapter was published in the Journal Global Crime and under a 
different title (see Kostakos and Antonopoulos, 2010). Only the work of the first author is 
presented in this chapter with permission by the second author of the article. 
8 
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4.2 The origin of Smuggling in Greece 
Cocaine smuggling is a lucrative enterprise and can be seen as the most 
prestigious position in the career path of professional drug smugglers 
(Pappas, 2009). Nevertheless, an accurate image of the cocaine industry-just 
as in any other drug industry- tumbles into a number of ‘conceptual, 
technical and political issues’ (Thoumi, 2005: 186-7). Furthermore, cocaine 
profits attract risky and shady entrepreneurs as well as other ‘interest 
groups’, who will often opt for an easy way out, or seek hasty and easy 
access to large sums of money. Therefore, legitimate businessmen and 
traders are extensively exposed to financial risks. Yet, they have a great 
technological expertise on environment tasks and, more importantly, have 
the ability to control, or manage risks associated with law enforcement 
interference. There are numerous cases suggesting that legitimate 
entrepreneurs enter into the cocaine smuggling business, when the survival 
of their legal business portfolio is at risk. From a cultural perspective, these 
traders and sea merchants are professionals who have been underpinned by 
conflicting norms, and whose morality and norms of conduct have been 
affected by a strong historical involvement in smuggling and deviant 
practices. Moreover, the Greek trader and sea merchants’ reciprocal and 
symbiotic relationships with the political system have been central in the 
development of the Modern Greek State (Close, 2002: 46, 53). 
Cocaine is extracted from coca leaves, mainly cultivated in Colombia, Peru 
and Bolivia (UNODC, 2008). Thus, close proximity to source countries and 
large internal markets played a catalytic role in the expansion of the cocaine 
trade in the Western hemisphere. However, Europe was largely unaffected 
by this phenomenon, and cocaine was consumed primarily by privileged 
individuals. Still, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC), cocaine consumption in Europe is constantly increasing, 
whereas retail and wholesale prices are dropping, and purity levels are 
improving (UNODC, 2008). The growth of the European market appears to 
reflect partly the changing dynamics in the American market. The decline of 
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the American market, which was affected by significant law enforcement 
efforts as well as saturation related to the nature of the product in question, 
is believed to have contributed to the establishment of smuggling channels 
in the European continent. Although not always successful, cocaine 
traffickers have always been keen in exporting their product across the 
Atlantic, in search of reliable connections and rising markets. Our 
investigation indicates that trans-national smuggling networks sought to 
establish stable connections with markets in the Middle East via the Indian 
Ocean. The venture was exposed in a 1961 U.N. report on the expansion of 
cocaine smuggling, and subsequently action was undertaken by Interpol in 
order to monitor smuggling channels in the Mediterranean (Taxydromos-
Egypt, 1962:3). 
Within the relatively new market setting for cocaine, focus is given on the 
cocaine market in Greece. It can be argued that the Greek case has a series 
of ‘competitive advantages’ (Zaitch, 2003: 7-17) in the development of the 
cocaine market in Greece and beyond. Firstly, the Greek cocaine market, 
although moderately small in volume, is one of a relatively long history, and 
one that has been quite vibrant. Our archive examination has revealed that 
cocaine smuggling, contains similarities in characteristics with the present 
moment situation, while it's existence in Greece dates back to as early as 
the 1910s and 1920s (Skrip, 1926:1, 1929:3). Back then, interpersonal 
networks of professionals, legal businessmen, law enforcement agents, 
tourists and travellers as well as the ‘high society’, imported small quantities 
of the merchandise on a regular basis. More specifically, Western and 
central European markets, particularly France, where consumption of 
cocaine in the first decades of the 20th century was significant, constituted a 
fundamental transit point for cocaine destined for the Greek market. 
Accurate sources designate that smuggling networks used to have ties with 
individuals linked with the night-time economy establishments in 
Marseilles, Alexandria and Istanbul, which provided significant amounts of 
cocaine and other drugs for transportation and consumption in Greece 
(Skrip, 1928a: 6, 1930:1). Steamboats from France (Skrip, 1928b: 2) and 
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Greek yacht owners (Skrip, 1929:3) were often mentioned in cocaine 
smuggling. Additionally, during this ‘first stage’ of the cocaine market, 
health professionals such as pharmacists are reported to have been heavily 
involved (Skrip, 1928a: 6). These experts played a central role in retail 
distribution of cocaine (as well as other drugs). Later on, individuals of 
Greek nationality, primarily from the shipping industry, were among the 
first to facilitate the transportation of large quantities of cocaine in Europe, 
from 1970s onwards. Nevertheless, the aforementioned trends were heavily 
influenced by the relatively large and dynamic Greek Diaspora communities 
in the Mediterranean basin, and South America (Prevelakis, 2005: 272-5; 
see also: Paoli and Reuter, 2008; Zaitch, 2002a), as well as the large 
shipping industry and related professions. An indicative role of the 
mariners’ past of the Greek Diaspora is the case of small East coast 
American town called Tampa bay. A Greek expat, called Mike Tsalickis (or 
Jungle Mike), a well-established businessman in the Caribbean, was 
involved in the largest confiscation case of cocaine smuggling in the USA in 
1988 (Vick, 2009). 
Secondly, a more recent political development indicates that cocaine is 
increasingly entering from neighbouring Balkan countries, whereas the 
socio-economic attributes and sophistication of the actors appear to have 
changed (Arsovska and Kostakos, 2007: 50-3). For instance, the restricted 
Europol reports maintain that cocaine smugglers in the Albanian port of 
Vlorë and in the town of Fieri, transport cocaine from Colombia to 
Montenegro, and then to Western Europe (Europol, 2001). In the same way, 
Bulgarian smugglers transport cocaine to western markets by ship 
(Eleytherotipia, 2002; Europol, 2001). Hence, reports stating a rising trend 
in cocaine consumption in Greece could be attributed to the fact that Greece 
is surrounded by many countries with porous borders (UNOCD, 2008). 
Thirdly, the Greek state has been suffering from endemic corruption 
(Transparency International, 2009). In an interview that took place in 2009, 
a legitimate businessman who engages in the importation and exportation of 
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products vividly narrates: “In the past you needed to bribe public officials in 
order to ask for some kind of an illegal favour. Nowadays, you bribe them 
in order to be effective in their job. We are, perhaps, the only European 
country where you need to bribe employees in the public sector to do their 
job as they should” (Informant 5, 2009). The bottom line is that the general 
institutional crisis, and low trust in the country’s authorities, supports a 
widespread perception among the general public that ‘nothing works’. 
Fourth, to the author's knowledge, no study has yet been conducted 
specifically on the social organisation of the Greek cocaine market, and/or 
the involvement of the Greek context in the international cocaine trade. 
However, there seems to be congruence among media, political and law 
enforcement circles in the idea of who is involved in the cocaine market, 
and a clear-cut view regarding the morality of the actors involved. A 
number of studies suggest that two sets of actors exist: the ‘good’ and the 
‘bad’ (van Duyne and Antonopoulos, 2009). The ‘good’ actors are usually 
those who ‘fall prey to drug dealers’, the authorities, who are there 
supposedly to protect the public, and the legal enterprises, who are 
victimised by their ‘underworld’ counterparts. On the other hand, the ‘bad’ 
actors are always those who trade the merchandise, and who actively or 
passively facilitate the trade: criminals, the corrupt official, the so-called 
‘others’ (Antonopoulos, 2009) and anyone else who lives off law-abiding 
citizens in a parasitic way. This well-established view, along with the lack 
of knowledge on the cocaine business in the country, makes the need for 
research on the topic in Greece, imperative. 
The increasing liberalization and internationalization of the global economy 
and the free movement of capital, have created a transnational framework 
within which a fruitful environment was created for new forms of illegal 
activities. This kind of activities exhibit the following characteristics: i) 
Hierarchical structure ii) Division of labour iii) Enterprise iv) Interpersonal 
networks v) Continuity vi) Transnational scope. As a consequence, many 
businessmen, mainly ship-owners, take advantage of the aforementioned 
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economic environment when dealing with huge financial debts from their 
shipping businesses, or when looking for super-profits, many times larger 
than their legitimate business activities. . Therefore, from the beginning of 
1990s, they entered in criminal organisations and created a transnational 
network that facilitated illegal transportation of cocaine, primarily from 
Latin American countries to either North America, or Western Europe 
(Court of Appeals in Athens, case 2585, 2005: 1043). 
4.3 The rise of the cocaine market in Greece 
4.3.1 Context setting: Cocaine use, price and purity in Greece 
Generally, even though cocaine was not widely consumed at that time, 
concern about (illegal) cocaine use was raised after World War I, and 
particularly in the 1920s(Ruggiero and South, 1995). A similar trend was 
noticed in Greece. More specifically, articles found in the Greek press on 
the use of cocaine and smuggling in the 1920s (Skrip, 1929:3), have 
references on the use of cocaine in Greece as early as in the 1930s. 
Moreover, accounts of the media, as well as the prohibited Rebetika songs, 
often celebrate the use of drugs (and smuggling). In 1932, for instance, 
Panagiotis Tountas’ song, called ‘Why I smoke cocaine’, has been 
considered as one of the most influential songs within this tradition. Another 
rebetiko song named 'Prussa', narrates the story of an expat from Prussa, a 
former Greek city in the northeast part of Turkey, when boarding onto a he 
ship back to Greece. The lyrics go: ‘I could not get away, on my way back 
from Prussa. I was snitched by some bravi [henchmen], and they caught me 
on the ship. I had sewn inside my jacket, two bags of ‘black’ [cannabis] and 
in my hollow heels, I had them filled up with heroin’. 
In general terms, Greece is a country to that has recorded relatively low 
levels of use of illicit drugs, compared to other countries of the European 
Union (EMCDDA, 2008). The trend in cocaine use among the general 
Greek population has remained almost identical to the trend for overall 
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illicit drug use in the last 20-25 years. Specifically, according to Greek 
REITOX Focal Point (2006), there has been a remarkable increase from 
1998 onwards, followed by a decrease in 2004. It is worth mentioning that 
in 1998, only 1.1% of the overall Greek population consumed cocaine. The 
equivalent percentage among the student population was 2%. Moreover, 
among participants from the clubbing scene, cocaine was the most popular 
drug after cannabis. It is estimated that 25% of young participants (aged 15-
30) that go out to nightclubs, have consumed cocaine at least once in their 
lifetime. The percentage for the year 1998 was only 11.9, respectively 
(Kathimerini, 2007). Results indicate that the percentage of the recorded 
cocaine users during this period has more than doubled. Interestingly, 
cocaine is primarily consumed by males, although evidence is inconsistent. 
For example, among participants in the nightlife, the percentage of cocaine 
as a recreational drug, was 28.6% for females and 18.8% for males, 
respectively (Greek REITOX Focal Point: 2008). 
Recently, there has been an increase in the prevalence of cocaine use among 
non-Greeks. For example, in 2006, the percentage on non-Greeks who used 
cocaine as a primary substance, was 3.1% (Greek REITOX Focal Point, 
2007). It is widely acknowledged that cocaine users have a higher 
educational and socio-economic level compared to other drug users. 
Following the example of many cases in the international jet set, many 
famous Greek actors, singers as well as models have been arrested for 
cocaine possession and use (Ethnos, 2007; Ta Nea, 2008). However, 
although relatively recently (since the early 2000s), the social and 
educational base of the cocaine clientele has been broadening (Greek 
REITOX Focal Point, 2004; Saxionis, 2008). Nevertheless, as some of our 
interviewees who have working experience in prisons in Greece have noted, 
the number of cocaine addicts in prison is extremely low in comparison to 
those addicted to other drugs such as heroin, cannabis and synthetic drugs 
(Kokkoris, 2009; Aravantinos, 2009; Informant 7, 2009). 
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As expected, the vast majority of cocaine users do not consider themselves 
as addicts. Consequently, only a very small proportion seeks treatment. 
Besides, only a small percentage of the drug users who have been in 
treatment, consume cocaine as a primary drug. For instance, in 2005 and 
2006, the percentages of cocaine users in the total population in drug 
treatment were 2.4% and 2.6%, respectively. However, it is interesting to 
note that the number of people seeking treatment for cocaine has more than 
doubled from 2002 to 2005. Among this group, 25.4% reported 
consumption of cocaine on a daily basis, whereas among those having 
reported multiple drug use, 31.5% reported cocaine as the second most 
common, drug (Greek REITOX Focal Point, 2007). 
In 2005 and 2006, there were 400 cocaine-related deaths in the European 
Union (Eleytherotipia, 2007). Yet, this particular substance is not 
responsible for a significant number of drug-related deaths in Greece. This 
is probably the reason why there has not been a ‘moral panic’ about it. 
Specifically, there have been 17 cocaine-related deaths for the period from 
1993 to 2007. However, there have been cases which attracted considerable 
media attention, such as the death of a fourteen-year-old female student 
from Northern Greece in the beginning of 2008 (Tsigganas, 2008; 
Kantouris, 2008). Again, the numbers in relation to cocaine-related deaths 
may be somehow misleading. The Director for the Implementation of 
Rehabilitation Programs of O.KA.NA (Kokkoris, interviewed in 2009) 
argues that ‘given that cocaine use is more prevailing in the higher levels of 
society, t is very possible that for social reasons, cocaine-related deaths are 
registered as ‘natural deaths’ instead of ‘violent deaths’, linked to cocaine 
abuse’. 
4.3.2 Official Statistics and Data on Cocaine Smuggling in 
Greece 
The cocaine detained in Greece is seized by the Greek Police, the Customs 
and the Coast Guard. Also, there is a small part of the merchandise which is 
128 4.3 The rise of the cocaine market in Greece 
held by the Bureau for Special Inspections. From 1980 to 2006, 2,582.181 
kilos of cocaine were seized by the Greek authorities (Graph 1) (SODN-
EMP, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007; MPO, 2008; UNODC, 2008). 
Diagram 4.1. Detentions of cocaine (in kilos), in Greece (1980-2006) 
Source: SODN-EMP, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007; MPO, 2008; UNODC, 2008 
Overall, the recorded quantities of the detained cocaine are considerably 
smaller to the quantities of seized cannabis, and slightly lesser than those of 
heroin. For example, even after 1994, when there was an increase in the 
amounts of cocaine seized by the Greek authorities, the quantities of 
cannabis and heroin consistently exceeded those of the seized cocaine. The 
only exception is documented in 2004, when a single bust resulted to the 
detention of more than a ton being (Graph 2) (SODN-EMP, 2002, 2003, 
2004, 2005, 2006, 2007; MPO, 2008), whereas the overall quantity of 
cannabis seized from 1999 to 2006, was more than 97.5 tons. 
The available data show that there are fluctuations in the quantity of cocaine 
seized by the Greek authorities, specifically from 1980 to 2006. Of special 
interest is that in 2004, the Greek authorities held more than one ton of 
cocaine, whereas in 2005, the amount of cocaine seized was as small as 43 
kilos. This difference constitutes a drop of about 96.3% from the previous 
year. However, this variation may not, of course, reflect an actual instability 
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in the cocaine market in Greece and the rest of European markets which are 
linked to Greece, but merely cases of successful operations on behalf of the 
authorities. In addition, it is important to note that the figures presented here 
are official statistics that, nevertheless, do not provide an integrated picture 
of the actual size of the cocaine market in the country. Hence, figures reflect 
only those quantities that the Greek authorities encountered and are, 
therefore, figures prone to ‘contextual variables’ (von Lampe, 2004), such 
as intensity of law enforcement in the country. 
Diagram 4.2. Detentions of cannabis, heroin and cocaine (in kilos), in 
Greece, (1999-2006) 
Source: SODN-EMP, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007; MPO, 2008; UNODC, 2008 
Another important seizure-related parameter is that the Greek authorities 
participate in joint investigations with law enforcement agencies from other 
countries outside the Greek sovereignty, such as the US and Italy. It seems 
that this partnership is related to information about the cocaine bulk ending 
up in Greece. In August 2000, for instance, an investigation that involved 
the Greek Police, the Greek Coast Guard, and the Greek Bureau for Special 
Inspections, and the US Drug Enforcement Administration, which lasted 
nine months, ended up in the detention of 9.5 tons of cocaine off the coast 
of Venezuela. Still, although the quantity was destined for Greece and 
Greek law enforcement agents were involved in its seizure, the capture was 
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not included in the overall seizures of the Greek law enforcement 
authorities. The following table (Table 1) shows a sample of successful law 
enforcement operations, in which the Greek authorities were heavily 
involved (YEN, 2008; author’s own research). However, confiscation took 
part in countries around the world, and therefore, the seized quantities 
presented here, are not attributed to the Greek authorities. 
Table 4.1 Selected sample of International seizures of large quantities of 
cocaine transported by vessels registered to Greek companies 
Month –Year Kg Cocaine Name of Vessel 
December 2008 100 Kg “Astro Saturn” 
February 2007 1,500kg “Blaus VII” 
February 2007 4,000kg (estimate) “Oct Challenger” 
July 2004 5,400 Kg “Africa I” 
Μay 2003 3,600 Kg “Cork” 
June 2002 5,000 Kg (estimate) “Winner” 
April 2003 2,140 Kg “Irene” 
Αugust 2000 10,000 Kg “Suerte I” 
May 1999 4,000 Kg “China Breeze” 
January 1999 4,310 Kg “Cannes” 
Source: YEN (2008); Kostakos and Antonopoulos, 2010; author’s own research. 
Finally, cases where the merchandise was thrown into the sea when law 
enforcement agencies approached a cocaine-transporting vessel, are also not 
included. For example, in June 2002, two tons of cocaine were thrown into 
the sea when French war ships approached a Greek ship, under the 
Cambodian flag, transporting cocaine (YEN, 2008). Not surprisingly, the 
vast majority of cocaine detained in Greek territory, is seized in the greater 
areas of Athens, with some exceptions. The fact that in 2001, 97% of the 
cocaine held in Greek sovereignty was seized in the prefecture of Attica, 
and specifically the port of Piraeus, highlights our estimation that the port 
has a central role in the cocaine business. 
4.3.3 Sources of merchandise, transportation methods and 
routes 
Greece is not perceived as a cocaine production country. However, during 
my empirical investigation I have come across one case where cocaine was 
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produced in the country. The Bureau for Special Inspections, with the 
assistance of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the 
Greek National Intelligence Service (NIS), found and dismantled a cocaine 
production laboratory in Anavyssos, a community in the prefecture of 
Attica. There, cocaine powder was processed before being introduced into 
markets in Western Europe. The objective of the particular laboratory, 
which was described by the Greek media as ‘the first cocaine laboratory in 
Europe’, was to prevent the loss of merchandise during the transportation 
phase, since ‘coca paste’ is not easily detectable. According to the 
authorities, this laboratory had employed a Venezuelan chemist, and a 
British citizen, who supervised the production and resale of the cocaine 
(Bureau for Special Inspections, 2007). Nevertheless, as noted before, the 
cocaine produced in Greece was destined to supply various European 
markets, and not solely the Greek market, which relies primarily on South 
American merchandise. 
In general, trends in cocaine smuggling into Europe, and Greece in 
particular, can only be fully grasped when having a broader perspective of 
the general routes of the cross-Atlantic maritime trade and travel patterns. 
Unlike heroin, which is transported mostly via land routes, cocaine is 
mainly smuggled into Europe via maritime routes. The task environment 
suggests that cocaine smuggling has a symbiotic relationship with maritime 
trade and tourism. 
The largest volume of the merchandise originates from South America, 
specifically from Colombia. Aggregating statistics for a six-year period, 
between 2001 and 2006, show that during this period, the Greek authorities 
seized approximately two tons of cocaine. Furthermore, as shown in Table 
2, police investigations concluded that more than 1.5 tons of cocaine 
originated from South America, which accounted for 78.9% of the overall 
quantity captured by the Greek authorities (SODN-EMP, 2002; 2003; 2004; 
2005; 2006; 2007). 
132 4.3 The rise of the cocaine market in Greece 
Table 4.2 Origin of cocaine seized by the Greek authorities 2001-2006 
Country of origin Quantity (Kg) (%) 
South America 1,572.078 78.9 
Albania 28.582 






Other 202.694 10.1 
7 
Total 1,992.687 100 
Source: SODN-EMP, 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007 and author’s 
own elaboration. 
However, the range of countries cocaine originated from, in the particular 
period, suggests that the cocaine market is not a monopoly of the 
Colombians. The same conclusion also applies to other countries in the EU 
(Duyne and Levi, 2005). 
Overall, our analysis indicates that during a six-year period, from 2001 
to2006, on average, 24.9% of the detained cocaine was imported by land, 
51.8% by sea, 3.3% by air, while 20% of the total seized cocaine, entered 
the country with a method unknown to the authorities (SODN/EMP, 2002, 
2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007). The bulk of cocaine enters the country via 
the port of Piraeus, which is the largest and busiest port in the country. 
Moreover, two other large ports of the country, those of Thessaloniki and 
Patras, are increasingly becoming important transit points for cocaine. In 
April 2007, a large shipment of cocaine in containers was seized by the 
Bureau for Special Inspections in Thessaloniki. The shipment, which 
originated from Uruguay, was destined for Bulgaria (Kantouris, 2007). 
Also, in early 2009, the authorities at the same port held 280 packages of a 
total of 70 kg of cocaine. The packages were hidden inside a timber 
shipment that was destined for a Bulgarian company based in Thessaloniki 
(Zougla, 2009). In another case, cocaine shipped from Ecuador, destined 
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for Bosnia and Herzegovina via Croatia, was intercepted in Piraeus 
(Elefheros Typos, 2007). Other sources suggest that cocaine is imported 
from Turkey into the islands of the Aegean Sea by Nigerian 
(Lambropoulou, 2003) or Turkish (Kathimerini, 2008) traffickers. 
There are however, instances, where cocaine is transported by air from 
South America, the Netherlands, or other Western European countries with 
single passengers, known as ‘body-packers’, or individuals who hide 
cocaine in their luggage (Zaitch, 2003). This is especially the case during 
the summer months, when controls of charter flights on islands are very lax. 
Moreover, cocaine is transported to Greece by air, even from other Balkan 
countries. To state an example, in August 2008, a Bulgarian citizen planned 
to import 4.5 kg of cocaine into Greece in his suitcase, via Romania. By 
mistake, the suitcase was not loaded onto the airplane and was later found 
by the Romanian authorities, who contacted their Greek counterparts (Ta 
Nea, 2008). Adding to this, a percentage of seized cocaine is imported by 
land via the Greek-Albanian border in private cars and trucks. It has been 
suggested that Albania has been used as a warehousing point for cocaine 
before being distributed in Greece, and other countries of Western Europe. 
Thus, the role of individuals with contacts in producing-countries and 
Albania is of central importance. Finally, Bulgaria is also a country via 
which cocaine is transported into Greece. 
Another confirmed route for the transportation of cocaine that from Western 
Europe by car/truck. For example, in April 2005, in their attempt to import 
2.2 Kg of Dutch-bought cocaine into Greece via Belgium, France, 
Switzerland and Italy, participants of a cocaine smuggling network were 
arrested in Athens. Apparently, the smugglers used to follow the same 
transportation course almost once every two months (Kathimerini, 2005). It 
is not uncommon during the transportation phase for, the merchandise to be 
concealed in or among other legal commodities such as fish, chicken, 
lemons, oranges, fruit compost, rice, corn, sugar, cereals, timber, decorative 
candles, dog food, bottles of water, photograph frames, and clocks. In 
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addition, packages are often hidden in crypts. Since the beginning of the 
2000s, there have been cases, known to the Greek authorities, involving the 
shipping of cocaine in vessels transporting undocumented migrants. Finally, 
small cocaine quantities are sent by mail/courier from Colombia. 
Greece has turned out to be an important transit point for cocaine destined 
for other Balkan countries as well as Western Europe. It appears that after 
failure to establish ties with the Middles East (Taxydromos-Egypt, 1962), 
and the subsequent destabilisation of Colombian smuggling networks, in the 
late 1980s-early 1990s, cocaine smugglers shifted their attention to 
networks that were active in the Mediterranean. Therefore, successful Greek 
smugglers of commodities, such as arms and cannabis, who had good 
relations with Spanish and Colombian smuggling networks, had a strategic 
advantage and the technical skills to provide assistance to Colombian 
traffickers. The well-known case of the Greek-Colombian-Spanish network 
that was consolidated in the mid-1990s, was responsible for introducing 
over 20 tons of cocaine into the E.U. market. Following the dismantlement 
of this network, other Greek ship-owners replaced the gap in the 
transportation of multi-ton cocaine smuggling schemes. Taken as a whole, 
these cases show that Greece can be used as a logistical base, and illicit 
activities may blend easily in an environment where a large number of 
shipping agencies engage in millions of legal transactions with foreign 
partners. Supplementary factors are considered the high level of corruption 
that is maintained through patron-client networks, as well as the availability 
of schemes for laundering illegal proceeds. Moreover, Greece is a member 
of the EU, and therefore, it is relatively easy to use the country as a transit 
and entry point for Western and Central European markets. For example, on 
7 January 2007, the police of FYROM seized 483 kg of cocaine at Blace, on 
the FYROM-Kosovo border. Most of the cocaine was of a very high quality, 
with smaller portions of lower quality, indicating that part of the shipment 
might have been collected from other producers, or that there might have 
been an attempt to gain the same price for lower-quality cocaine. 
Subsequently, the cocaine, originating from Venezuela, was offloaded at the 
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port of Bar in Montenegro and was destined for Piraeus, Greece. The 
cocaine was purchased by a Greek ship-owner who had ties with the Greek 
and Serbian ‘underworld’ (Arsovska and Kostakos, 2007). 
In the cases where the merchandise remains in Greece, cocaine is destined 
for the Greek market, houses, apartments, and warehouses, while often, 
remote locations are used to store cocaine for a short period of time. Also, 
cars and vans are frequently rented to facilitate the transportation from the 
port to the storage places. The cocaine smuggling networks seem to have 
specific housing/storage requirements, differing in the various stages of the 
‘job’. Moreover, having multiple safe and discrete locations to store large 
quantities of cocaine is also of great importance. Furthermore, individuals 
who take care of the storage of the merchandise, have good knowledge of 
the morphological characteristics of the particular area and features of the 
towns and villages, that could provide natural cover against eyewitnesses, 
when bags with cocaine are moved from the cars into the storage places. 
Once these large quantities of cocaine are divided and stored, the ‘product’ 
is then divided into smaller loads and forwarded to the market. 
4.3.4 Retail distribution 
The perception of drug availability, as found in numerous general public 
and student surveys, depends on the type of the drug, with cocaine being 
relatively easily available. Specifically, 20.7% of the general population 
surveyed, considers cocaine as a drug that they can effortlessly acquire 
(Greek REITOX Focal Point, 2006). The perception of availability is higher 
in Athens. In the early 2000s, no open street market of cocaine could be 
observed in Greece. Our research has revealed independent traffickers in the 
retail level, many of which can be identified with extortion groups and 
bouncers. Our study also indicates that the cocaine market is ‘closed’, which 
basically means that cocaine retailers/distributors cannot openly sell their 
merchandise on the street or other public spaces by approaching potential 
customers. The reason for the absence of an ‘open’ market', –apart from the 
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law enforcement stance against illicit drugs in the country, -is that cocaine is 
consumed by more affluent and ‘respectable’ parts of the Greek society. 
Therefore, the demand for supply of the merchandise in a more discreet 
manner is more evident. . This is not of course, to suggest that distribution 
of cocaine does not occur on the street or in other public spaces. It simply 
suggests that the commercial interactions between the client and the supplier 
take place after a pre-arranged meeting. In many cases, famous individuals 
do not approach the distributor directly, but through their social circle. 
Hence, a good friend or a trusted person would collect the merchandise for 
them. Similar to other illegal markets (Antonopoulos, 2006), on some 
occasions, trusted clients have the merchandise delivered to them. Recently, 
cocaine smuggling networks have been using the services of destitute 
foreigners, primarily asylum seekers, in various Greek conurbations. For 
instance, a rudimentary settlement was established by Afghan and Kurdish 
asylum seekers in the areas of Agyia, next to the port and marina of Patras. 
Networks have been exploiting the presence of asylum seekers by providing 
them with quantities of cocaine (among other drugs) for distribution. 
In addition, distribution of cocaine also takes place in private parties or in 
‘glamorous’ nightclubs throughout the country, primarily in Athens and 
Thessaloniki, as well as in cosmopolitan and/or busy islands, especially 
from April to September. Moreover, cocaine is distributed at venues 
frequented by young people such as in schools, as the case of the dead 
student from Northern Greece revealed. According to Jack Stanton, the 
scientific director of the prevention centre of O.KA.NA, when cocaine is 
distributed in, or around schools, ‘the distributors do not have direct contact 
with the students, but they use adult individuals, who could be the students’ 
relatives or friends to approach the children’ (Kathimerini, 2008). Finally, 
cocaine distribution takes place in hotels, primarily in the southern suburbs 
of Athens (coincidentally, close to the marina) by ‘call-girls’. However, 
some smuggling networks do not use distributors. Instead, there is a 
tendency to work with a specific and limited clientele, which allows for a 
certain insularity and protection from law enforcement. The degree to which 
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the Greek market is decentralised and fragmented, is also reflected in the 
fact that cocaine can also be purchased through friends, or even through the 
Internet. In 2005, the tourist police of Chania in Crete, identified a website 
of a company based in San Francisco, in which prospective customers could 
place their orders for cocaine (among other drugs) and have the merchandise 
delivered within just 3-4 hours (Eleytherotypia, 2005). In addition, in 2006, 
a 25-year old was arrested for selling cocaine and cannabis for three 
consecutive years, through chat rooms, to under-aged (Kathimerini, 2006). 
The fact that cocaine is one of the most expensive drugs in Greece, second 
only to ketamine (‘Special K’), explains why the regular clientele has a high 
social standing and, therefore, is in a better financial situation (SODN/EMP, 
2000-7). The retail price currently ranges from € 75-100/gram, which is 
higher than the equivalent price of heroin (€ 45-80/gram), cannabis (€ 
5/gram) and synthetic drugs. Nevertheless, the average Greek retail price 
has been lower than the equivalent average European price (1990-2006 US$ 
95.3 for Greece – US$ 105.9 for Europe). However, from 1990 to 2008, the 
retail price of cocaine ranged from as high as US$ 150, in 1990, to as low as 
US$ 53,in 1993 and 1998, respectively (UNOCD, 2008). 
Recently, there have been indications that cocaine has been used as a 
currency for other illegal markets. For example, in February 2008, the 
Greek police was after an Albanian who was using four different surnames, 
and who used to exchange cocaine transported from Albania with cannabis 
produced in Crete (Kathimerini, 2008). There have also been references of 
Dutch ‘entrepreneurs’ paying in cash for large quantities of cocaine and 
cannabis produced in Crete (Kathimerini, 2007). Lastly, in one of the court 
cases I noted that private yachts were used to transport ecstasy from Greece 
to the Caribbean and cocaine from the Caribbean to Greece, respectively 
(Court of Appeal, case 3481/2005 & 10/2006). 
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It is very common for the Greek media and the authorities to consider and 
report the entities involved in cocaine smuggling as ‘Cartels’. This has also 
been the case with other commodities such as cigarettes. Also, taking into 
account newspaper titles such as ‘The Launderette of the Greek Cartel’, the 
existence of similar representations of cocaine smuggling would not come 
as a surprise (Antonopoulos, 2008). In addition, specific individuals are 
highlighted in these representations (e.g. ‘Robin Cocaine’; ‘The Rise and 
Fall of the Greek ‘Baron’). However, a closer examination of the available 
evidence reveals a different picture. The structure of the smuggling chains 
that serve the Greek cocaine market and act as a link with other European 
markets comprises of a large array of ‘actors’ from different socio-
economic, professional and ethnic backgrounds, who perform different 
functions in order to achieve their goals. Yet, the ‘coordination’ of tasks 
involved in different stages of the smuggling, lacks sophistication. Hence, 
the ‘actors’ easily adapt to unexpected circumstances and often employ 
improvisation and spontaneous decision-making. For instance, when 
interviewed, the Director of the Greek Drug Enforcement Agency noted that 
there have been very few cases of ‘well-organised’ groups that smuggle 
cocaine systematically, but the majority of the collaborations are best 
described as opportunistic and ad hoc (Saxionis, interviewed in 2008). 
Against this background, before introducing details about the micro-division 
of labour’ of the cocaine market in Greece, a few words about the nature 
and properties of the macro-‘organisation’ are in order. The macro-typology 
that represents the cocaine market in Greece exhibits universal 
characteristics, often found in other legal and illegal marketplaces. A 
ubiquitous characteristic is the symbiosis of cocaine smuggling with 
legitimate businesses, an issue that we will be focusing on later in this 
thesis. There are, however, some distinguishable features that should be 
mentioned. Firstly, the density of the network and compartmentalisation of 
activities that varies according to geospatial variables. The more ‘trans-
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national’ the operation in scope is, the less connected actors appear to be. In 
essence, this places emphasis on - the importance of the locality in the 
cocaine business (Hobbs, 1998). 
Secondly, network density and compartmentalisation of activities also vary, 
depending on the quantities being trafficked. The smaller the quantities, the 
greater the connectivity and overlap between tasks and ‘actors’. A plausible 
explanation of these networks’ attributes is that the extent of the deal is 
analogous to the sophistication, security and guarantees required. 
Furthermore, the number of people involved and, most probably, the 
markets destined to supply are also equivalent to the nature of the deal. 
However, even though large structures may exist, the fact that the cocaine 
business is a mosaic of small, flexible, independent and often improvising 
enterprises, is by no means the norm in the Greek cocaine business.  
Nevertheless, large quantities of cocaine can be transported by schemes that 
are much simpler and have ‘thinner’ structures than the big cases that often 
draw significant media attention. In 2004, for instance, the Greek authorities 
apprehended members of a scheme, smuggling 1,056 kg of cocaine from 
Martinique to South-western Greece by sailing a boat. The smugglers were 
involved in all phases of the smuggling scheme, from importation to sale 
(Court of Appeals, case 3481/2005 & 10/2006). Still, despite the frequency 
of joint projects involving controlled deliveries, the Greek authorities are 
not willing to take such initiatives for cocaine trades. One possible 
justification is the lack of political will to arrest and prosecute some 
perpetrators when interests of power protect the particular trade. 
Next, the following ‘actors’ appear to be involved in the cocaine smuggling 
business. This does not, of course, mean that these actors appear in all 
smuggling schemes. Offenders may have different ‘roles’ in different 
smuggling schemes, or assume more than one ‘role’: 
Brokers: Brokers are individuals who bridge the gap between two parties 
involved in the cocaine smuggling business. These individuals usually act as 
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intermediaries between people who broke social capital, connections, 
knowledge, expertise or specialization (see also: Decker and Chapman, 
2008). For instance, one of the individuals appearing in one of the trial 
reports was a broker between the transportation and processing networks. 
Also, even though brokers may have higher stakes compared to others 
involved in this business, in terms of financial and legal risks, they are also 
the ones to enjoy the highest financial returns within the circle of actors. 
Furthermore, they may be actively involved with the day-to-day operations 
of the scheme by buying and selling the merchandise, supervising the 
transportation of the retail, recruiting ‘workers’ for the business, having law 
enforcement agents on a payroll, or occasionally, helping a politician with 
his political objectives and aspirations. The broker, apart from the financial 
capital, possesses personal qualities and attributes that are instrumental and 
functional for the business, such as networking skills. A transporter (legally 
employed as a skipper), who was involved in a large-scale, unsuccessful 
scheme, describes how he perceived the social circle of brokers: 
Everybody knew us in Martinique. 'X' was working for many 
years in the marina and he knew everybody. He was working for 
a company there, and he had many acquaintances and business 
associates. I would often give them lifts to and from the airport. 
Their movements never aroused any suspicion; they were very 
transparent and open in their meetings. The meetings often took 
place in the 'L' Hotel. 
(Court of Appeals, case 3481/2005 and 10/2006) 
Under no circumstances, do we consider brokers to be Godfather-type 
figures. Although social and professional ties are important, most brokers 
are better seen as opportunists and arbitragers. The following account of a 
broker involved in a case of importing cocaine from Martinique, verified 
this: 
141 Chapter 4: Cocaine Barons 
I met 'K' by chance, in June-July 2002 and I asked him if he had 
any jobs... He told me that he knew someone in Holland who 
wanted to buy two yachts, and that he would share the legal 
commission with me…I went to meet this Russian in Holland 
before April 2003[…] he proposed to send the yachts to the 
Caribbean with ecstasy tablets […] I said neither yes nor no. In a 
later meeting 'K', told me that the yachts were already in the 
Caribbean. He asked me to bring them back with 100 kilos of 
cocaine and that I would be in contact with the Russian... He 
also said that it was urgent to find a crew. I accepted the offer. I 
was in a dilemma, but I had serious financial difficulties. 
(Court of Appeals, case 3481/2005 and 10/2006, p.p 168, 169-
170) 
Transporters: A key characteristic of complex cocaine smuggling 
schemes, is the management of large quantities of cocaine that need to be 
transported, stored and delivered from distant locations. This suggests that 
actors, who are willingly involved in such activities and are exposed to law 
enforcement tactics, have to deal with significant problems with regards to 
the practicalities of transporting as well as the concealment of bulky illicit 
cargos. Moreover, the unregulated nature of illicit trade means that property 
rights and contract laws do not apply. Consequently, any individual arrested 
in possession of substances, is regarded as the ‘rightful owner’. This 
indicates that transporters are usually actors who have strong financial 
interests in the network. Besides, transporters can be distinguished in 
captains and crew of vessels, and drivers. The former are responsible for the 
transportation of large quantities of cocaine primarily from South America. 
The latter, are responsible for transporting the merchandise in smaller 
quantities to stash houses and/or warehouses. It is very common that actors 
involved in the logistics and transportation of cocaine are paid in product. 
Again, once can notice the disorganised nature of this task. 
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Couriers: The couriers are usually those who transport smaller quantities of 
cocaine and involve other individuals in transporting merchandise in their 
luggage or in specific articles. For example, I have come across an Albanian 
courier transporting a small quantity of cocaine in a book. Relatively 
recently for the Greek context, ‘body-packers’ have appeared in the 
transportation of cocaine. More specifically, what ‘body-packers’ usually 
do, is to swallow quantities of condoms filled with cocaine. Moreover, in an 
effort to mislead the authorities, they frequently travel to Greece from Latin 
America via other European countries. ‘Body-packers’ are usually of a 
foreign nationality, in many cases West Africans (Nigerians, Ivorians etc.), 
including a large number of women. As an illustration, in July 2008, a 34-
year old ‘body-packer’, was arrested in the airport of Athens, travelling 
from Ivory Coast to Greece via Belgium. He had swallowed 54 condoms 
filled with cocaine of a total weight of 718 grams (Ethnos, 2008). Similarly, 
in early 2009, a 38-year-old Nigerian travelling from Brussels, was arrested 
in the same airport, having swallowed approximately 1.2 kilos of cocaine 
(Espresso, 2009). Erroneously, however, couriers are many times perceived 
both by the authorities and the media as ‘leading members’ of cocaine 
smuggling schemes (Eleytheros Typos, 2007). 
‘Authorities attention diverter’ (‘ksekarfoma’): Avoiding police 
detection by means of deception, is a ubiquitous tactic for most criminals. In 
the same way, actors who are involved in illegal markets such as that of the 
cocaine market, face significant legal and financial risks, and their deception 
tactics require a degree of sophistication. In their attempt to avoid law 
enforcement detection, cocaine smugglers use –primarily during the phase 
of transportation of the merchandise – an individual who is not only beyond 
suspicion, but in many circumstances, is also unaware of his involvement. . 
Furthermore, the selection of such an individual is based on connections 
with powerful individuals, as a facilitator that is able to guarantee the 
authorities’ diversion of attention. In one of the court cases examined, the 
deception tactic entailed the involvement of a female who was the daughter 
of a well-known and respectable journalist, associated with a popular 
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football club of Thessaloniki, and the niece of a top-level party member of 
the Greek Socialist Movement (PASOK). From the same court transcripts, it 
emerged that a ‘member’ of the smuggling network suggested the captain of 
the yacht transporting the cocaine to find a woman to accompany him in the 
trip, in order to ‘make this look as normal holidays’ (Court of Appeals, case 
3481/2005 and 10/2006, pp. 70,133) and, consequently, avoid unwanted 
attention. In addition, because the particular person was well connected, the 
hearings of the trial, as well as the testimonies, were consumed in 
explaining her role in the group, whereas other serious questions loomed 
unanswered. 
Un-loaders: These are usually individuals, who work legally at the port or 
the marinas (dockers) and unload the merchandise. Moreover, they usually 
are of Greek nationality, even though there have been situations where the 
un-loaders came from Pakistan, Italy and Albania. Whatever the case may 
be, un-loaders belong in the circle of facilitators of the actors involved. 
Warehouse owners: In most situations, actors involved in the 
transportation and/or importation of cocaine are also responsible for the safe 
storage of cocaine. However, I have encountered cases where the storage 
was sub-contracted to an individual owner of a legal warehouse near the 
port facilities in Athens. The owner of the warehouse was not aware that 
cocaine was hidden within the container stored in his warehouse. 
Corrupt public officials: A number of corrupt public officials are actively 
involved in cocaine smuggling schemes. From the court transcripts, it 
becomes evident that access to port and marina authorities as well as the 
Greek Coast Guard, is extremely functional. Similar to Zaitch’s (2002b: 
253) study, “entire operations can be organised around a single contact that 
guarantees access to the port” and/or the marina. In the court files examined, 
a number of cocaine smugglers claim that night-guards in the marina who 
had been previously actively involved in cocaine schemes, were aware of 
the operation and ensured that the unloading of cocaine from the vessels to 
the cars/vans, was uninterrupted and without witnesses. Besides, in the court 
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files there are also claims about high-ranking coast guard officers accepting 
bribes to ‘turn a blind eye’ to smuggling operations. In one of these 
accounts, the broker’s acquaintances in the Martinique provided a certain 
degree of protection and security to the boat transporting cocaine. Finally, 
police officers and border guards have been reportedly involved, among the 
sale of other commodities, in cocaine sales. However, similar to other illegal 
markets (Antonopoulos, 2008), corrupt public officials are not an 
indispensable feature of the cocaine smuggling business. 
Distributors: During the distribution phase, cocaine changes many hands. 
Therefore, it is fairly difficult to provide a detailed mapping of the ‘actors’ 
who participate in the retail phase. There seems to be quite a diverse 
background of those involved in the retail distribution of cocaine. For 
instance, we have come across middle-aged businessmen and teenage 
students as cocaine sellers. 
Lawyers: Lawyers are only one set of the peripheral, legal actors in the 
cocaine business. Although, it appears that they are not involved in the 
wholesale, middle-level or retail parts of the cocaine market, lawyers are 
primarily occupied with the legal defence of brokers. Furthermore, they 
facilitate the laundering of money from cocaine smuggling, through 
offshore companies owned by other clients. 
Women: The role of women in the cocaine business, has often escaped the 
radar of the authorities. Yet, spouses and partners in particular, seem to play 
a key function in these activities. Wifes are often money couriers and 
perform tasks that require the trust of the main organisers. Wifes can also 
help to avoid police attention. 
In all stages of the market, from importation to retail, the schemes are 
characterised by the versatility of the commodities traded (and other 
criminal activities). For instance, there are cocaine smugglers who are 
highly ‘specialised’ and deal only with cocaine, and others who are also 
involved in several drugs as well as other commodities. For instance, there 
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have been documented cases, in which traffickers traded both cocaine and 
heroin (Astynomiki Anaskopisi, 2004: 81). In the same way, in our 
investigation of a Greek-Spanish-Colombian network, an involvement in 
migrant smuggling, amphetamine trade, environmental pollution, diamonds 
and gold smuggling, arms smuggling, blackmail and financial crimes, was 
revealed (Court of Appeals, case 2585/2005: 117, 926, 897, 122). Similarly, 
in the Martinique case, there were numerous references to offences ranging 
from violations of shipping regulations, drug smuggling, murder and arms 
smuggling to diamond smuggling, fraud and forgeries. To conclude, the 
actors of the cases I have examined are best described as arbitragers who 
deal with whatever commodity falls into their hands, as long as market 
‘asymmetries’ (Passas, 1999) provide them with the opportunity to make 
profits.  
Table 4.3 Nationality of smugglers arrested by the Greek authorities 













Total 5,012 100 
Source: See Kostakos and Antonopoulos, 2010: 52 [Original source: SODN-EMP, 2002; 
2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007 and author’s own elaboration]. 
Furthermore, the vast majority of individuals involved in cocaine 
transportation into Greece (transporters and couriers) are Greeks, who often 
work in multi-ethnic networks. It is interesting to note that, unlike other 
contexts (see Pearson & Hobbs, 2001; Zaitch, 2003; Reuter, 2004; Paoli and 
Reuter, 2008), and despite the connotation the Colombian nationality may 
have in terms of cocaine smuggling for the average Greek, no references 
have been made either by authorities or media sources to the involvement of 
Colombians in cocaine smuggling in the country. As shown in Table 3, 
between 2001 and 2006, less than a third (26.2%) of the total arrestees for 
cocaine smuggling are of a foreign origin, whilst 73.2% of the arrestees are 
Greek. However, a significant number of foreign smugglers come from the 
Balkans (SODN-EMP, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007). 
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As mentioned earlier, it is the larger quantities that are being smuggled via 
sea routes that cross the Atlantic. These operations are more complex and 
time consuming in nature. Additionally, key nodes of these networks are 
permanently based in source and transit countries like Venezuela, 
Colombia, Guinea, Guiana and Martinique. Moreover, the networks of 
people who are directly involved in the operations, tend to have common 
professional backgrounds and, most of them, are linked to the shipping 
industry. Reporting on the activities of a cocaine smuggling network with 
Greek connections, dismantled in 2008 by the French authorities in Guinea, 
a Greek Coast Guard report comments: 
It was found out that the criminal organization in question was 
operating internationally in the field of drug trafficking with the 
assistance of people who were broadly connected to shipping 
including, ship-owners and third party ship-managers and ship-
crews, who knowingly participated in the transportation of 
narcotic substances. We can also observe the essential role of 
people who know their way around foreign countries and who 
use their professional status as shipping agents, representatives 
of shipping companies, traders and brokers as a legal cover. 
(Greek Coast Guard, Security Division, 2008: 1) 
Companies that rent private yachts, marina managers, skippers, maintenance 
workers, marina security guards and porters are also involved. They have 
different, active or passive, roles in the smuggling chains. The role of 
marinas, as an entry point for illegal goods, is underplayed by the media and 
policy makers. Yet, it is a point that the people interviewed, often 
highlighted. A marina worker and drug dealer in a Greek island, noted: 
Yes, there is drug smuggling going on here, in the marina. Every 
now and then, you learn about ‘deals’. The police also arrested 
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some guys a few months ago [for cocaine smuggling]. How is it 
possible for this guy, who is the manager of a marina, to buy 
expensive cars and make so much money in such a short period? 
He knows what’s going on. He also must be doing some "dirty-
business. 
(Informant 2, 2008) 
Another retired drug dealer explains the use of recreational boats for 
smuggling substantial quantities of drugs: 
If you own, or know someone who owns a sailing boat, you can 
do the job very easily and with very low risk. You sail to the 
pick-up point (a marina or a harbor)…then store the drugs inside 
the mast of the boat. Even if they stop you for inspection, they 
will not be able to cut through the mast, since the authorities will 
need an official warrant for such a major structural interference 
with the boat. 
(Informant 1, 2008) 
A high ranking coast guard officer explains that such practices, are known 
to the authorities, but there is very little they can do: 
The scheme is known. Big players in the yacht industry will 
give orders. When their yacht returns from the source country, 
usually the Caribbean, loaded with cocaine, they will declare it 
missing. In this way if something goes wrong they stay out of 
trouble, and most likely they will keep their yacht. We 
know...they know that we know...but no one is doing 
anything...no one can go against these interests. You will not 
find a prosecutor who will risk his/her career and will go to this 
guy and start investigating him for drug trafficking. 
(Informant 3, 2008) 
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Similar concerns are expressed by Mr. Aravantinos who is a high-ranking 
prison guard and has served in numerous prisons though Greece. He notes: 
Throughout my career as a prison guard, I have come across 
with at least 200-300 cocaine dealers whereas, the number of 
heroin pushers runs in thousands. No one touches the cocaine 
dealers and in those few cases in which they are arrested, they 
are most likely ‘gifts’ [for promotion] for high-ranking police 
officers. 
(Aravantinos, 2009) 
The significantly smaller number of imprisoned cocaine dealers may in fact 
be a result of the relative fewer dangers involved in using cocaine compared 
to heroin, and the subsequent diversion of resources and time, on the part of 
the law enforcement authorities into heroin (Kokkoris, interviewed in 2009). 
However, the rank prison officer’s account corroborates with other sources 
and highlights, in our opinion, the heavy involvement of ‘upperworld’ 
actors in the trade. For instance, in 2004, the police arrested seven 
individuals involved in the smuggling of more than one ton of cocaine, from 
Martinique to a marina in Southern Greece. According to the court files 
reviewed for the current study, these individuals received the drugs on 
behalf of a third party, consisted of Greek and Kazakhstani (legal) 
businessmen. Their task was to supervise the operation and facilitate the 
safe storage of the drugs in the marina. The group that was sent to collect 
the drugs, was supervised by yet another individual, responsible for the 
communications between the Greek and Kazakhstani businessmen, and the 
ongoing operations. Subsequently, the skipper of the yacht, with two of his 
colleagues, picked up the load from a Colombian speedboat offshore of 
Martinique. The cocaine was later transported to a marina in the South of 
Greece, where the smugglers were arrested. All of the ‘actors’ in that 
particular group knew each other, or had worked jointly in previous legal 
projects in marinas. In addition to the highlighting of the heavy involvement 
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of legal entrepreneurs and enterprises in the cocaine business, this is yet 
another example of how legal businesses constitute an environment in 
which legal business relationships can be easily transformed into illegal 
ones (von Lampe and Johansen, 2004).  
The retail levels of the cocaine market in Greece appear to be operated by 
actors who participate in the night-time economy, and are associated with, 
or actually are, nightclub bouncers (bravi) as well as night-time economy 
legal businessmen. Relevant to this, a recent study on bouncers in Greece, 
offers extensive interview material that supports such claims (Svourdakou, 
2003). Additionally, a court file consulted for the current study, along with 
other interview material, indicate that some notorious individuals, 
euphemistically called ‘The Godfathers of the Night’, heavily involved in 
extortion, cigarette and oil smuggling (Antonopoulos, 2008), are also 
involved in heavy cocaine smuggling and use (Court of Appeal, case 
3765/2006). Furthermore, bouncers, who normally transport one to two 
kilos of cocaine on behalf of some key players, often operate after receiving 
a phone call in order to ‘pick up the package’ and deliver it at specific 
locations. Actors associated with the legal night-time economy often narrate 
that: 
Bravi [bouncers/bodyguards] undertake the dirty business for 
the boss (i.e. businessmen involved in night-time economy). 
They will collect protection money, distribute drugs and take 
care of the security in nightclubs. 
(Ta Nea, 2008) 
Finally, off-shore companies, tourist agencies, gyms, garment factories, 
small division football clubs, Greek banks, and legal gambling schemes are 
used as smoke-screens, and/or as ways to launder money from cocaine 
smuggling. A ship-owner, who was involved in the smuggling of large 
quantities of cocaine, used to legalise money through a scheme involving 
about one hundred agents of the leading legal gaming company of the 
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country (O.P.A.P.) in Athens, Northern Greece and Crete. This, allowed 
him to obtain winning bet tickets. The ship-owner would then submit those 
tickets to the gaming company, which would issue a letter certifying (to the 
Greek Revenue) that he had indeed won these amounts of money 
(Eleytherotypia, 2004). 
The previous section examined evidence demonstrating that the ‘cocaine 
barons’ have continuous and collaborative relations with the economic and 
political systems. Also, it verified that they receive support from the civil 
society actors. Unlike any other illegal commodity, cocaine follows by far 
the most complex and sophisticated smuggling routes. As the stakes are 
high, planning requires time, effort and a good network. Hard evidence, and 
not merely hearsay, comes from two authoritative sources: i) satellite 
tracking devises implemented in the ship that transports the drugs, and ii) 
controlled deliveries. In order to secure either of these investigative 
techniques one needs to establish a transnational policing and intelligence 
network. In the absence of such network, the Greek police has no resources 
on it own to dismantle and prosecute the groups involved. 
4.6 Conclusions and implications: beyond 
Greece 
A series of issues can be noted in relation to how the present research 
contributes to existing knowledge on cocaine smuggling beyond Greece. It 
is equally interesting to reconsider the explanatory power of the holistic 
conceptual model that integrates social, cultural and system forces into a 
single framework (Diagram 1.1). 
The first one relates to the ‘entities’ involved in the business. Unlike 
popular depictions of ‘organised crime’, in general, and the cocaine market, 
in particular, no ‘cartels’ are involved. From the point the drugs are 
imported into the Greek market, there are horizontal and decentralised 
structures, as well as a constellation of individuals who conduct business on 
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a regular or opportunistic basis. Nonetheless, the major objective is 
normally the acquisition of profit. Within this context, the role of 
interpersonal networks remains, of course, central, similar to what used to 
be the case in the early stages of the Greek cocaine market in the first half of 
the 20th century. More specifically, the role of professional networks and 
the links between professional networks are vital in understanding the 
structure of the cocaine market in Greece. Thus, one can get a good grasp of 
the formation and operation of illegal networks by paying closer attention to 
the legitimate economic and social organisation. The degree of social 
embeddedbness in the cocaine smuggling business in Greece is significant 
(Kleemans, and Van De Bunt, 1999; Hobbs, 1998). The assemblage of 
criminal networks forms a loose web of social relations, very similar to that 
illustrated by other research, which could be described as a manifestation of 
‘organised crime’. The core pillars of these networks are comprised of 
networks from the shipping community, entertainment industry, gyms and 
fitness centres as well as from circles linked to security, law enforcement 
and local politicians. Although it is relatively easy for non-Greeks to enter 
into this web, there are, nevertheless, considerable barriers to enter the 
security and business sectors that provide cover, technology and protection. 
If migrants enter the political and economic life in a more dynamic way, we 
may as well see an integration process that will alter the current cocaine 
market dynamics. 
Another issue that arises from our presentation of the social organisation of 
the cocaine smuggling business in Greece, concerns the cocaine smuggler’s 
profile. There are differences in how ‘upper-level’ actors on one hand, and 
the ‘stereotypical’ offenders on the other, are perceived. Often, a clear 
division between the ‘legal’ and the ‘illegal’ does not exist. However, the 
division between the upper-world and the underworld, which is deeply 
embedded in popular culture and frequently reinforced by the media, has 
been accused of providing a distorted image of the true interplay between 
the different socio-economic layers of society. It has been suggested that the 
cause of this misrepresentation derives primarily from the nature of the 
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collected data, followed by their treatment. This view gains additional 
empirical support when alternative sources of data are considered. Thus, it 
is not surprising that when offenders’ perceptions on who the ‘real criminal’ 
is, and what constitutes a ‘real crime’ are considered, attention shifts to 
white-collar crime and the institutions, and social strata these figures 
represent (Magganas, Lazos and Svourdakou, 2008). The mainstream view 
amongst the law enforcement and political circles in Greece, that the drug 
user is, at least equally, if not more threatening than the dealer, cultivates a 
general protective shield against the upper levels of the cocaine market. 
Therefore, this practice has a positive effect on the symbiosis between 
‘organised crime’, politics and business. 
A number of studies on ‘organised crime’ have exposed the synergy 
between police, civil society, politicians and businessmen, as an irrevocable 
part of the history, origins and the development of ‘organised crime’ (Block 
and Chambliss, 1981). In light of emerging empirical data, which stand 
critical to established/bureaucratic perceptions, ‘organised crime’ is better 
conceptualised as a system of collaborative relationships between state, 
market and civil society actors. Hence, the cocaine market provides the 
ground for assessing the pervasiveness and embeddedness of ‘organised 
crime’ in business; something that is tied to the cultural variables 
contributing to cocaine smuggling, among other illegal trades. Moreover, 
the chapter has already emphasised the critical role played by the Greek 
maritime entrepreneurs. Greek ship-owners and networks tied to the 
worldwide shipping community, have played an important role in the 
facilitation of cocaine trade across the Atlantic by means of funding and 
transportation of bulky quantities across the Atlantic. This phenomenon is 
related to the traditional involvement of Greeks in international smuggling 
operations, and dates back to the first stages of the formation of the modern 
capitalist systems. For instance, historical evidence indicates that the 
smuggling of grains and coffee by Greeks was thriving during the Ottoman 
Empire. Nevertheless, during the French Revolution and the ‘Napoleonic 
exclusion’, Greek schooner owners and sailors defied prohibitions and were 
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introduced into several European ports, commodities whose prices 
skyrocketed (Theodoridis and Lazarou, 1981). Also, during the 20th 
century, Greeks were involved in cigarette smuggling, along with the 
smuggling of alcohol, oil, coffee, sugar and drugs. Geography, topography, 
merchant, shipping economy and diasporic networks, consisted essential 
elements in this involvement. Therefore, these historical dynamics intersect 
with economic variables and the formation of strong profiteering motives, 
as well as a normative addiction to arbitrage. Besides, such a behaviour is, 
promoted and cultivated by the Greek political system. 
Involvement in the cocaine smuggling business can also be explained by 
structural–economic perspectives. These suggest that individuals become 
involved in cocaine smuggling because of economic limitations which 
prevent them from earning sufficient amounts of money from licit activities. 
Therefore, participation takes place in an effort to augment their (legal) 
income. Though not exclusively, this tactic applies primarily, to foreign 
individuals involved in transportation of smaller quantities of cocaine as 
well as distributors. However, a political economy perspective is also 
applicable to ‘upper-level’ smugglers and the legal businesses involved in 
the cocaine market. As was present in our thesis, the cocaine smuggling 
business is heavily dependent upon Greek shipping companies, Greek ship-
owners and sailors who are willing to engage in the business. Therefore, 
they constitute what Morselli and Giguere (2006) would term as ‘critical 
actors’ of the business. These critical actors have entered an era of facing 
severe (for their standards) economic conditions. According to Athanassiou 
(2008: 11), 1,500 Greek-owned tankers, bunkers and containers faced 
immense pressure by the dramatic reduction in sea fares, which-along with 
the reduced value of the ships-has resulted in a loss of approximately US$ 
50 billion (see also Yfantis, 2009: 19). Maritime piracy is also a significant 
factor, as it increases the operational costs and enhances risks involved in 
shipping. Within such a context for the Greek shipping industry, one of the 
most important sectors of the country’s economy, heavier involvement in 
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cocaine smuggling and other black markets may be seen as an option in 
order to secure an advantage against competitors. 
We mentioned earlier that the depiction of the cocaine market, similar to 
depictions of illegal markets of other commodities and services, is 
immersed in moral dichotomies. Critically, what our description of the 
Greek cocaine market shows, not only is a distinction between the two 
groups, the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’, is impossible, but also it is the ‘good’ 
guys, who drive the market by demanding to be served by the ‘bad’ guys. In 
addition, it is important to note that individuals who ‘belong’ to both 
groups, constantly drift from legality to illegality and back, thus rendering 
the moral dichotomy, which has been a central theme in the depiction of the 
(Greek) cocaine business, as worthless. 
Against this background, it is imperative to observe how the cocaine market 
develops in times of, an almost, stagnating global economy. The prolonged 
economic crisis and the general culture of individualism, profiteering and 
illegality, may encourage the expansion and establishment of a strong 
cocaine market in Europe. A number of issues require our attention: Is the 
nature of the cocaine market in Greece going to change? How is the 
shipping community and other related business communities going to 
recover from/compensate for the huge financial loses? What kind of 
business endeavours would shady entrepreneurs discover to maintain their 
prestigious portfolios in the business world? There are also important 
theoretical aspects that necessitate further exploration. Our analysis of the 
cocaine market in Greece suggests that a holistic approach could provide the 
analytical framework, for considering historical and contemporary socio-
cultural, economic and institutional variables that could lead to a better 
understanding of ‘organised crime’. We believe that such a framework can 
contribute greatly to existing academic debates regarding the development 
and transformation of ‘organised crime’. 
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5.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapters investigated two criminals communities-the 
“Cocaine Barons” and the “Godfathers of the night”-whose social and 
professional links are mainly within the shipping industry and the night-
entertainment economy, respectively. There are three main differences 
between these two criminal networks: the level of social power, their 
visibility and the interaction with the criminal justice system. In the present 
chapter we turn our attention on the phenomenon of urban terrorist groups 
or otherwise, urban guerrillas. These groups are consisted of a loosely 
connected and a socially excluded, highly politicized community that has 
lowest levels of social power, in comparison to the previous two case 
studies. Although urban guerrilla groups are not ‘criminal organisations’, 
driven by economic motives, their tactics and methods are in some cases, 
similar to the profit-oriented organised crime groups. Moreover, 
revolutionaries and ordinary criminals often share the same enemies (the 
police and the ‘system’), and by default, their cooperation is impending 
(Jenkins, 1971: 10; Schmid, 1996; Makarenko, 2004). Also, politically 
motivated terrorist groups and profit oriented organised crime groups, are 
both defined and prosecuted by the Greek penal law as ‘criminal 
organisations’. Due to their positioning within the Greek society, we 
expected that left wing urban terrorist groups would have higher visibility 
and exposure by the criminal justice system. However, after reviewing all 
the available evidence, our analysis reveals a number of noteworthy 
anomalies. 
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Guerrilla war has been a major security concern for the International 
Community, particularly for the governments of Latin America, Asia and 
Africa. Following the success of Fidel Castro’s revolution in Cuba, many 
analysts and political leaders anticipated a domino effect of ‘Castro-style 
revolutions’, in countries where the Communist ideology had a significant 
influence. Soon after, anti-Communist hysteria dominated the security and 
political agendas in the Western world, vividly expressed with the rise of 
McCarthyism in the United States (Schrecker, 2002). By the mid-1960’s, 
many guerrilla movements had already made an appearance in Colombia, 
Bolivia and Guatemala. Moreover, the rising success and influence of the 
Communists in China and Vietnam showed the way for guerrilla 
movements in Malaysia, Philippines, South Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, 
Indonesia and Burma. For the most part, these revolutionary movements 
were mainly based in rural areas and the countryside. Radical ideologists 
and political leaders like Mao Tse-Tung, Vo Nguyen Giap, Fidel Castro and 
Che Guevara were the driving intellectual force behind these rural 
revolutionary groups. However, in many cases, the tactics and strategy of 
rural rebels did not produce the anticipated revolutionary results. Both in 
Latin America and the Southeast Asia, the achievements of rural 
revolutionary movements could not ‘boast of any success beyond survival’ 
(Jenkins, 1971: 2). Still, new groups or radicals realized that the urban 
environment provides greater proximity to sympathizers (student 
movement), intellectuals and a larger pool of potential targets. Besides, 
large cities provided greater protection and opportunities for the 
revolutionary cause (Russell, Miller and Hildner, 1974; Clutterbuck, 1990a, 
1990b). 
Furthermore, the process of urbanization that took place during the past 
three decades, with the migration of rural populations to larger cities for 
economic reasons are central for understanding the emergence of urban 
revolutionary movements. Chronic structural crises and the resultant 
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political instability can be considered as forces that, in many instances, have 
facilitated the upsurge of revolutionary wars (Marighellas, 2006: 507). In 
numerous occasions, the infrastructure of cities, especially in developing 
countries, could not keep pace with the increasing urbanization. Moreover, 
the socio-economic relationships of cities and the links between the polity 
(politicians and businesses) and civil society (voters, students, workers’ 
unions), was challenged as waves of newcomers made their way into the 
more affluent urban space, demanding a fair share of the pie. Under these 
conditions, dissatisfaction with the corrupted political and business elites 
was inevitable. The establishment of reactionary groups aimed at improving 
the power position of the urban population. However, the use of violent 
means was also expected. Along with these socio-economic and 
demographic changes, the presence of suppressive and dictatorial regimes, 
and the emergence of anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist and anti-American 
predispositions acted as catalytic factors for the uprising of armed struggles. 
The threat posed by the urban guerrilla movements in the industrialized 
nations of the Western world, is not straightforward. Some commentators 
point out that 'by 2025, two thirds of the world’s population is predicted to 
live in cities, opposed to just over a third in 1975’ (Lia, 2005: 143). This 
demographic shift, along with political, social and economic inequalities, 
could potentially provide a good ‘cause’ for the rise of urban guerrilla 
groups. However, others provide a different estimation for the future of the 
left-wing urban revolutionary movements. According to Martin, ‘left-wing 
revolutionary' activism is unlikely to match the scale or scope of the past, 
unless there is a new ideological revolution system or movement similar to 
20th-century Marxism, as a foundation. In the long term, there simply is not 
a large pool of new revolutionaries, and without a clear vision for the post 
revolutionary society, this pool will continue to be small at best’ (2010: 
253). 
Throughout history, urban guerrilla and terrorist groups have attempted to 
accomplish their goals through non-traditional, illegal and often, violent 
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means. Moreover, urban guerrilla groups are in most countries defined and 
classified as terrorist groups, even though urban guerrilla fighters have some 
particular characteristics that distinguish them from other terrorists (Europol 
TE-SAT, 2007). The Brazilian Marxist revolutionary, Carlos Marighella, 
who is considered by many the father of urban guerrilla warfare (see: 
Williams, 1989), provides in his Mini-manual of the Urban Guerrilla, a 
detailed analysis of the organisational dynamics within guerrilla groups. In 
this book, he offers a detailed investigation in the profile of the actors likely 
to participate in such groups. Marighella explains: 
The urban guerrilla is a person who fights the military 
dictatorship with weapons, using unconventional methods. A 
political revolutionary and an ardent patriot, he is a fighter for 
his country's liberation, a friend of the people and of freedom. 
The area in which the urban guerrilla operates is in the large 
Brazilian cities. There are also criminals or outlaws who work in 
the big cities. Many times, actions by criminals are taken to be 
actions by urban guerrillas. The urban guerrilla, however, differs 
radically from the criminal. The criminal benefits personally 
from his actions, and attacks indiscriminately without 
distinguishing between the exploiters and the exploited, which is 
why there are so many ordinary people among his victims. The 
urban guerrilla follows a political goal, and only attacks the 
government, the big businesses and the foreign imperialists [...].  
To compensate for few arms, little ammunition, and poor 
equipment, the urban guerrilla must have initiative and be astute 
[...]. In spite of these limitations, the urban guerrilla boasts 
certain advantages over the national armed forces and police. He 
has the support of the masses. The nation’s military and police 
authorities act on behalf of powerful interests and the wealthy, 
and against the best interests of the masses. It is they whom the 
masses hate. The urban guerrilla, on the other hand, defends a 
just cause - the cause of the masses. Where the urban guerrilla’s 
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weapons are inferior, he gains through moral superiority. In 
moral superiority the urban guerrilla has undeniable superiority. 
(Marighella, 1969:  3-4) 
So, defining characteristics of the urban guerrilla groups are their ongoing 
struggle against State oppression, as well as the popular support by the 
masses. In other words, in the eyes of the public, crimes such as 
assassination, arsons and bank robbery, committed by such ‘terrorist’ 
groups against the State or against State interests, are perceived to be 
serving the general good. In the guerrilla terminology, a bank robbery is an 
“expropriation” of funds that have been stolen from the people. Thus, 'the 
guerrillas steal them back on behalf of the people’ (Jenkins, 1971: 10). 
Furthermore, the rise of such a violent urban revolutionary movement is 
widely assumed to emerge as a response to the State's failure to mediate the 
different social and economic strata. Besides, although less developed 
countries have greater propensity in developing rebel movements within 
large cities, far left guerrilla groups have appeared in many industrialized 
nations and European countries during peacetime (Clutterbuck, 1990a; 
1990b).  
In Germany, for example, the Baader-Meinhof group (Red Army Faction) 
operated as a covert guerrilla group from 1970 to 1998, and was responsible 
for 34 deaths. Judging from the published manifesto and communiqués of 
the groups with the media, it becomes evident that the typical phraseology 
in the urban guerrilla lexicon derives from the Marxsist-Leninist-Maost 
writings, which acted as the main driving intellectual force behind the ‘anti-
imperialist struggle in the metropole’ practiced by this group (Red Army 
Faction [1971] (2005) 14). Another less well-known left wing urban 
guerrilla community that also operated in Germany during the same period, 
was the autonomous group of Revolutionary Cells. The German police 
recorded many hundreds of politically motivated assaults and ‘terrorist 
crimes’ against State and Imperialist targets that were carried out the 
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autonomous Revolutionary Cells (Clutterbuck, 1990a: 51-3). Similarly, in 
Italy and France, terrorist groups engaged in armed struggles against the 
state and imperialist targets. In many cases the authorities dismantled these 
groups, and their supporters remained inactive.  
In Greece, the urban guerrillas do not have an international reputation. 
However, they continue to be fairly active, organizing violent campaigns 
against the establishment and state targets. Since the 1970s, when the first 
urban revolutionary organisations began rising in the country (mainly in 
Athens), there have been hundreds of well organised and high-impact 
terrorist attacks including mortar assaults, drive-by shootings, bombing, 
arsons and assassinations (Mihas, 2001; Eleytherotipia, 2007). Adding to 
this, less organised terrorist incidents, such as arsons with gas canisters and 
petrol bombs against national and international private and public property, 
have become a daily routine. The evolution of the urban guerrilla movement 
in Greece has gone through three phases, starting from the early days of the 
military Junta in the 70s, to the present moment. The first generation of 
armed struggle is widely seen as a reaction to the military Junta imposed by 
the Colonels in April 1967. Once democracy was restored, many of those 
actors and underground organisations that practiced in the anti-dictatorial 
struggle through terrorist activities, entered eventually into mainstream 
politics. Then the second generation of terrorist groups was formed by 
hardliners and revolutionary groups that remained underground and 
continued guerrilla warfare, even after Parliamentary democracy was 
established in the country. Thus, followers and sympathizers of armed 
struggle formed new groups and continued their violent tactics against State 
and imperialist targets. However, by 2004, the core of the second generation 
of terrorist groups was dismantled in the end, and a large number of 
guerrilla fighters were put on trial. Finally, following the riots that took 
place in December 2008, new groups were formed and a new wave of 
bombings, assassinations and kidnappings against State, businesses and 
political targets begun. The scenario that the third generation of terrorist 
groups is linked with ordinary criminal and ‘gangsters’, is increasingly 
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gaining popularity in law enforcement circles of the country (Xrysochoidis, 
2009). 
5.3 The First Generation (1967-1975) 
Many contemporary historians and political analysts express the view that 
the Military Junta, that lasted for almost seven years, from 1967 to 1974, 
had detrimental consequences to the radicalization of youth and student 
movements. The prohibition and harsh control of most of the social and 
political life during the dictatorship by the Colonels contributed greatly to 
the formation of the revolutionary political culture in the post-Junta period. 
The coup of the 21 April signified the dissolution of political parties, the 
prohibition of all forms of political activity, and the silencing of the press 
and media communication (Yannopoulos, 1972: 164). The struggle against 
the ultra right wing Dictatorship had many consequences. For instance, old 
grievances from the Greek Civil war, remerged in the public consciousness. 
Therefore, a violent struggle was again, a very possible path to resist the 
Junta. Furthermore, a large number of political organisations from the left 
and the radical left, decided that the only way towards liberation was to take 
up arms against the authoritarian rulers. Moreover, many believed that the 
Greek Colonels were backed up by the US Government. As a consequence, 
the violent struggle was soon directed against both the Military Dictatorship 
and the Imperialist forces. This mixture of events was catalytic for the 
formation of an urban guerrilla movement. What is perhaps more 
interesting, is that many of the actors who led the guerrilla movement 
during the anti-dictatorial struggle, will later on become the elite of the 
country (Agrafiotis, 2003). 
The first anti-dictatorial groups were born simultaneously with the Military 
coup in 21 April 1967. The majority of these groups were active, well-
organised and democratic political organizations, even before the junta was 
imposed. 
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5.3.1 Panhellenic Liberation Movement (Panellio 
Apeleytherotiko Kenima) 
From the first day the martial law was imposed in Greece, Anderas 
Papanderou (later on the leader of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement, 
PASOK) was arrested and imprisoned, along with many other political 
prisoners. Soon after, Papandreou went into exile to France and Sweden. In 
1968, he established a revolutionary organization called the Panhellenic 
Liberation Movement. Then, he toured around the world to gain the support 
of foreign governments against the US backed Military Dictatorship in 
Greece. Thus, the Panhellenic Liberation Movement operated abroad and in 
Greece at the same time, and a large number of organizations were created 
and assimilated under the umbrella of the Movement. These groups engaged 
in propaganda activities (newspapers, periodicals and flyers), and in violent 
attacks and bombings against the Dictatorship (see: Historical Archives of 
Georgios Anomeritis; Autonomous Citizens' Action, 1983). At that time, a 
pocket size manual was published by the PLM. The manual circulated to all 
its members in Greece, addressing the main goals and objectives of the 
movement. Also, it included information on the modus operandi of covert 
operations, and techniques for avoiding detection by the authorities 
(Toutountzh, 2007). 
5.3.2 Democratic defence (Democratiki Amyna) 
Few years before the military junta was imposed in Greece, a number of 
scholars and intellectuals from the wider centre and centre-left political 
spectrum, established the group ‘Alexander Papanastasiou’. The aim of this 
group was to ‘systematically study key social and economic problems 
facing the Greek society and to take decisive action towards their solutions'. 
In 1967, the group was evolved into an anti-dictatorial organisation called 
the “Democratic Defence” (Simitis, 2007). The organization was officially 
established in May 1967, and was initially involved in propaganda 
activities, distributing flyers and brochures against the dictatorship in 
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Athens and Thessaloniki, the largest cities in Greece. Additionally, in 
cooperation with unites from the Navy, members of the Democratic 
Defence executed a series of bombings and terrorist attacks against selected 
targets. Interviews with intellectuals, who participated in the anti-dictatorial 
struggle, indicate that the membership of the groups was fairly diverse, 
including people from various professions such as taxi drivers, doctors, 
students, military officers and university professors (Magkakhs, 2005). 
Besides, many sources note that, Kostas Simitis, who was the leader of the 
Democratic Union and at the end of the 90s served as a Prime Minister, 
ultimately joined forces with Andreas Papandreou in the Panhellenic 
Liberation Movement (Politi, 1996; Katsoridas, 2004). 
5.3.3 The ‘October 20 movement’ 
The revolutionary movement of ‘20 October’, was established in 20 October 
1969 in Paris. The movement was established by former members of the 
‘Democratic Defence’ and ‘PAK’, as well as by people (civilians) who were 
at the time not involved in any revolutionary organisation. Amongst those 
who participated in the group, there were people who participated in the 
second generation of terrorist groups (ELA and Christos Kassimis). The 
main ideological project of the group was to oust the military dictatorship in 
Greece, with all the available violent means. It is worth noting that the 
group trained many Greek political activists who shortly after, became 
prominent figures in Greek politics. Although, very little is known regarding 
the funding and organisation of these groups, the following interview by 
Petros Eythimiou (currently the President of the OECD Assembly), provides 
a glimpse into the logistical support and training received by Greek anti-
dictatorial organisations. 
A. I was in the middle-left and moved towards the revolutionary 
left during the Dictatorship [...]. In 1967,I was member of a 
group called “Rigas Fereos” and in 1969, I entered organisations 
that supported the armed struggle against the dictatorship. 
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Q. Did you participate in any real revolutionary activities 
besides intellectual debates during the dictatorship? 
A. It was the best years of my life. We started in “Rigas Fereos” 
with brochures and newspapers... 
Q. Bombings? 
A. For six years I lived an intense life [...]. It was by chance that 
we came out of this alive. In the summer of 1971, I went in  
Paris and was thoroughly trained in guns and explosives [...]. 
Q. Why did you go to Paris to receive training on urban 
conflict? 
A. This is where the ’October 20 movement’ could provide 
training for the rest of us. 
(Cited in Theodorakis, 2001) 
Recently emerged CIA documents indicate that American Banks (as well as 
other foreign governments) provided financial support and political 
patronage to the leaders of the anti-dictatorial struggle (Hardavelas, 2010). 
Those who were labelled as ‘terrorist’ during the dictatorship subsequently 
became heroes and assumed control of the key political institutions of the 
country: politics, education, media and music/entertainment.  
5.4 The Second Generation (1975-2002) 
During the seven years of military dictatorship, the political climate in 
Greece, facilitated the emergence of a large number of revolutionary and 
anti-authoritarian organizations. The use of terrorism, as a tool against the 
authoritarian regime, was embraced by a large number of political figures 
and intellectuals from the left and the centre-left of the political spectrum. 
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This was a period where violence, terror and chaos dominated the political 
and social life in many Greek cities. At that time, the political question was 
how would the country come out from this political turmoil. Leading 
political figures from the resistance movement, such as Andreas 
Papandreou, supported the view that ‘once the dictatorship was overthrown, 
these organisations [urban guerrillas] should be dismantle and replaced by 
democratic political parties that would eventually compete with each other 
in order to gain the popular vote’ (Mpalioti, 2005). His intention was that 
the PAK would eventually be transformed into a legal political party. 
Indeed, many activists joined the ranks the socialist party PASOK, formed 
by Andreas Papandreou in September 1974. Others were assimilated by the 
Communist Party (KKE) and by other left-wing political parties.  
Although the overthrow of the military junta, in 1974, produced a 
democratic constitution, several remaining radical organizations that had 
taken part in the armed struggle during the dictatorship, decided to continue 
their struggle against the newly born political system. The ideological 
program of those organizations, continued to fight the system in the post-
junta period, influenced by the works of left-wing revolutionist like Marx, 
Lenin, Mao, Trotsky and Che Guevara. However, the transformation of 
radical left-wing, anti-authoritarian organizations, that in the eyes of the 
general public were fighting for a great cause and for the restoration 
democracy, was not a simple process. In particular, the different ideological 
programs and the available on the table action plans for the future of urban 
guerrillas in Greece produced significant differences and conflicts amongst 
the remaining hard-liners (Papachelas and Telloglou, 2003: 54-64). 
Nevertheless, the two main organizations in the post junta period, the 
‘Revolutionary Popular Struggle’ (ELA) and the ‘Revolutionary 
Organisation November 17’, that could have provided a solid structure for 
the growth of a second generation of urban guerrillas, had very different 
visions regarding the use of terrorism as a political tool in the new political 
context (Agrafiotis, 2003; Nikolakopoulos, 2002). 
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The second generation of urban guerrilla groups emerged in the immediate 
aftermath of the fall of the junta, between 1974 and 1975. Even after the fall 
of the military dictatorship, the role of leftish discourse and rhetoric was 
fundamental for the encouragement and support of new forms of armed 
struggle. In any case, the political parties that gained power (politicians, 
intellectuals, businesses and the media) in the post-junta era, were actors, 
who in some way or another, supported and participated in unconventional 
political tactics (i.e. terrorism) for achieving their goals. Moreover, there 
were still a number of former members of the military junta, mostly police 
officers and foreign operatives in the country that could potentially provide 
‘legitimate’ targets for those radical groups who had decided to continue the 
armed struggle (Ios, 2005; Revolutionary Organisation 17 November, 
1975a, 1975b, 1976, 1977). 
The post junta period was marked by high levels of social unrest and 
violence. Within such a fragile political environment, the Greek State was 
straggling to exercise power and impose the rule of law. Thus, the second 
generation of revolutionary groups would then have to remain underground 
and out of sight in order to avoid detection. In contrast to other groups, the 
second generation of terrorist groups will not have the means and resources 
to ‘tour Europe’ and the rest of the world in order to get support by foreign 
intellectuals and governments. After democracy was restored, the first 
generation of revolutionaries assumed prominent positions in the economic, 
political, social, and cultural systems of the country. In reality, the 
oppressive regimes imposed by the newly born democratic State, meant that 
the second-generation urban guerrillas would have to operate in the same 
milieu with common professional criminals. Hence, the third generation of 
terrorists, as we will see later on, eventually shared the same prison cells, 
funding sources and modus operandi. Additionally, they ultimately shared 
the same suppliers of ammunition and the same circles of friends as well as 
enemies. 
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In the early 1980s, we see the consolidation of networks between urban 
gangs of young males, based mainly in Athens, and professional criminals. 
Drug dealing and property crime seem to be the main activities that bind 
these two different worlds together. The press during that time remarks: 
Organised gangs are gaining a foothold in the Greek society. 
Many are operating openly, like the “iron fist of fascism”. There 
are, however others that operate covertly. These gangs are even 
more sinister. Here, the buts and the iron chains are being 
replaced with guns. Guns circulate relatively freely among 
criminals, who will not hesitate to use them against the popular 
movement. The para-state and the underworld can be seen in 
perfect unity in these illegal gangs [...]. The meeting place for 
those people [gang members], is the Cyprus Square, in 
Kallithea. The network includes far-right fascists, anarchists, 
drug dealers, thieves and muggers. They have all been united 
under one chapter: drugs and money [...]. In effect, the activities 
of the gangs in Cyprus Square, differ very little from those from 
the Ampelokipoi and Kolonakiou Squares. 
(Nikolakopoulos, 1983) 
As noted before, after the end of the junta, the Greek society was in turmoil. 
Thus, criminality, deviance and the problem with law and order became 
common themes of the newly democratically elected socialist government. 
As it is demonstrated in table 4.1, the total number of convictions in courts 
for all recorded crimes in the post junta period, increased steadily through 
the 80s. A young man who was involved in these gangs explains: 
Many of us had taken part in the riots for the anniversary of the 
end of Junta. Some had been arrested. They were the hoodies 
that smashed shop windows and put fires. Lefties and neo-Nazi 
acted in unison at that time. They also co-operated closely in the 
distribution and use of drugs. 
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(Quoted in Nikolakopoulos, 1983) 
About 500 bombings and a large number of violent assaults have been 
attributed to the second generation of urban guerrilla groups. Although 
official statistics from the police authorities responsible for investigating the 
activities of terrorist groups in the post-junta period, have not been made 
public, journalistic sources claim that 12 revolutionary groups have been 
fairly active in the country in the periods between 1975 and 2000 (To Bhma, 
2002). 
Diagram 5.1 Total number of people convicted in court (1926-2004) 
Source: National Greek Statistics Organization 
According to the same sources, some of these twelve revolutionary 
organizations had close associations with each other, and formed a loosely 
connected network of about 120 individuals who collaborated with each 
other on an ad hoc basis. Furthermore, the majority of these individuals 
participated in two or more of these organizations. However, the 
Revolutionary People’s Struggle (ELA), that achieved more that 300 
terrorist attacks between 1975 and 1995, is considered by many, the 
‘mother’ of all organizations (Nikolakopoulos, 2002). 
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5.4.1 Case 1: Revolutionary People’s Struggle (ELA) 
From 1975 to approximately the mid 1990s, the Revolutionary People’s 
Struggle was one of the most active (along with the 17N group) and well-
organised terrorist groups operating in Greece. Furthermore, the 
organisation is considered as the core organisation that would later on assist, 
cooperate, train and inspire the materialization of a large number of smaller, 
armed revolutionary organizations that operated mainly in Athens and 
Thessaloniki. According to the official political manifesto of ELA that was 
published in October 20, 1986 in the Greek newspaper Eleytherotypia, the 
organisation was created during the summer of 1974. This was the so called 
‘hot summer’ of the post Junta period that, according to various political 
commentators, played a catalytic role in the history of contemporary armed 
struggle in Greece. During the twenty years of its existence,, ELA was 
involved in three assassinations, 180 explosions and more than 80 arson 
attacks against public buildings, Multinational Corporations, police 
departments, publicly owned beaches, cinemas, private and public cars, 
transport infrastructure and night clubs and bars (Kyriakopoulos, 2004). 
Official operations began in April 1975, with simultaneous arson attacks 
against diplomatic vehicles (see table 4.1). Analysts believe that ELA was a 
working class organization that inspired many other groups to take part in 
the post-junta urban guerrilla movement in Athens. The Revolutionary 
People’s Struggle was formed by Christos Kassimis, a member of the anti-
dictatorial revolutionary organization “20 October” (Nikolakopoulos, 2002). 
The size and scope of ELA is grasped when considering the large number of 
publications the organization achieved during its operations. Although many 
of these publications are not in circulation any more, some sources note that 
ELA published more that 100 documents involving propaganda, political 
analyses and manuals on guerrilla warfare (Indimedia, 2004). According to 
judicial sources, from May 1975 to February 1982, the organisation printed 
44 issues of a political magazine called “Anti-plirosforisi”(see image 4.1).  
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The recorded terrorist incidences involving ELA and other organizations, 
believed to be closely associated with ELA,  is presented in Table 4.1. 
Image 4.1 An original copy of the magazine Anti-plirosforisi by the 
Revolutionary People’s Struggle with the red framed star and the words 
‘ΕΛΑ’ (ELA), impressed at the centre of the document. 
Table  5.1 Attacks by ELA and ELA affiliated group (1975-1987) 
Date Method Target Location 
Attacks by ELA (1975-1987) 
9.4.1975 Arson USA cars Athens (Eleysina) 
20.7.1975 Arson Public Beach Athens (Voula and 
Vouliagmeni) 




29.01.76 Vandalism Electric Chain Store Athens 
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6.3.1976 Arson Public transport 
busses (6) 
Athens 








11.09.1976 Explosion Skalistiri’ Enterprises Athens 
14.08.1976 Explosion Two Siemens offices Athens (Ilisia and 
Kifisos) 
13.11.1976 Explosion Buildings of Special 
Police Forces (MAT) 
Athens (Kesariani) 
13.11.1976 Explosions US companies and 
PX 
Athens (Eliniko) 
15.01.1977 Explosions Cinema Atticon Athens 
12.02.1977 Vandalism Cinema Kallithea Athens 




22.02.1977 Vandalism Shop owned by MNC Athens (Ilisia) 
30.03.1977 Arson 15 US cars Athens 






14.07.1977 Explosion American Express Athens 
14.07.1977 Arson American Express Athens 
09.10.1977 Explosion American Army Base Athens ( Eliniko) 
20.11.1977 Explosion Boss Corporation Athens (Iera Odo) 
30.07.1978 Arson Public Beach Athens (Alimos) 
02.08.1978 Explosion Public transport 
busses (4) 
Athens 
13.01.1979 Explosion Police car Athens 
30.01.1979 Explosion Public busses (5) Athens 
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12.03.1979 Arson Public transport 
busses (2) 
Athens 












22.05.1979 Explosion Court of First 
Instance of Athens 
Athens (Ononia) 
08.07.1979 Explosion Hellenic Tobacco 
Association  
Athens (Kalithea) 




26.07.1979 Explosion Ministry of Education Athens 
10.10.1979 Explosion Public Transport 
Company 
Athens (Exarchia) 
09.05.1980 Explosions 22 US cars Athens 




03.08.1980 Explosions Two Private tracks  Athens (Eleysina) 




18.10.1980 Explosion Social Insurance 
Institute (IKA) 
Athens (Omonia) 
30.10.1980 Explosion Electricity supply hub Athens 




17.04.1981 Explosion Foreign Businessman Athens (illisia) 
05.05.1981 Explosion US Diplomatic Car Athens 
(Kononaki) 
08.05.1981 Explosions Four police stations Athens 
173 Chapter 5: Urban Guerrillas 
01.04.1982 Explosions Home of US 
Ambassador 
Athens 
26.04.1982 Explosions Offices of IBM Athens 
27.04.1982 Explosions Car of US embassy 
and CIA Officer 
Athens (Kolonaki) 
02.06.1982 Arson.Explosions US cars and 
Companies 
Athens 
03.06.1982 Explosions Three US Banks Athens 
02.07.1982 Explosions Five Israeli and 
American targets 
Athens 
31.07.1982 Explosion Offices of the Union 
of Greek Shipowners 
Athens 
30.09.1984 Explosions Ministry of Industry 





01.07.1985 Explosions Hotel Appolon Palace 
and US camp 
Athens (Kavouri 
& nea Makri) 
18.03.1986 Explosions Hellenic-American 
Union 
Athens (kolonaki) 
01.07.1986 Explosions Ministry of Planing 
(YPEXODE) 
Athens 
26.07.1986 Explosions Greek Bank, Skalistiri 
Enterpise, 
Athens 
12.08.1986 Arson Citybank Athens (P. Faliro) 
01.10.1986 Explosions Government targets Athens 





20.10.1986 Explosions Police Station Athens 
(Kononaki) 
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29.04.1987 Explosions Ministry of Finance 
(Tax collection 
agency) & US 
Company 
Athens 
14.05.1987 Explosions Ministry of 
Agriculture  
Athens 
19.08.1987 Explosion Ministry of Finance Athens (Eleysina) 
27.11.1987 Explosions American Army 
Supermarket (PX) 
Athens (Syggrou) 
27.04.1988 Explosion Tax Collection 
agency & Police 
station 
Thessaloniki 
21.05.1988 Explosions Police station; Cafe 
Bar & Disco bar 
Athens (Pereus) 
05.07.1988 Explosions Industrial targets Athens 
02.12.1988 Explosions  European Bank; 
Offices of the 
European Union 
Athens 




01.07.1989 Explosion Ministry of Justice Athens 
07.07.1989 Letter Explosions 
(warnings) 
Journalists Athens 
14.07.1989 Explosions Ministry of Interior; 
Internal Revenue; 
School of Public 
Administration 	  
Athens 
02.11.1989 Explosions Home of Chief of the 
Hellenic Police  
Athens 
08.12.1989 Explosion Police station Athens (Tzitzifies) 
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Attacks by 1 May (1987-1989) 
29.06.1987 Assassination 
(attempted) 






23.01.1989 Assassination Prosecutor Athens 




Attacks by ELA and 1 May (1990-1995) 
03.04.1990 Explosions Offices of the General 
Confederation of 
Greek Workers; 





30.03.1991 Explosions Citibank Athens (Kypsili 
and Ampelokipi) 
03.04.1991 Explosions-arson French embassy cars Athens (Kolonaki) 
03.04.1991 Explosion United Nations 
Offices 
Athens 
24.06.1991 Side road Explosion Police officers Athens 
16.07.1991 Explosions Insurance Companies 
(4) 
Athens 





21.02.1992 Explosion Night Club (Can-Can) Athens 
26.07.1992 Explosion (remote 
controlled) 
Special Police Force 
bus (MAT) 
Athens 
17.03.1992 Explosions European Unin cars 
and Bank 
Athens 
20.03.1992 Explosion State weaknesses Athens (Thisis and 
Melissia) 
5.4 The Second Generation (1975-2002) 176 
29.03.1992 Explosion Night Club (Can-Can) 	  
30.03.1992 Explosions Court Buildings Thessaloniki 
15.02.1993 Explosion Shipping Company Athens (Eleysina) 
24.02.1993 Explosions ETBA Bank Athens 
23.03.1993 Explosions Ministry of Trade Athens 









03.02.1994 Explosions Goethe Institute Athens 




17.04.1994 Arsons Financial Director of 
French Academy; 
Employee of French 
Academy; Employee 
of the Dutch Embassy 
Athens 
24.04.1994 Explosion United Nations 
Offices 
Athens (Skoufa) 
25.04.1994 Explosion United Nations 
Offices 
Athens 
07.06.1994 Explosion Belgian Embassy Athens 
24.06.1994 Explosion European Union 
Offices 
Athens 
11.06.1994 Explosion German Insurance 
Company 
Athens 
19.11.1994 Explosion Police Officers Athens 
(Ampelokipi) 
06.12.1994 Explosion Internal Revenue 
Agency 
Athens (Pereus) 
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Source: Author’s own research. 
5.4.2 Case 2: Revolutionary Organisation 17 November 
The leaders of ELA were often accused for adopting a ‘softly-softly 
approach’. Political activists, and the remaining radicals who did not enter  
the political system after the end of junta, had a different vision of the 
future of urban conflict in Greece. The 'November 17' (17N), an 
organization closely associated with the leadership of ELA (see image 4.2), 
especially in the first years of the transition to democracy, is by far the 
deadliest group in the history of urban terrorism in Greece (Papachelas and 
Telloglou, 2004: 73-5). Whereas ELA, and many other terrorist groups, 
focused on sabotage, arsons and bombings, 17N, as shown from the number 
of terrorist attacks (Table 4.2), focused heavily on associations and 
fundraising through bank robberies. 
Nevertheless, the group was dismantled in 2002, after a faulty bomb 
detonator caused an explosion while being transported by a member of the 
terrorist organisation. Police investigations revealed that eight members 
composed the core of the group. It is indicative that most of the members, 
never arose the suspicion of the law enforces authorities. Instead, they had 
always maintained a low profile (Lampropoulos, 2002). Moreover, the 
group had a very rigid organisational structure. Judicial evidence suggests 
that each member had a clearly defined role in the group. In addition to the 
assassination of high ranking national and foreign figures, that in a way 
guaranteed high levels of visibility for the group, N 17 was also known for 
its mastery in the planning and execution of a large number of bank 
robberies. Besides, ammunition and firepower was often acquired and stolen 
from police stations and military camps. Nevertheless, the case of the 17N is 
unique in that it is, perhaps, the first time in the history of urban guerrilla 
warfare, where financial resources and funding of such groups become 
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public. Indeed, looking at the record of the group in executing bank 
robberies, many have proposed the theory that the 17N was a renegade 
terrorist group that was transformed into an organised crime group, driven 
mainly by economic motives. 
Image 4.2 An original copy of a communiqué by the Revolutionary 
Organisation November 17 with the red-framed start and the letters ’17 N’ 
printed at the centre of the document 
The structure and wider connections of Greek terrorist remain an intriguing 
puzzle. All evidence we have on the composition of radical leftish groups, 
derive from the confessions of former 17N members. Two conflicting views 
on the structure of the revolutionary groups are most prevalent. The first 
pertains to the widespread belief, especially amongst official and law 
enforcement circles, that terrorist groups are linked with each other as well 
as with others groups that engage mainly in criminal activities, with non-
ideological objectives. 
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Brady Kiesling, an American Diplomat formerly stationed in Greece, who 
has done numerous investigations on the terrorist groups in Greece, 
summarizes the inner workings of the 17N, as follows: 
Throughout the active operational period [of the 17N group], its 
membership never exceeded the 15 or maximum 17 individuals, 
organised in small groups that often had family elements. The 
safe houses at any case, ranged from 6 to 17, while four or five 
members received each month about 100.000 (GRD)-at the 
beginning, and 150.000 (GRD) later on-in order to pay the rent, 
electricity bills and expenses. Moreover, every Christmas and 
Easter, bonuses were given to all the members in order to go on 
holidays.[...]. Furthermore, the organisation was not receiving 
intelligence from secret sources, as the Greek society believed. 
On contrast, information was gathered through newspaper 
articles and from hearsay by its members, who were regularly 
going out for  coffees in Kolonaki. 
(Cited in Aggelioforos, 2009) 
However, the official view of the structure of terrorism in Greece was 
highly challenged by one of the alleged chiefs of the 17N group. In an 
interview he remarks: 
Q. From the first moment you were arrested, you rejected the 
claims that you have been the leader of 17N. You refuted all the 
charges by the police, although there is evidence, such as your 
personal hand written notes and your fingerprints. Are you still 
supporting the same position? 
A. Absolutely. The position of the ‘leader’ is a police 
construction. Whoever reads carefully the confessions of the 
alleged members of the 17N, will understand that what they 
describe is an organisation with autonomous nuclei that decide 
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only for those activities they are carried out by themselves, and 
act independently from each other. History shows that similar 
small organisations don’t have a leader, simply because the so-
called leader will not have the mechanism to insert his power, 
since monitoring the everyday life of the members is impossible. 
The opposite happens only in rural guerrilla groups, where the 
leader can exercise authority. Yet, the police mind-frame, 
national or foreign, cannot conceive an organisation without a 
leader. 
(Giotopoulos, interviewed in: Alexandris, 2002) 
Indeed, it is indicative that the initial confessions of the 17N arrested 
members, seem to have been elaborated by the authorities, in a way so as to 
reflect the 'needs' of the law, according to which a terrorist organisation has 
specific roles and divisions of labour. 
The following sections will try to highlight some of the core aspects of the 
November 17 organisation, as well as the roles and function of its members. 
More specifically, we will examine social relations between the affiliates, 
the source of funding, the supply of arms and weapons, the operational 
capabilities, and the division of labour. 
Generally, terrorist groups such as the November 17, have a very secretive 
and elaborative structure, taking sophisticated measures against police 
interference. Moreover, recruitment takes place within specific ideological 
circles and the anarchist community. Yet, family ties seem to be preferred. 
In the case of the 17N group, for example, we encounter first and second 
degree family relations. The following passage is the confessions of 
Vasssils Xiros, the youngest of the three brothers involved in 17N: 
Q. How do you know [...] that your brother and the other person 
with the name Luke were members of the Revolutionary 
Organisation 17 November? 
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A. I know all this because I also, have participated in these 
activities during different phases of the organisation. In 1992, in 
particular, when I finished my military service and returned to 
my hometown in Thessaloniki to stay with my parents. Three 
years later, if I remember correctly, in 1995-1996, I visited 
Athens to see my brother Sabbas [...]. I stayed with him for 
about 2-3 months, and then returned to Thessaloniki. Six months 
after that, I went back to Athens [...]. This time, I stayed 1-2 
weeks. During that period, we had few general discussions about 
how the powerful people in the country are trying to ‘suck our 
blood’, and that the Americans, having the power and wealth,  
destroy the world. Although I was not politically active at that 
time, I agreed with these views. Also, Sabbas told me that there 
are a couple of friends who resisted this situation through 
various activities, and he asked me whether I too, would like to 
help them. I agreed to try and see if I can help. So, in the 
following days I met in a cafe', with my brother Sabbas, a 
person that was introduced to me by my brother, as Luke. [...]. 
In this meeting, Luke suggested to plant a ‘basket’, a code name 
for bomb [...]. 
(Xiros, 2002) 
From the statements provided by the apprehended members of the 17N 
groups, it can be assumed that bank robberies had been the main source of 
income and funding of the group. Here, Sabbas Xiros, one of the captured 
core members of the 17N group narrates: 
The second bank robbery organised by the ‘17 November’ took 
place in 1989, at the Ergasias Bank in Patisia. In that robbery, 
besides Luke, Stamatis, two others, and myself that I cannot 
recall also participated. We took about 23.000.000 (GRD). 
Then, the next robbery took place in 1990, at the Ergasias Bank 
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in Peristeri. I went there with Stamatis and Xristodoulos and few 
others that I cannot recall. From there, we took about 
45.000.000 (GRD). In 1992, I remember [in another robbery], 
Georgatos, Xristodoulos, Luke dressed up as a police officer, 
Apostolis, the ‘Turk’, I, and another one , whose name I cannot 
recall...from that robbery we took 395.000.000. In 1997, myself, 
my brother Vassilis, Luke and another one, on behalf of ‘17N’ 
we robbed the Post Office in Bironas, and after breaking down 
the door with a iron cutter we took 100.000.000 (GDR). Also, 
in 1998, me, Vassilis and Xristodoulos, we robed the ETE in 
Pagrati. I forced the door with a hammer. We took about 
110.000.000 (GDR). In 2001, myself, Vassilis and Luke, robed a 
armoured truck [...] we took about 80.000.000. Our last robbery 
was this year with the same amount of money mission [...] and 
we took 230.000 EURO. 
(Cited in Eleytherotypia 2002) 
5.4.3 Case 3: Revolutionary Struggle (RS) 
The group Revolutionary Struggle is the most noticeable organisation in the 
post 17N era. The group made its debut on the 6th of September 2003, with 
a double bombing of a court in Athens. Six months later, the group sticks 
again and targets Citibank. In May 2004, and only a hundred days before 
the Olympic Games, the group gains international recognition and visibility, 
as the international media publishes stories on a possible terrorist attack 
during the Olympic Games. Moreover, the group seems to follow a mixture 
of tactics similar to that of both the November 17 and the Revolutionary 
People’s Struggle (ELA). The Revolutionary struggle has under its belt few, 
high profile and symbolic attacks, like the RPG attack against the American 
Embassy in Athens, and the bombing of the Stock Exchange, as well as a 
large number of attacks against police forces state buildings. Interestingly, 
journalist and police sources claim that some of the members of the 
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Revolutionary Struggle had frequent communications with some of the 
imprisoned members of the November 17 group (Bradelis, 2010). 
5.4.4 Splinter cells and other affiliated organisations 
As already noted in the previous section, ideological and logistical 
differences between and within terrorist groups, resulted in the formation of 
ad hoc groups, and/or splinter cells, with the aim to embark in more violent 
activities, such as assassinations. In fact, police sources believe that ELA 
and 17N were initially a single group that later on, due to ideological 
differences, was separated. Hence, the community of revolutionaries that 
made an appearance after the end of the junta, acted as a pond for the 
recruitment of members and political activists who were willing to 
participate in the armed struggle movement. Based on journalist accounts, 
the following groups were shaped: 
May 1 
The organisation 'May 1', makes its first appearance in June 1987. The 
attempted murder against George Raytopoulos, the then president of the 
General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE) was their first act. A year 
after, in 23 January 1989, the group assassinated Theodoros Bernardo, who 
was a public prosecutor of the Hellenic Supreme Court of Civil and Penal 
Law. Subsequently, the group collaborated with ELA. Thereafter, it 
remained inactive (To Bhma, 2002). 
June 78 
The only direct activity of this group was the assassination of Mpampali. 
Later on, it was discovered that the organisation was established by the 
members of the ELA, in order to curry out exclusively this attack (To 
Bhma, 2002). 
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The Revolutionary group of Internationalist Solidarity Xristos Kassimis 
(1977-1985) 
This group makes an entry into the urban guerrilla scene of Athens with a 
number of small scale attacks between 1975 and 1982. The organisation 
engages mainly in bombings and arsons against state and imperialist targets. 
It is of special interest to mention that the name ‘Christos Kassimis’ had 
been used by a large number of anarchist organizations in the past. More 
specifically, Kassimis was an anarchist who participated in the anti-
dictatorial organizations ‘Democrat Defence’ and ‘20 October’, the first 
‘casualty’ of the post junta urban guerrilla movement. Many believe that 
Kassimis, as well as the new organisations that emerged after his death, 
have very close ties with ELA (Kyriakopoulos and Chatzigeorgiou, 2003; 
To Bhma, 2002) 
The Popular revolutionary Struggle (LEA) (1975-1982) 
The 'Popular Revolutionary Struggle', is one of the few organizations that 
largely operated in Thessaloniki. The group was responsible for a number of 
arsons and bombings against the offices of political parties and 
organizations. Also, LEA was in charge for explosions in police 
departments and numerous banks. It is widely believed that the group was 
initially formed by members of the November 17. (To Bhma, 2002) 
The Revolutionary Organisation October ’80 (1980-1981) 
This group orchestrated only six attacks, between 1980 and 1981. The 
targets of the group were diverging, ranging from arsons in shopping 
centres, electric companies and cars owned by foreign companies. It is 
indicative that some of these terrorist attacks created conflicts between the 
various groups of the urban guerrilla community in Athens, as some of 
these targets (mainly against the shopping centre that left many workers 
unemployed), were seen as  counter-revolutionary acts. 
185 Chapter 5: Urban Guerrillas 
The Revolutionary Popular Solidarity Group (OELA) (Οµάδα 
Επαναστατικής Λαϊκής Αλληλεγγύης). 
In April 1983, a remotely detonated bomb nearly kills the Saudi Arabian 
Ambassador, in Athens. Interestingly, this attack was the very first terrorist 
incident, involving high technology explosive mechanisms in Greece. The 
group for the 'Revolutionary Popular Solidarity' (OELA) takes 
responsibility for the action . Moreover, the group claims responsibility for 
the bombing of the 'Oscar' bar, famous among US soldiers stationed in 
Athens. Further evidence from the 'Stasi files suggests that four of the 
OELA group had collaborated with the notorious international terrorist 
Carlos in the past. Finally, analysts suggest that OELA was an ad hoc 
splitter cell of the 'Revolutionary People Struggle' (ELA). 
Anti-state Struggle 
The 'Anti-state Struggle' was a splinter group from ELA, under the 
leadership of Christos Tsoutsouvis, a member of PAK during the Junta, and 
possibly Dimitris Koufontinas, from 17N. In April 1985, the group 
assassinated a prosecutor and, a month later, killed two security couriers 
working for the Sklavenitis super market chain. In the end, Christos 
Tsoutsouvis was gunned down by police officers in a random police search. 
Police forces searched his apartment in Athens and discovered many 
detonators, a typing machine where he used to write communiqués and 
declarations, and an original draft of the proclamation, which circulated in 
the media soon after the assassination of the prosecutor. (Eleytherotypia, 
2003) 
The revolutionary Nuclear (1997-1999) 
The group emerged in May 1997, with a terrorist attack against the Coast 
Guard offices in Piraeus. The 'Revolutionary Nuclear' participated in more 
than 13 bombings against banks, businesses and political targets. However, 
an explosion at the Intercontinental Hotel in Athens, where two workers 
were killed, was the last terrorist incident claimed by the group. It is 
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estimated that the negative publicity received from these deaths forced the 
members of the group to discontinue from further activities. 
5.5 The Third generation (2002-present) 
The second generation of the Greek urban guerrilla movement arrived to a 
closure, with the arrest and dismantling of leading groups such as the ELA, 
and 17N. In early 2010, the police managed to capture and imprison most, if 
not all, of the members of the 'Revolutionary Struggle' that was formed 
shortly after the arrest of the 17N and ELA. However, the demise of the 'old 
school' of urban guerrilla groups signified the beginning of a new circle of 
armed strugglers. Concerns may rest regarding the incentive for the 
appearance of a third circle of terrorism that these arrests created. Also it is 
evident that the ‘rules of the game’ have now changed. In particular, the 
two previous generations had first-hand experience of the dictatorship, and 
were either incapacitated or assimilated by the system. However, the post-
17N era, the third generation of terrorist groups, represents a new phase of 
terrorism, with new characteristics in terms of intensity of the tacks and 
the symbolism of the targets. Moreover, the increase in terrorist incidences 
was also prominent by the international media and security forces. The 
annual report on terrorism by the US State department makes note of these 
dramatic changes. 
Domestic terrorism in Greece increased significantly in 2009, 
following large-scale rioting in December 2008. In 2009, there 
were more than 430 security incidents–defined to include 
incendiary and explosive attacks, as well as attacks involving 
small arms, grenades, and other infantry-style weaponry- far 
more than those  recorded in each of the previous 20 years. 
(US State Department, 2010: 82) 
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The “boiling pot” exploded once again in December 2008, with mass riots 
through the capital of Greece, Athens, following the shooting of a 17 years 
old school-boy by a police officer. The country was thrown into a short 
period of chaos, looting, lawlessness and disorder. Nevertheless, this murder 
was only the trigger to a new social explosion, routed in numerous political 
and socio-economic factors. For many months, the political system was 
overwhelmed by political and financial scandals, whilst the government 
seemed to be unwilling, or incapable, of taking firm action against their 
protagonists. Groups from street gangs, mainly composed by young pupils 
and students, evolved to more violent groups. Furthermore, their tactics and 
modus operandi became more sophisticated, as improvised explosive 
devices began emerging. Noteworthy, the political developments in  
Greece also played a major role in the radicalization of the youth, who had 
no previous knowledge or first had experience of the Junta. Adding to this, 
political scandals, corruption and police brutality, coupled with the 
deterioration of the economic situation in the country, creating a fertile 
ground for the dissemination of revolutionary propaganda and radicalization 
(Moroy, 2009; Karousis, 2010). 
The new groups have very little in common with the second generation of 
terrorist groups. Many analysts point out the ‘archaic nature’ of these 
groups, that resembles more to the anarchist groups of the Spanish civil war, 
than the Marxist revolutionary groups, like the Italian Red Brigades or the 
German urban guerrilla groups (Karousis, 2010). Besides, the targets and 
agenda of these new groups is much wider, perhaps partly reflecting the 
endemic lack of trust within the Greek society, fuelled by the continuing 
political instability in the country. Additionally, third generation groups are 
more likely to establish partnerships with criminal groups and the wider 
underworld community. Whereas ELA and 17N gained their ammunitions 
and supplies by extrapolating resources either by police stations or from 
military bases, new groups are more willing to form linkages and a chain of 
supply with criminal groups. Also, the second generation was very cautious, 
selecting symbolic targets that would produce the minimum condemnation 
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by the Greek society. In other words, they deeply cared about the public 
image of the revolutionary movement. Respectively, the new groups find 
symbolism in 'easy' targets (common police officers or journalists), which 
consist symbols of authority but at the same time, may also have a negative 
effect on public perceptions. The use of blind violence and lack of planning 
are the key characteristics of the new generation of terrorists in the Greek 
scene. 
Although it is quire early to pass any judgment on the nature of the new 
form of terrorism that is currently emerging in Greece, it appears that one 
essential variable that may have an impact on the ruthlessness of the new 
groups, is disorganization. As depicted by the legacy of the first and second 
generation of terrorist groups, the traditional Marxist organisational model 
for urban guerrillas was fairly successful. Hence, every activity was planned 
and executed with precision, with its own ideological symbolism. However, 
the third generation has a new vision for the continuation of the urban 
conflict in Greece. The hierarchical or semi-hierarchical model, adopted by 
groups like ELA and 17N, have become rather the exception to the rule. The 
third generation is using the more flexible network model and in 
organisational terms become closer to the way criminal groups are also 
organised. 
5.6 Conclusions and implications: beyond 
Greece 
Greek terrorism has undergone through three core historical phases. Each of 
these phases is tied to ongoing systemic changes that took place in the 
country over the past decades. Moreover, culture and social organisation 
appear to be as important as the systemic factors. The Greek value system is 
marked by a long lasting tradition of disobedience, lawlessness and 
struggles that gives legitimacy to action undertaken by extremist political 
groupings (Damianakos, 2003; Giannaras, 2002). The Greek State (and 
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any other form of political representation) is perceived by the people as 
criminal and corrupted acting against the interest of the general public 
(Halpern, 2001, see also: World Values Survey, 1999). Revolutionary 
groups have capitalised on pre-existing social and political structures both 
home and abroad to further their goals. Thus, it seems that a convergence of 
cultural, systemic, and social organisational forces can help us better 
understand the problem of terrorism in Greece.  
To begin with, the first generation of revolutionaries was mainly 
radicalized in response to the military junta. Political activists, who 
participated in terrorist activities against the dictatorship in the early 70s, 
found support within the international community. Their international ties 
with governments and political parties from around the world were central 
in achieving their revolutionary objectives. Thus, the key actors of the anti-
dictatorial struggle took over the power of the country shortly after the 
collapse of the military junta. After parliamentary democracy in Greece was 
restored, the second generation of terrorism was born. Compared to the first 
generation, this one was characterized by a more radical and revolutionary 
agenda and ideology. Groups, such as 'ELA' and '17N', to a great extent, 
reflected the international political environment, while they organised 
themselves under the urban guerrilla model exported by Latin America 
(Marighella, 2006, 1969). Moreover, some members of these groups 
developed ties with other international terrorists, and received training and 
support from them. The second generation reached to an end after strong 
pressure from both the state and the police authorities. Most of the members 
are now imprisoned, dead, or assimilated by the system. 
Finally, the third generation represents a new form of terrorism. This 
generation seems to have more ideological and strategic similarities with 
Islamic fundamentalist groups, in terms of the exercise of violence and 
tactics used in their operation. Also, the organisation of these groups 
appears to be more spontaneous and disorganised than the former ones. The 
lack of training and available resources as well as previous imprisonments, 
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are indicative of the tendency of these groups to form bonds with common 
criminals, and vice versa. 
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I will not say anything about this indictment because innocence 
and guilt are relative to the standpoint each one has chosen to 
adopt. If for the cops, journalists, politicians, bankers and the 
judges some people are guilty in the name of constitutional 
democracy, all those that I just mentioned are guilty in the name 
of popular justice. 
(Koresis 2010: lines 36-39)9 
6.1 Introduction 
The political, economic and cultural environment in Greece indicates that 
the country should, in theory, be up against a serious endogenous organised 
crime problem. However, few people consider Greek organised crime to be 
a serious social problem (Eurobarometer, 2009, see also OCTA-SE, 2009; 
Europol TE-SAT, 2007; Europol, 2008; European Union, 2007; European 
Commission, 2005, UN General Assembly 2005). The lack of information 
about Greek organised crime is an anomaly that requires further research. 
We have labelled this anomaly, the ‘Greek paradox’ and it is the research 
puzzle tackled in the present work. 
It is common knowledge that the activities and the people involved in 
‘organised crime’ cannot be easily detected. Traditional research methods 
can be applied with great difficulty (Kelly, 1982; Cressey, 1967) and data 
are often created ‘by reasoning from the known to the inaccessible’ (Hinson, 
2010: 830). Thus, scholars researching OC borrow techniques from 
archaeologist, geologist and physicists ‘who manufacture data by reasoning 
that knowledge about inaccessible affairs can be obtained from considering 
affairs that are accessible to study’ (Cressey, 1967: 101, 110, 112).  
According to Cressey (1967), the fact that OC cannot be studied with 
conventional research methods raises the following four reasonable 
9 Koresis was arrested and imprisoned in 2010 for participating in the Greek terrorist 
groups “Revolutionary Struggle” (Epanastatikos Agonas). 
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alternative conclusions when the researcher is trying to expose an 
‘organised crime’ problem: 
1) An organization of “organised criminals’ does not exist 
2) An organization of “organised criminals” exists, but it is so 
secret that we cannot learn anything about it that law-
enforcement personnel do not already know 
3) Any organization of “organized criminals” that exists must 
not be much of a social problem or we would know more about 
it 
4) an organization of “organized criminals” exists, but it must be 
studied by methods not ordinary utilized by social scientists 
(Cressey 1967: 102) 
The explanation put forward in this study is that Greek OC exists, but it not 
considered to be a social problem because it is also regarded as a normal 
phenomenon embedded into the everyday life and functioning of the 
cultural, social and political systems of the country. We have already 
presented and discussed in some length the extent to which the holist model 
relates back to the empirical data gathered during this project. Additionally, 
the second chapter deals extensively with the Greekness of Greek organised 
crime. In abstract terms, we point out that the visibility, publicity, exposure 
and construction of an organised crime ‘problem’ depends on the 
embeddedness (connectivity) and social power of the communities, interest 
groups and networks involved in illegal activities (see for example: Vold et 
al 2002: 227-247). In practical terms, there seems to be an inverse 
relationship between power, visibility and official arrests: the higher the 
embeddedness and power a group/activity, the less visible the group it 
becomes. And visa versa. 
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So in addition to the four conclusions proposed by Cressey (1967: 102), we 
can add the following fifth plausible deduction: an ‘organisation’ of 
‘organized criminals’ exists, but we do not know much about it because 
society does not perceive its activities as a threat. This view transforms OC 
from a law enforcement and security problem, to a matter of social and 
political perception. So the problem one needs to consider is not necessarily 
how much organised crime there is in a particular country, but rather, a more 
fruitful approach is to examine why, how and if organised crime has been 
established in the public discourse and consciousness as a social problem? 
Is there the political will to fight serious forms of organized criminality? 
Does an anti-organised crime agenda serves the interest of the powerful? 
And of course, how do powerful policy making and policy shaping circles 
define “organised crime” in the first instance? Whose narrative prevails and 
why? These questions, in our view, address the real nature of organised 
crime in its everyday context.  
Having these theoretical concerns at the back of our mind, the primary aim 
in this concluding chapter is to discuss and synthesize the empirical 
evidence gathered on the three criminal communities (case studies) in 
Greece and to present the general themes that emerge from the data. We 
have identified a number of ‘rules of thumb’ and hope this discussion will 
contribute to the ongoing debated that interests both academics and 
practitioners regarding the structure of criminal and terrorist groups as well 
to the debate on the causes, and interaction of OC with the social system 
(Morselli, Giguere and Petit 2007; Bruinsma and Bernasco 2004, Armao, 
2003, Allum, 2006, 2010). Although most of the data derive form the Greek 
experience, we think the patterns that emerge can also be applied to 
different countries. 
6.2 General principles 
This section briefly highlights the general themes, principles or ‘rules of 
thumb’ that emerge when comparing the three case studies and subsequently 
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the following sections will provide an in-depth discussion. We remind the 
reader that the three cases examined here, varied in the degree of social 
power and visibility each group or community has. Additionally, each 
empirical chapter presented an account on the origin, structure and systemic 
interaction of the groups examined. A cross-case comparison can bring new 
insight that can improve our understanding of the phenomena under 
investigation (Eisenhardt, 1989; Stake, 1978; Yin, 2003). 
Overall, a key outcome of this work is the realisation that criminal groups 
can be placed in a spectrum of visibility (graph 6.1). We think that this 
spectrum is an analytical tool that can shed more light on a number of 
puzzling questions regarding serious forms of organised crime. In the one 
extreme of this spectrum we can place groups whose activities and existence 
are tolerated and the general visibility of the actors to the general public and 
law enforcement authorities is low. In other words, actors enjoy an 
unbefitting degree of impunity from the law. On the other extreme, groups 
and actors have a high degree of visibility, that riches the point of mass 
hysteria. Between the two extremes, we can also identify groups and 
criminal communities with low and medium exposure to the media, public 
perception, law enforcement and criminal justice system. Existing research 
tackles these manifestation of OC, but to our knowledge, none has united 
them under a common analytical framework. The originality and 
contribution of the present research to the existing literature on OC is based 
on this effort to fuse previously unconnected concepts. 
Diagram. 6.1 Spectrum of visibility 
Source: Author’s own elaboration 
The examination of different groups along this spectrum allows us to deduct 
a number of general principles on the everyday manifestations and working 
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of organised crime in Greece. In particular the analytical power of this 
spectrum becomes apparent when the researcher questions who is doing 
what; and where these actors or groups can be positioned on the spectrum of 
visibility. We think that these principles say something about the nature of 
organised crime in Greece, but could also apply to other illegal groups, 
networks and communities around the world. The following general themes 
emerge from data examined. 
First, the proceeding chapters indicate that the groups involved in criminal 
activities are susceptible to material and ideational contradictions, struggles, 
prohibitions and conflicts. Conflict in other words is a dynamic that explains 
why some actors from within specific communities behave in the way they 
do (Chambliss 1989,1988b,1975a, Chambliss and Mankoff, 1976; Andreas 
and Nadelmann, 2006, Nadelmann, 1989, 1990, 1988, Tilly: 1985, 1992; 
Gallant 1999). More specifically, the three empirical cases suggest that 
conflict takes place in various levels and our goal is to develop a typology 
that will clarify all instances of conflict that have emerged in the three cases 
studies. So how can the spectrum of visibility helps us interpret this 
observation? 
The available empirical data support the view that the origin of organised 
crime in Greece is routed in conflict, but we think that the nature and form 
of this conflict is contingent to the visibility, power and exposure by the 
legal system. As we move along the spectrum of visibility, we expect to see 
that the causes/origin, organisation and systemic interaction assume 
different shapes and forms (see graph 6.1). A very interesting conclusion is 
that criminal groups or communities with medium and high exposure and 
visibility have a more ideological language whereas the low visibility 
communities produce a more rational and economic rhetoric. The 
documents that we have examined in this work, obtained from the Greek 
courts as well as information from interviews with offenders, allow us to 
expose this ideological preference in the language and rhetoric used by the 
criminals. 
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Second, the structure of the groups in all three cases is best conceptualized 
as a loose network were family relations and trusted friendship ties (mainly 
dyads) play a central role in the organization of crime (von Lampe and 
Johansen, 2004, Albini, 1971; 1975; Cressey, 1972; Ianni and Ianni, 1972; 
Smith, 1980; 1994; 1978). The organisational structure of the groups varies, 
depending on the task environment. Recruitment of new members takes 
place from within the respective legal communities. However, we have 
identified in all the cases, the presence of a high density leadership cluster 
or clique which is isolated from the main network. Again the organization 
of the groups should be examined against the social power and exposure of 
the group or criminal community. One interesting conclusion that emerges 
with regards the structure and social organization of the groups is that, high 
visibility groups tent to rely more on trusted ties (blood, family and 
marriage) whereas low visibility groups are more willing to trust old friends 
and business colleagues and form bonds based on profits and economic 
gains.   
Third, we demonstrated the presence of strong links and cooperation 
between the state, businesses and civil society (Armao, 2003: 29; Allum 
2010, Chambliss, 1971; Kostakos and Antonopoulos, 2010; Court of Appeal 
case 3481/2005 & 10/2006; Court of Appeal case 3765/2006; Court of 
Appeals case 2585/2005, Aravantinos, 2009; Kampanakis, 2007; Saxionis, 
2008; Informant 3, 2008; Informant 2, 2008). Such links make it very 
difficult for a social problem (crime or terrorism) to be condemned by the 
society. Systemic cooperation is facilitated by social, economic, cultural and 
political forces. It ranges from direct protection of illegal interests to the 
Greek value system that ‘protects’ and normalizes some forms of illegal 
behaviour. It is interesting to see the extent to which social power is a 
modifying variable in this observation. Here the conclusion that emerges 
from the case studies is that direct systemic cooperation decreases when the 
visibly of a criminal groups increases. Groups with low visibility have very 
strong and symbiotic ties with the rest of the systems. Groups with higher 
visibility and exposure to the Greek criminal justice system have indirect 
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ties that take the form of ideological and normative support especially by 
the civil society and by some parts of the political and economic system. 
6.3 The origin of organised crime 
The data examined in the previous chapters shows that organised crime and 
other forms of criminal behaviour could be interpreted as the product of 
conflict. The term ‘conflict’ is vague and it is very often used by political 
scientist, IR scholars and criminologists in various ways and in different 
contexts (cultural, political and economic). Conflict is ubiquitous to every 
culture and can be found in all aspects of social life. Bartos and Wehr 
(2002) for example note that: ‘Homo sapiens has been learning about 
conflict throughout its development. That knowledge is spread across 
humanity, residing wherever human live, work, and play. It is folk 
knowledge, used continuously in everyday life - in commerce, family 
relations, government, sports, child rearing’ (2002: 1). So what types of 
conflicts could give rise to serious forms of criminality? 
In the three cases examined in this work, it appears that the forms of 
organised crime activities examined derive from economic competition, 
ideological struggle and also from wider conflicts between different power 
groups. This conclusion is in line with existing research findings indicating 
that conflict has a criminogenic potential (Selling, 1938; Sutherland, 1940; 
1941; 1945; 1983; Coleman, 1987: 414-420; Chambliss and Mankoff, 
1976). Furthermore, the case studies show that the conflicts can be 
categorized into three main types. 
•	 Type 1 conflicts are confrontations and tensions that take place at the 
micro level and within communities. Dispute settlement, economic 
competition as well as personal and cultural predispositions towards 
‘rivals’ are all forms of micro level conflicts (Quinney, 1964; 
Sutherland, 1983; Vold et al  2002: 227-266). 
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•	 Type 2 are macro conflicts and more sociological and political in 
nature. These are often clashes and confrontations that take place 
between larger systems, but nevertheless confined within a finite 
territory or a country. Avoiding prohibition regimes is a typical 
example of a macro conflict were a group supplies a good or a 
service the state-law is prohibiting (Sellin, 1938; Gambetta, 1993; 
Varese, 2005). 
•	 Type 3 conflicts are global conflicts defined by strong international 
and transnational characteristics. These conflicts emerge from 
international control regimes, imperialism, foreign policy goals and 
the distribution of global power. Global conflicts are in essence 
macro conflicts with transitional characteristics that cannot be 
managed effectively by a single state. In our case studies such 
conflicts can be observed between the state and the communities that 
engage primarily in transnational illegal practices, such as groups 
that engage in transnational cocaine smuggling and are been 
investigated by the Drugs Enforcement Agency (DEA) and/or other 
global policing forces. The Urban terrorist groups also have these 
characteristics since the Greek state receives significant pressure by 
foreign countries to confront these groups (Thoumi, 1995; 
Woodiwiss, 2001; Andreas and Nadelmann 2006; Nadelmann 1988; 
1989; 1990). 
So, is there a pattern or a general rule that emerges with regards to the type 
of conflict that takes place across cases with different social power? Again 
the spectrum of visibility can be employed as an analytical platform for this 
task (Table 6.1). 
The short answer is yes, although, further research is needed in order to 
come a more reliable conclusion. Both visibility and power are correlated to 
the level (micro, macro, global) in which tensions and conflicts emerge. We 
have recorded that conflicts between state and criminal communities clearly 
take place at the macro level and their impact is much more visible to the 
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public whereas intra community conflicts are more localized and therefore 
more difficult to be detect and prosecute. Additionally, we noticed that in 
some cases macro and micro conflicts are overlapping and could both take 
place at the same time. Macro conflict, that is to say, between the state and 
non-state actors emerge from prohibition regimes, but also take the form of 
ideological struggle. The core difference between these the two types of 
conflict is that the former is pure economical and based on material gains 
whereas the later has strong ideological and ideational components. In the 
case of the cocaine Barons, a social group that holds political and economic 
power, conflict is also at the macro level (i.e. importation of a prohibited 
good like, narcotics). However, their visibility remains low. This is an 
anomaly because we have already argued that macro conflicts often draw 
more the attention of the authorities and thus become more visible. 
Table 6.1 Typology of conflicts 
Cases Power/visibilit Origin Type of conflict 
y 











Type 2 and type 1 
Case 3 Urban 
Guerrilla groups 
Low/high Struggle Type 2 and type 3 
Source: Author’s own elaboration 
We can explain this anomaly on the grounds that cocaine smugglers do not 
engage in cocaine smuggling in Greece on a systematic basis. In other 
words, the smuggling of cocaine is not driven solely by market asymmetries 
an the dynamics between demand, state prohibition and supply (see for 
example: Passas, 1993;1994 and 1998). Smuggling of cocaine in Greece is 
opportunistic. High competition and the risky environment of the Greek 
shipping industry is also a significant push factor (Kostakos and 
Antonopoulos, 2010). Put is simply, when an entrepreneur who is involved 
200 6.3 The origin of organised crime 
in the shipping industry, has serious economic difficulties, is very likely to 
organise one or two ‘jobs’ in order to avoid financial ruin. Subsequently, 
when the crisis is gone, these actors tend to return to their legitimate and 
semi-legitimate activities. Their deviation to cocaine smuggling is a 
temporary carrier path and may provide some benefits to the Greek state and 
state officials, such as bribes, intelligence, networking and diplomacy. 
In the event were the Greek Cocaine barons turn into the cocaine business 
on a permanent basis, then it is very likely that the macro conflict will 
assume very strong ideological components. But, at the moment, the 
smuggling networks and the Greek state do not have particularly strong 
antagonistic relations. The same logic applies for the other two communities 
examined in this thesis. The more systematic and ‘organised’ they become, 
the more antagonistic their relationships with the state, and thus the conflict 
tents to intensify. 
Clearly there is more work to be done is this context in developing a more 
robust typology of the different states and escalation of macro-level conflict. 
More specifically it is interesting to find the extent to which ad hoc 
smuggling of prohibited goods that takes places within strategic industries 
(i.e. shipping) serves any personal or national interests. There are strong 
historical links between strategic industries, states power and organised 
forms of smuggling that requires further research (Tilly, 1985; Chambliss 
1989). Nevertheless, we can still provide a preliminary analysis on the three 
types of conflict that appear in our cases studies. 
First, prohibition seems to be a significant source of conflict between social 
groups and the state. Through a historical analysis of the origin of the 
‘Godfathers of the night’ as well as of the ‘Cocaine Barons we note that 
taxation and prohibition of gambling, drugs, prostitution and other state 
efforts to control of various activities have given a reason to groups and 
networks willing to challenge these policies. One the one hand state policy 
attempts, for various economic and political/ideological reasons to dominate 
and control a specific market whereas such efforts, that often go against the 
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economic and ideological interests of various communities generate 
confrontation and conflict. The emergence of revolutionary groups is also 
routed in very similar conflict dynamics, although the ideological drivers 
seem to be stronger than the material-economic. Similarly, the rise of 
cocaine smuggling networks in Greece are also routed in conflicts generated 
by various prohibitions and controls that serve state interest, but 
nevertheless go against the interests of various social groupings involved in 
legal and illegal markets. 
Second, the evidence on all three communities examined, suggest that 
organised crime also is caused by intra-community dynamics, antagonism, 
competition and conflicts. When such conflicts emerge, the role of the state 
is indirect and less significant, although prohibition regimes and the 
weakness of the state to inserts its authority and hegemony does play a role 
in their manifestation. A general weakness (normative and practical) to 
enforce the rule of law, increases the probability that disputes, antagonism 
and competition could be solved by resulting to the use extra-legal means 
(i.e. use of violence, threat and intimidation). We have recorded at least two 
sub categories of intra-community conflicts (type 1 conflicts) that we think 
are relevant for this analysis. First depute settlement, extortion and the 
threat or use of violence between members of a community is an illustrative 
example were such conflicts are being manifested. In the case of the 
‘Godfathers’, such conflicts are indeed very visible. Although the source of 
turf wars may be complex and divergent, we believe that in the final 
analysis, it demonstrates, if only symbolically, a manifestation of a struggle 
to control and dominate a given legal or illegal market (Court of Appeal 
case 3765/2006). The role of the state is not very clear in these inter-
community struggles. This is not to say that the state, and more specifically 
the law enforcement is just a bystander. On the contrary, we have collected 
oral and written evidence (court cases, news papers, interviews with 
offenders) suggesting that the law enforcement (police, Coast Guards and 
Marines) plays a significant role ‘behind the scenes’. We have not been able 
to establish the motives of the police involvement in these conflicts, but it is 
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indeed a very common tactic for the law enforcement to ask undercover 
agents to infiltrating criminal groups and then manipulate the relations 
between groups either by providing information or by controlling members 
of criminal groups. 
In the case of the revolutionary groups, conflicts are very rare and we have 
not seen any evidence suggesting the opposite. Competition between 
ideologically driven criminal groups takes place only at the production of 
propaganda and political discourse. Second, competition and antagonism 
within legal markets is also criminogenic. In the case of the Cocaine Barons, 
for instance, we can observe that actors turn to illegal activities (smuggling, 
fraud and other activities) when they have economic difficulties. 
Competition and risk are very strong and therefore we believe that actors 
who wish to maintain their power position within such markets, are more 
likely to participate in serious criminal activities. An additional reason can 
be that their legal profession and experience ( this is also true for the night 
economy as well as the shipping community) gives them a competitive 
advantage and the necessary technology and skill to organize and execute 
such complex plans (see: Zaitch, 2002b; 2003; Fijnaut et al. 1998; 
Kleemans and Bunt, 1999, 2008) 
Third, when looking at the causes and origin of organised crime, it becomes 
clear that a third type of conflict emerges. The second type of conflict which 
is a confrontation between the state and a specific criminal groups or illicit 
market. We notice for example that the fight against smuggling in Greece is 
closely related to International norms about tax evasion and protection of 
economic interests. In fact, when we trace the history of the public discourse 
against smuggling in Greece, we see that the prohibition and control of 
certain goods is linked with the demands of foreign creditors. So from a 
historical perspective, the pursuit of anti-organised policies is linked to the 
global financial governance. Firm actions and strong institutional 
arrangements against smuggling, provides an guaranties to the lenders that 
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the loans will be repaid by securing high revenues via taxation (Skrip, 1989: 
1-2; Skrip, 1909). 
Our own conceptualization of the origin of organised crime shares some 
similarities with Sellin’s (1938) typology of culture conflicts. Sellin notes 
that in homogenous societies norms that are enacted into laws are upheld by 
most of the members of society because they represent a consensual 
viewpoint. In heterogeneous societies however, it is very difficult to derive 
to this consensus and cultural conflicts therefore lead to patterns of criminal 
behaviour. Sellin also makes a reference to two types of conflicts: primary 
and secondary. Primary conflicts are between societies and can be induced 
by territorial proximity and through migration. Secondary conflicts, Selling 
argues, are conflicts between sub-cultures who have fundamentally different 
world views, norms and values (1938: 98-9). Our conclusions however, 
show that the position of the power group in the social system does not play 
a determinant role in the manifestation of conflict. In other words, the 
perspective seems to apply to actors from poor and disadvantaged 
backgrounds as well as to those from more powerful communities. 
The comparative research design allows us to derive some general 
conclusion regarding the nature and causes of organised crime with regards 
the previous argument. Although, illegality is the stronger variable that links 
these three communities together, there are also many other variables that 
differentiate them. The Urban Guerrilla groups have a much stronger 
ideological agenda and come from the base of the society; cocaine 
smuggling is organised by privileged upper society actors; and the cabals of 
the “Godfathers” are defined by diversity as well as some working class 
characteristics. Despite these socio-economic and political differences it 
appear that the prediction of the conflict perspective can be verified in all 
cases. Cocaine smugglers are usually entrepreneurs from the shipping 
community who have various economic problems (shipping is anyway a 
very risky industry) and who engage in illicit activities in order to ‘stay in 
the game’. The conclusion we can deduct from this analysis is that criminal 
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behaviour is not solely the behaviour of ‘minority power groups’ (Vold et al 
2002: 230). The notion that culture, ethnicity and economic statues play a 
role in facilitating criminal associations has been very central in the 
theoretical discussion of organised crime (Fijnaut, Bovenkerk, Bruinsma, 
and Van de Bunt, 1998; Bovenkerk, Siegel, and Zaitch, 2003; Bovenkerk, 
1998). Our analysis indicates that these variables are important, but may 
different from country to country and from case to case. The cultural 
divergent is so great, that may lead to the conclusion that mafias are sui 
generis phenomena, thus making generalisations by comparison extremely 
problematic (Gambetta, 1996: 97; Hill, 2003: 2; Mayntz, 2004). Rich and 
powerful also commit serious crimes, and the basis of this behaviour is the 
same with those of poor and powerless. In order words it seems that 
individual attributes such as ethnicity, and economic and social status are 
not as significant as we previously thought, especially when the role of 
conflict is taken into account. 
6.3.1 Language, visibility and ideology 
A close investigation on the defence line of those accused by the state for 
participating in a criminal organisation, exposes an ideology which is not 
often reported in mainstream research (Schulte-Bockholt, 2001). This 
language is in our view a strong indicator that criminals also develop 
ideological motives. The greater the exposure to law enforcement and 
criminal justice system, the stronger the political and ideological motives 
become. 
The following is an extract from an interview with Vassilis Stefanakos, the 
so called ‘boss of all Godfathers’, who has been sentenced for various 
offenses, including, participating into a criminal organisation, smuggling, 
kidnapping and murder. 
Q. The authorities have charged you with participation in 
organised crime and they are also saying that organised crime is 
controlled from people within prisons. 
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A. There is no ‘organised crime’ as defined by the authorities. 
How could organised crime go to prison? Being ‘organised’ 
means that you make sure you have immunity or that you 
receive pardons for your offenses. Organised crime doesn't go to 
prison. No more needs to be said... 
(Stefanakos, 2009: para. 18-19) 
In the previous quote, Stefanakos implies that the ‘real’ organised crime 
enjoys the political protection and total impunity. Although his view lacks 
an organisational description of the concept in question, we can only assume 
that his comment refers to the Greek politicians who are never put on trial. 
Nevertheless, a convicted member of the Revolutionary Organisation 17 
November provides a more detail overview of the real Greek Organised 
Crime. His definition seems to include a large array of offenses perpetrated 
by the legal-political system and the Greek political and economic 
establishment. He explains: 
Organised crime in Greece, is not only under the protection of 
the powerful, it is the state itself and its various gangs and 
syndicates are simply collaborative associations, fronts ect. And 
when we talk about the organised crimes of the state we do not 
only mean the official theft, such as, theft via taxation, kick 
backs from public expenditure, plundering of public funds, the 
dismantling [privatization] and the rake-offs from the Olympic 
[airlines], OSE, OTE, ports, airports, and many more. We do not 
mean only that, there are also other activities by state 
‘organisations’ which differ very little from the practices of the 
Mafiosi and Cocaine Barons. From where to begin and where to 
end: a) Assassinations by para-state gangs or state officials only 
the last year: Isidoropoulos, Koumis, Kanellopoulou, 
Temponeras, Kaltezas, Grigoropoulos, but also there are cases 
of criminal neglect: Samina shipwreck, the forest fires in 2007, 
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the Pipe works in Corinth, accidents in Perama and many others. 
b) Abductions - Hostage taking either directly mafia-like 
kidnappings, like the case with the Pakistanis or for revenge 
purposes like in our case [Revolutionary Organisation 17 
November] in the summer of 2002 that today tends to become 
the dominant norm [...]. c) Prostitution-drugs-protection rackets: 
Hellenic Police-Magistrates-Politicians ect. d) ‘Exploitation’ of 
public land ect: Church, ministers, arsonists. e) Major 
construction projects: Constructors: Ministers, constructor 
tycoons, media owners, publishers f) Money laundering: 
Ministers, Prime Ministers, Parliament, Justice System, Mass 
Media and so on. 
(Xyros 2009: para. 19-26) 
Another vivid example of how ideology shapes people’s definition of OC, is 
provided by Mr. Georgiadis who was charged in 2009 for participating in a 
criminal organisation and for the kidnapping of Mr. Mylonas who was the 
president of the Federation of Industries of Northern Greece. Georgiadis 
provides an alternative narrative of what OC is all about, but also on the 
notions of continuity and criminal association: 
Unfortunately for the exponents of legality, the facts are 
concrete: a handful of capitalists have organised a criminal gang 
and kidnapped proletarians demanding as ransom, their labour 
force, the commercialization of their human activity, their time 
(converted to cash) their very existence. Wage slavery is a 
continuing crime against human dignity. Not only the 
"accidents" in the workplace, the "collateral damage" of a class 
conflict. Not only the millions of dead, wounded and mutilated, 
by occupational "accidents" but also from diseases related to the 
nature of the work or the workplace. Not only the existence of 
strawberry fields, demonstrating that slave-merchants never 
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eclipsed. Not only the sacrificed workers (natives and 
immigrants, "expensive" and "cheap" manpower) in the name of 
every "American Dream" or "Greek miracle". It is the very 
existence of waged labour that constitutes a continuing crime! 
And the criminals, kidnappers, blackmailers are all like 
Mylonas. Even though the media represent Mylonas who is the 
‘Boss of all Bosses’ (leader of the gang of the thieves of the 
Federation of Industries of Northern Greece) as an "innocent" 
victim, as a misunderstood neoliberal Christian child, who 
struggles day and night for the common good. 
(Georgiadis 2008: lines 17- 34) 
The opinions and view about the nature of organised crime as expressed by 
the offenders is very often ignored in the academic accounts of this 
phenomenon (Paoli, 2003: 14-5). Ethnographic research and participatory 
observation, techniques that allow the research to gain the everyday 
perspective from those directly involved in organised crime, can provide 
fruitful theoretical insights. As Chambliss notes: ‘the theories of law and of 
crime that dominate the academic study of crime (as contrasted with the 
street knowledge of crime) are in my view almost entirely misleading’ 
(Chambliss 1988: 8). By studying closer the langue and narratives produces 
by the offenders, we have been able to clarify the link between economic 
and political motives, considering that visibility and exposure is an 
intervening factors. In all cases and irrespectively of the social power of the 
actors, visibility seems to lead to the politicization of the offence. 
6.4 The structure of the groups 
A wealth of sources and empirical evidence consulted for this project, 
strongly indicate that the groups examined are loosely organised network of 
‘cabals’ (see Chambliss 1972) composed by actors from the police, the 
security services, lawyers, public officials, bankers, bouncers, gym 
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owners/athletes, club owners, professional criminals, carrier criminals, 
politicians and businessmen. Each one of these cabals or communities 
collectively form a ‘social world’ which has rapidly evolved, in response to 
national and international prohibition regimes, intra-community competition 
and ideological struggle, into a disorganised and rather powerful and 
wealthy structure. 
There are some reoccurring patterns in the membership and structure of the 
groups, across the three criminal communities we have examined. We have 
come across four major types of interpersonal ties that include: blood ties, 
entrepreneurial ties, social and friendship ties (table, 6.2). The available 
empirical evidence suggest that entrepreneurial networks such as those 
found in the shipping communities are more likely to develop ad hoc 
relations. Respectively, the Godfathers operate on different dynamics and 
principles. Economic motives are important, but it appears that profit is not 
the sole determinant of their organisation. Reputation, trust and rivalry are 
also some of the principles with an ordering power over the nature and 
structure of these groups. Fear or retaliation and double crossing is putting 
additional pressure to the members of these groups to give additional 
attention on their links and ties. Investing on trust is as good as investing on 
a job that will later on generate profits. 
What we often see in these criminal groupings is that interpersonal relations, 
social ties and other personal characteristics play a central role (3765/2006: 
168). Moreover, the dynamics within the illegal cabal or community that 
engages in cocaine smuggling are not very competitive. Violence is mostly 
applied for intergroup dispute settlements and it is rather the exception to 
the rule. The simple explanation is that the cocaine trade in Greece is not 
organised and systematic. Thus, we do not see the emergence of conflicts 
between groups. 
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Table 6.2 Typology of the structure of Groups 
Cases Power Structure 
Case 1 Cocaine Barons High Entrepreneurial, ad hoc,  
friendship and some family ties 
Case 2 Godfathers of the 
Night 
Medium Friendship, family and local 
ties 
Case 3 Urban Guerrilla 
groups 
Low Family and strong friendship 
ties 
The structure of the groups with medium power and visibility (The 
godfathers) is different. It can be argued that the combination of a degree of 
hedonism, consumptionism and greediness acts as a stopping power for 
forging strong group ties. Social bonds and ties in other words are based on 
short terms and individualist sentiments. Research has shows that such 
sentiments are central in the forging of friendship ties in the nocturnal 
economy. Thus, ties and connections are shaped in relation to changes in the 
lifestyle of the members. 
It’s now clear that the ‘nocturnal economy’, with its peculiar 
mix of hedonism and conspicuous consumption, is becoming a 
crucial cultural site for young people seeking companionship 
and forging their identities. For most of our respondents, the 
establishment and maintenance of close personal relationships 
were synonymous with ‘going out’, and many voiced the belief 
that without ‘going out’ there would be no ‘friendship’ at all. Of 
course friendships have been changing across the individual’s 
life-course for some generations, but what becomes important 
here is the culturo-economic context in which these fragile 
relations are enacted and maintained, where the long-term 
mutuality, reciprocity and loyalty that were core properties of 
traditional friendships are being rapidly eroded by the prevailing 
neo-liberal ethos of self-interest. Although some of our 
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respondents talked about the depth of their affections for friends, 
in most cases they were mindful of the inherent instability of 
these attachments from the moment they were established. The 
‘close relationship’ seems to have become a rare bonus rather 
than an everyday normative end in itself, a luxury that is always 
contingent on the utility that it provides for the achievement of 
personal occupational and lifestyle ambitions. Many current 
youth friendships do not seem to be generating the deep 
personal knowledge of each other’s lives that was such a 
palpable feature of traditional working class communities. As 
traditional community and the ethos of mutuality declines, 
labour markets become increasingly diverse and friendships 
become cantered around lifestyle ambitions, individuals are now 
often unaware of their friends’ work, family, politics or inner 
emotions because they have no regular contact in these 
dimensions of life. An unwritten agreement appears to exist that 
the anticipated hedonism and abandon of a night out should not 
be spoilt by talk of them. 
(Hall and Winlow 2005: 34-35) 
Also, in all three case studies we have examined, a reoccurring pattern in the 
way groups are organised has emerges. It seems that these groups have 
developed an informal hierarchical structure, although, we should stress that 
their principal organisational dynamic is horizontal and network-like. 
Nevertheless, some degree of specialisation and division of labour 
according to the power, authority and perhaps experience of the offender 
exists. In particular we noted a three-layer division of labour that in 
organisational terms resembles a pyramid. At the bottom of that pyramid are 
members who have a marginal role in the illegal activities, albeit they 
undertake important peripheral tasks. At the middle we see a cast of people 
who perform duties of middle management and often work as intermediaries 
between the top and the lower parts of the pyramid. Finally at the top we see 
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the leading members and the acting ‘head’ or ‘boss’ of the groups who take 
executing decisions and often remain invisible and not related to the 
everyday activities that can incriminate them. 
We noted that the more hedonist the task environment is the less likely this 
structure to be effective and to preserve through time. Members at the 
bottom of the pyramid will try to climb a the top and thereby creating 
conflict between the group. When the task environment is more 
opportunistic and profit-driven (Cocaine barons), this structure seems more 
appropriate, since it is formed on an ad hoc basis. Finally, the most durable 
seems to be the structure adopted by the revolutionary groups. Here, blood 
ties and family ties are very strong and guaranty that attempts of back 
stabbing as well as cooperation with the law enforcement will be limited. 
6.5 Systems: cooperation and conflict 
The interaction between the state, businesses and civil society is primarily 
based on the notion of cooperation. From our three case studies it emerges 
that cooperation between these subsystems is forthcoming when certain 
norms are prohibited or when a specific behaviour lacks the support and 
legitimacy of the major political actor in society, the state. It was 
demonstrated that illegal groupings emerge due to various restrictions, 
prohibitions and conflicts. So, it can be argued that groups from all 
segments of society resolve to illegal means as an alternative way of 
accumulating power and wealth. 
Cooperation between the main sub-systems of society in illegal means is the 
dominant norms since, the weak state attempts to aggregate more power and 
social control through what appears to be poorly sustained prohibition 
policies. In simple rational terms, this interaction is well explained via the 
systems approach. Parsons (1965) expertly provides the following analysis: 
As a formal analytical point of reference, primacy of orientation 
to the attainment of a specific goal is used as the defining 
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characteristic of an organization which distinguishes it from 
other types of social systems. This criterion has implications for 
both the external relations and the internal structure of the 
system referred to here as an organization. The attainment of a 
goal is defined as a relation between a system (in this case a 
social systems) and the relevant parts of the external situation in 
which it acts or operates. This relation can be conceived as the 
maximization, relative to the relevant conditions such as costs 
and obstacles, of some category of output of the system to 
objects or systems in the external situation. These considerations 
yield a further important criterion of an organization. An 
organisation is a system which, as the attainment of its goal, 
“produces” an identifiable something which can be utilized in 
some way by another system that is, the output of the 
organization is, for some other system, an input. In the case of 
an organization with economic primacy, this output may be a 
class of goods or services which are either consumable or serve 
as instruments for a further phase of the production process by 
other organisations. In the case of a government agency the 
output may be a class of regulatory decisions; in that of an 
educational organisation it may be a certain type of “trained 
capacity” on the part of the students who have been subjected to 
its influence. In any of these cases there must be a set of 
consequences of the processes which go on within the 
organisation, which make a difference to the functioning of 
some other sub-system of the society; that is, without the 
production of certain goods the consuming unit must behave 
differently, i.e., suffer a “deprivation”. 
(Parsons 1965: 64) 
By applying the previous analytical framework to the study of organised 
crime, we can deduct a number of plausible instances were the output of a 
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sub-system can be used as a valuable input for another. There is existing 
literature that elaborates on the symbiosis of the social systems, exposing 
the role of organised crime groups as functional parts within society (Allum, 
2006; Allum and Siebert, 2003; Armao, 2003; Sabetti, 2002; Allum, 2010). 
Nevertheless, we think that the visibility spectrum can improve the existing 
research on the functional attributes of organised crime. In Table 6.1 we 
provide an overview of the instances and nature of cooperation we have 
identified in the cases studies. As we can see, there is an inverse relationship 
between systemic cooperation and visibility. Groups with low visibility tent 
to be more connected, whereas those with high visibility are in theory 
marginalised. The paradox here is that there is another very interesting 
correlation between visibility and normative/ideational symbiosis. There 
seems to be a positive relationship between the levels of visibility and the 
level of normative support. In other words, activities which are broadly 
condemned and do not have strong normative support by society tent to 
receive more help, whereas activities with stronger normative justification 
tend to remain marginalised. 
Table 6.3 Typology of systemic interaction 
Cases Power Systemic interaction 
Case 1 Cocaine Barons High Strong systemic relations, 
weak normative support 
Case 2 Godfathers of the 
Night 
Medium Strong systemic relations, fair 
normative support 
Case 3 Urban Guerrilla 
groups 
Low Week systemic relations, 
strong normative support 
Cooperation however, is not the only norm in this systemic interaction. In 
particular, we argued that when the laws are applied, that is, when groups 
are prosecuted and individuals are imprisoned, we have a conflicting 
relationship. The question that we tried to address in the previous chapter, 
concerned with the conditions that facilitated this conflict. Organised crime 
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can be seen as an activity that is protected from powerful actors and 
therefore, it is by definition very difficult to study the inner-workings of this 
secretive and hidden phenomenon. So an interesting puzzle is why some 
groups are prosecuted whilst others remain undetected. By far the major 
variable is the involvement of foreign security services such as the CIA, 
MI5, the US DEA and other European partners. So it appease that pressure 
for results, that derives from foreign powers is a significant factor that 
undermines the norm of cooperation that underpins the systemic 
relationship. 
6.6 Gangster Politics 
The present work examines a specific empirical facet of organised crime 
and terrorism manifested in Greece. The conclusions are clearly a reflection 
of the situation in Greece. However, the argument presented in this work 
also has an impact on much wider debates and ‘grand narratives’ with 
regards the nature of organised crime in other countries as well as the nature 
of the political system overall. In the introductory chapter, four metaphors 
were used in order to simplify and better understand how scholars have 
interpreted an abstract and contested concept such as ‘organised crime’. In 
this section we will briefly touch upon these issues hoping to add a new 
metaphor into the existing debate. 
Criminal behaviour and the control of crime have political readings 
(Chambliss, 1968, 1975b; Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006). Why should 
the legal-political system criminalise some forms of behaviour? Why some 
people, groups and crimes have systematically a higher degree of exposure, 
whilst other people, groups and crimes remain unpunished? Who benefits 
from the order the legal system creates? 
The political implications of these questions become even more prominent, 
bearing in mind that controlling some forms of criminal behaviour, such as 
organised crime and terrorism has a global appeal that can mobilise the 
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International community of states. There is an ongoing debate over the 
political implications of globalisation and the rise of Global Governance and 
we think that the study of transnational crime should not be excluded from 
this discourse (Edwards and Gill, 2002; Gootenberg, 2009; Hobbs, 1998; 
Woodiwiss and Hobbs, 2009; Sheptycki. 1995; 1998). We can learn a great 
deal about politics by looking closely on the working of organised crime.  
The political theories and conceptualisations of ‘power’ and the ‘state’ 
developed by Marx and Engels (orthodox Marxism) and later on by 
Gramsci (neo-Marxism) will provide a reference point for such discussion. 
The orthodox Marxist explanation of social life is underlined by the 
assumption that relations are antagonistic and conflictual. This conflict is 
interpreted as ‘the attempt to dominate others and to avoid being dominated’ 
(Babble 2010: 36). Thus, political power according to Marx and Engels 
(1888) is ‘merely the organised power of one class for oppressing another’ 
(p. 21). Within this framework of analysis (historical materialism) the State 
emerges as a ‘superior power’ in order to mediate these conflicts, but 
becomes merely a tool of economic exploitation and domination of the 
powerful over the powerless. Engels provides the following explanation of 
the origins and nature of the State that illustrates this point: 
But in order that these antagonisms, classes with conflicting 
economic interests, might not consume themselves and society 
in fruitless struggle, it became necessary to have a power 
seemingly standing above society that would alleviate the 
conflict and keep it within the bounds of “order”; and this 
power, arisen out of society but placing itself above it, and 
alienating itself more and more from it, is the state. [...] Because 
the state arose from the need to hold class antagonisms in check, 
but because it arose, at the same time, in the midst of the conflict 
of these classes, it is, as a rule, the state of the most powerful, 
economically dominant class, which, through the medium of the 
state, becomes also the politically dominant class, and thus 
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acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the 
oppressed class. Thus, the state of antiquity was above all the 
state of the slave owners for the purpose of holding down the 
slaves, as the feudal state was the organ of the nobility for 
holding down the peasant serfs and bondsmen, and the modern 
representative state is an instrument of exploitation of wage 
labour by capital. 
(Engels 2004: 157, 159) 
Overall, there are three core characteristics that define the State from the 
perspective of orthodox Marxism: territorial division, control of violence 
(public power) and economic exploitation via taxation. The confluence of 
these three characteristics according to Engels (2004: 158) make the State 
organs of society ‘above society’. Tracing the genesis of the State in the 
political context of the Ancient Athens, Engels explains: 
As distinct from the old gentile order, the state, first, divides its 
subjects according to territory. [...] The second distinguishing 
feature is the establishment of a public power which no longer 
directly coincides with the population organising itself as an 
armed force. This special public power is necessary because a 
self-acting armed organisation of the population has become 
impossible since the split into classes. [...] In order to maintain 
this public power, contributions from the citizens become 
necessary — taxes. [...] As civilisation advances, these taxes 
become inadequate; the state makes drafts on the future, 
contracts loans, public debts. 
(Engels 2004: 157-8). 
Consequently, the main notions that derive from the orthodox Marxian 
analysis is that the State maintains ‘order’ by serving the interests of the 
powerful and exercises control over society through violence and political 
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and economic coercion. However, the idea that norms and ideology are also 
the means of indirect source of power remained analytically underdeveloped 
in the orthodox Marxist writings (Curtis 1997). 
Gramsci sought to extent this line of analysis, by arguing that ideological 
and cultural hegemony is also relevant in the analysis of power relations. 
Gramsci’s major contribution to political philosophy that continues to shape 
our understanding and analysis of political change even today (see for 
example the works of Noam Chomsky), derives from his emphasis on the 
crucial role of intellectuals in the legitimisation of power and/or in the 
creation of ‘new relations with power’ (Martin 2002: 171). Gramsci show a 
crucial analytical distinction between hegemony (agemonia) and 
domination (dominio) that can be found in the traditional (Marxist) notion 
of historical materialism. The later is based on coercive force of the 
Repressive State Apparatus (Althusser 1970) that required the monopoly of 
violence involving the formal governmental power and can be translated in 
strategic terms as a ‘War of Manoeuvre’. Hegemony on the other hand, 
refers to an indirect cultural and ideological struggle between competing 
groups and it is a struggle that resembles in Gramsci’s own words a ‘War of 
Position’ (Gramsci 2003). The hegemonic power of the dominant group is 
exercised indirectly, by what Althusser calls (1970) the Ideological State 
Apparatuses, including civil and political institutions such as schools, legal 
professions, church, media and trade unions. Gramsci theorized that the 
dominant group maintained its power position through a mixture of coercion 
and force (employed by the state/political society) with the consensual 
participation of the subordinate groups, through consent (cultural hegemony 
via propaganda). The dominant group will resolve to the use of violence 
only when attempts to manufacture consent fail (Gramsci 2003). 
Consequently, cultural and ideological hegemony, Gramsci contended ‘is 
synonymous with the study of political power’ (Martin, 2002: 171). 
The neo-Marxist perspective allows us to expand the definition of power 
and to including additional variables in our analysis of organised crime, 
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such as ideological, normative and cultural characteristics. Organised crime 
and the State do not stand at opposite trenches simply because they both 
seek to monopolize the use of violence over a given territory and with the 
final goal being the provision a tangible public commodity such as 
protection (Gambetta 1993: 1-2). In other words, the struggle between OC 
and the State is not simply a ‘War of Manoeuvre’ and should not only be 
treated as such. Taking the Gramscian definition of power as the starting 
point, it can be argued that the struggle between OC and the State is a ‘War 
of Position’ and the commodity that it is really at stake is a cultural product. 
Violence by either side is of secondary importance, since as the theory 
suggests, it is only used when voluntary consent fails (Gramsci 2003). The 
collection of taxes for example, suggests how important the role of consent 
is. There are also implications of territorial integrity and to more traditional 
power issues. Tilly (1992) for instance explains that smuggling, that is, the 
evasion of internal or external custom duties, ‘became a crime precisely to 
the extent that European states attempted to define and defend their 
boundaries’ (p. 88). 
Thus, organised crime is a counter hegemonic force, a ‘mentality’ or a 
cultural institution that challenges the ability of Ideological State 
Apparatuses (Althusser 1970) to impose the norms of the dominant group 
and establish the ‘rules of the game’. What follows logically from these 
syllogisms is that the current securitisation and militarization of policing, 
does not addresses the cultural and normative asymmetries, but rather focus 
on the issue of force, coercion and violence. There is very little doubt that 
international policing has over the past few decades rapidly changed its 
powers, aims and scope. This change can be very well defined as a 
contemporary political revolution; a drastic response to the criminal 
neoplasms that have emerged in the global environment. Kuhn for example 
notes that: 
Political revolutions are inaugurated by a growing sense, often 
restricted to a segment of the political community, that existing 
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institutions have ceased adequately to meet the problems posed 
by an environment that they have in part created. 
(Kuhn 1996: 92). 
However, one could argue that the paradigm shift (in relation to 
international policing) instigated by the political elite, forces the 
International Community to integrate the fight against organised crime and 
terrorism into what Rupert Smith have called: ‘War amongst the people’ 
(Smith: 2008). These are ‘fights’ involving constant adaptation to new 
tactics and weapons by both sides and in general terms do not reply on a 
general strategy. The weakness to establish a general strategy and a vision 
about the desired results, often leads to a paradoxical combination of 
military (or police) success and political failure. 
Placing the proceeding analysis into a broader and more solid historical 
context, the origin of organised crime can be summarised as follows: The 
domestication of homo sapiens and the subsequent imposition of well 
defined norms that are now being globally adhered by most ‘advanced’ 
social systems, have had a tremendous impact on the notions of social piece, 
security and order. Humans who have over the past millennia preyed upon 
other humans as a means of guaranteeing their survival, are now up against 
the ‘new society’ governed and ruled by a capitalist legal-political order that 
promotes and protects a set of narrowly and politically defined norms, such 
as private property and democracy, and punishes on a mass scale those 
perceived to pose a threat to that normative order. The ‘rules of the game’ 
have changed radically. Norms have become institutionalized and 
‘civilized’. The character and attitude of the players have also adopted to 
this reality. It is indicative that some anthropologists and philosophers argue 
that, if the name of our species was given in accordance to behavioural 
patterns and not on the grounds of biology and anomy, ‘man would be 
called Homo domesticus’ (Ayres 1921: 600). Anarchy is no longer the 
overarching ordering principle that rules our reasoning and the material life 
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within societies. Deviance, violence and force no longer represent a 
politically, legally and socially acceptable tactic for achieving personal 
and/or collective goals. Tradition and archaic norms are been replaced by 
modernity and the constitutional capitalist democracy. Yet, this is an 
ongoing struggle as we are far from the ideal society proposed in the 
dominant narrative of liberal democracy. 
Those tactics remain under the absolute control and/or supervision of the 
few hegemonic and powerful legal-political organisations and nation-states, 
that currently control the national and international normative, social, 
political and economic spheres. Many socialist critics for instance, will 
point out that the essence of the capitalist system is a form of ‘social theft, 
class exploitation and a priory social injustice‘ (Eldred 2008: 121). Thus, in 
phlegmatic times, a number of puzzling question about the true power the 
people keep resurfacing: What is social justice? Whose norms? Whose law? 
What order? (Chambliss and Mankoff, 1976). The system that determines 
the gap between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’ has become attached to this 
institutionalization of power. The inequalities and cleavages generated by 
this modern ‘tyrannic’ system of governance, fuels an inevitable and 
continuing struggle between competing normative orders 
(tradition/modernity, archaic/liberal) and their representative interest 
groups. The outcome of this clash generates a plethora of social problems 
that scholars have tried to address: war, ethnic conflict, revolution, social 
unrest, racial and gender discrimination, poverty, violence, terrorism and 
crime to name few. Organised crime is also a phenomenon that emerges 
from the clash between the modern normative order of the ‘new society’ 
against a more ‘primitive’ order of an anti-society that adheres to different 
and often ‘archaic’ values, norms and practices that continue to exist, even 
if, only in peoples’ reasoning, imagination, history, tradition and ideology. 
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6.7 Conclusion: How ‘Greek’ is Greek 
Organised Crime? 
Since the end of the cold war, organised crime has been a persistent 
phenomenon in most countries of the world. A number of explanations or 
metaphors have been put forward to make sense of the persistent nature of 
organised crime in both sides of the Atlantic. At the begging of this thesis 
we provided an overview of the four major thesis/explanations/metaphors 
that appear in the academic and professional literature. Clearly each 
metaphor tents to overemphasize some variable more than others. Our own 
approach was a more holistic one, considering multiple factors into our 
explanation (see Diagram 6.1). 
Diagram 6.2 A Holistic conceptual model 
Source: Author’s own elaboration 
Organisational approaches focus on the criminal capabilities of shadow and 
complex criminal organisations (Council of Europe 1998, United Nations 
2004, Cressey 1969); structural explanations stress the symbiotic links 
between criminal groups with the social system and communities (Blok 
1974; Block 1983; Block and Chambliss 1981; Chambliss 1971; 1988b; 
Potter 1994; Allum, 2010) economic and entrepreneurial models look at the 
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rational-economic incentives that create market dynamics for dispute 
settlement and other illegal goods and services (Gambetta 1993, Smith 
1980, 1978, 1994); cultural and functional models emphasize the role of 
‘alien’ and deviant culture (Ianni and Ianni 1972, Lupsha 2006); political 
explanations examine the role of weak institutions in facilitating the growth 
of organised crime in weak states; and hybrid models draw their analytical 
tools from two or more of the previous approaches (Allum 2006, Williams 
and Godson 2002). The perspective proposed in this work exposes the 
political nature and ‘normality’ of organised crime. Emphasizing the group 
nature of society and the competitive relations between power groups, it is 
argued that organised crime can also be understood as an everyday 
phenomenon. 
The starting point of this thesis/metaphor, is based on a rather cynical view 
of social life, suggesting that power groups and communities within society 
will maintain their status and position through all means available; lawful 
and illicit. Consequently, the development and enforcement of laws as well 
as the process of lawbreaking are vested into these fundamental struggles 
between groups for power and control (Chambliss 1975b, 1989, Vold 1958, 
Vold et al 2002: 227-247). From this perspective, the main theme of this 
work was to study and analyse organised crime as an epiphenomenon of 
everyday life; it is perceived as a proto-revolutionary effort for 
accumulating power and wealth employed by various groups and 
communities with society, including states. Indeed when looking deeper 
into the history of political organisation, one sees the explicit linkages of 
concepts such as organised crime, protection, extortion and war with the 
birth of the nation state (Tilly, 1985, 1992). From tis angle, as Hobbs notes, 
organised crime appears to be a glocal phenomenon (Hobbs, 1998). 
Although western norms, values and institutions may have helped to erase 
these memories, the Greek reality is fairly different, making organised crime 
a normal epiphenomenon of Greek life. 
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In order to empirically assess the strength and weaknesses of this approach, 
the previous chapters investigated three criminal communities in Greece. 
Greece was selected as a typical case, give that most of the available 
historical, social and political indicators suggest that up to the present 
moment, the country manifests significant conflicts demonstrated through 
contentious social agitation and unrest (see Diagram 1.2). Moreover, there is 
what we have called ‘the Greek paradox’. All the indicators suggest the 
presence on an organised crime problem, yet public and academic discourse 
is insignificant. It is indeed very likely that Greece maybe suffering from a 
‘black hole syndrome’, a condition that comes into sight when deviance is 
embedded into the everyday life and functioning of the society (see: 
Makarenko, 2004). Subsequently, the decision to select the three criminal 
communities was based on their high degree of visibility in the mass media, 
as well as, their frequent interaction with by the Greek criminal justice 
system; a claim also supported by the research that was undertaken for this 
research. 
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7.1 General Conclusions 
The general thrust of this work evolves around the visibility of organised 
crime in the everyday context. In this work, we have tried to contribute to 
the sparse body of empirical and theoretical research about Greek organised 
crime, but in a way that can provide comparable results and fresh analytical 
tools to practitioners and academics who have an interest on the topic. The 
main body of the thesis examined three criminal communities in Greece, 
congregating empirical evidence from a variety of sources. Each case study 
had every aspect related to the notion of ‘organised crime’ similar whilst the 
social power and visibility of the groups involved was in each case 
different. First, all groups engaged in illegal activities and operated in a 
structured group defined by the Greek law as ‘organised crime’ (Hellenic 
Parliament, 2001a). Second, all three networks examined have received 
final court verdict and its members have received lengthy prison sentences 
for participating in a criminal organisation as defined in the Greek law. 
Third, the level of power and visibility for each case was different. 
Subsequently, the results were comparatively discussed, utilising the 
visibility spectrum as an analytical point of reference. Overall we can 
provide the following conclusions that we think could also apply in other 
cases within Greece, but also in other countries. 
1.Criminal groups have both economic and ideological motives. However, 
the line is not as blurring as previously thought. The notions of visibility 
and exposure can shed fresh light into this dynamic. Criminal groups with 
high visibility and lower social power develop a stronger ideological 
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rhetoric. This applies to both Urban Guerrillas who have mainly political 
goals, but also to the ‘Godfather of the night’ who do not have a political 
agenda per se. Very recently, new evidence suggests that professional 
criminals linked with the ‘Godfathers of the night’ are also involved in 
terrorist financing. In our view this crime-terror link can be explain on the 
grounds that the criminal justice system has put ‘unfair’ pressure and 
exposure to the workings of the professional criminals and/or professional 
criminals collaborate with terrorist groups as a way of retaliating to police 
interference to their own affairs. Economic motives are also strong, but it 
seems that reputation and trust is also something that high visibility 
groups value more. Respectively, low visibly groups have predominately a 
rational and economic rhetoric.  
2.Criminal groups with high visibility rely more on blood, marriage and 
strong friendship ties. This can be observed at all levels of their 
organisation. Trust seems to be more important that economic gains. Low 
visibility groups also use blood and family ties, but mainly for the most 
critical parts of the organisation that often involved the management, 
storage and transportation of cash. Economic motives in low visibility 
groups are stronger than reputation and trust. 
3.Criminal groups with high visibility are less likely to develop systemic 
ties with the wider society. Also popular support is stronger. In the low 
visibility groups we notice the opposite dynamic. Material links with the 
systems are widespread, but popular support is non existent. This 
polarised behaviour is particularly stronger when we compare the Cocaine 
Barons with the Urban Guerrilla groups. It appears that in the former, 
society agrees with the principles, norms and ideas expressed by the acts 
of the groups (i.e. there is strong popular support), but not willing to 
provide direct help. In the former case, society (especially the political 
system) provides direct assistance, but people do not openly ‘agree’ with 
the principles expressed via their activities. 
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7.2 Future work 
Due to space and time constrains the present work did not allow the author 
to investigate in depth a number of issues that remain marginalised in the 
academic literature. The present provides a good reference point for other 
research projects that will seek to examine the political and ideological 
dimensions of organised crime in addition to the role of visibility, social 
construction, the role of criminal justice and global policing. 
First, the history of organised crime in Greece is an issue future work should 
explore. Here we have shown that it is possible to link the current notion of 
“transnational organised crime” with other historical form of “organised 
criminality”. Greece is a good case study for studying the parallel histories 
of state and gang formation because it offers a historical continuity. Our 
own historical analysis shows that legal and illegal activities and groups, 
like, piracy, smuggling, trade, states, businesses, terrorist groups and violent 
gangs can be place in the same spectrum (see also Tilly: 1985,1992). So this 
research can challenge current official definitions and perceptions of 
“organised crime” that often lack a historical perspective. Organised crime 
is not a phenomenon that emerged after the end of the Cold war as the 
Globalist thesis puts it, neither it is simply an economic problem that rises in 
the transition from feudalism to capitalism. A historical perspective shows 
that organised crime has a timeless character and it is as old as political 
organisation (see Woodiwiss, 2001). Future research should pay more 
attention into the history of political violence, prohibition and state power 
utilising existing historical research methods and tools. Archives, libraries, 
state records and secondary historical sources could unravel new 
perspectives about the historical forms of organised crime. Such research 
could revitalize moral relativism which is a declining normative position in 
an area were fundamentalism seems to have gained a foothold in all the 
major civilisation. 
The three case studies examined in this work are considered to be normal 
examples in terms of their position on the spectrum of visibility. Future 
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work should examine the two extreme cases, that is to say, groups with 
impunity and groups that provoke mass hysteria, in order to provide a more 
complete picture of the role of social power and visibility. Two possible 
communities that may fit these examples are the political system and the 
immigrant community in Greece. By doing so future research could test the 
validity of the present research. In short, the following questions should be 
addressed: Is the language used by offenders in line with the observation 
that the more visible the community is the more ideological it becomes and 
visa versa? Is the structure of the group contingent to the visibility and 
social power of the community? We have noticed that low visibility groups 
tend to overemphasise profit and underemphasise trust, whereas high 
visibility groups value trust more than profits. Could this principle perhaps 
explain why alien criminal groups (such as Albanians in Greece) tend to 
rely heavily on family ties? Also, can this be a plausible explanation in 
cases were politicians and businessmen who lack strong family ties become 
bedfellows in corrupt practices? 
Second, political scientists and especially those interested in political ethics, 
culture, morality and philosophy can use the case of organised crime as their 
empirical field for developing new and critical perspectives on the nature of 
the nation-state. There is still some room to contribute on state theory, 
development theory, as well as on criminological and criminal justice 
perspectives. Third, the interaction between the sub-social systems in 
Greece requires further research and analysis. The illegal or semi-legal 
interaction between the state, business and civil society may take different 
forms and shapes and it is an issue that has not yet been explored. 
Finally, the two core variables, social power and visibility require further 
analytical scrutiny. Although an ethnographic and bibliographical research 
can point out that some groups have a greater visibility than others, further 
research should develop a more robust methodology for measuring them. 
Developing appropriate and holistic tools for this task is essential for 
comparing between large number of cases and across countries. 
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Indicatively, we not that visibility can be measured by considering a 
combination of the following indicators: level of violence, type of violence, 
officially recorded crimes, court records, media mentions (local and 
international), police funding (time and resources spent), public perceptions, 
police perceptions and offenders perceptions. Respectively, for measuring 
social power, future research could focus on the social, political and 
economic aspects of the offenders, the crime committed as well as the wider 
social milieu and community that can be relevant in decoding levels of 
power involved. A practical tool for measuring this variable is to use the 
existing power structure within a given country and assess the extent to 
which some activities and actors are connected to that power structure. This 
tool could be helpful when comparing countries with the same systems, but 
there are also many practical issues that may emerge when the comparison 
takes places between countries with different legal-political systems (for 
example between Democracies and Dictatorships) or when the comparison 
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Appendix A

1. Data and sources 
A large number of sources were used and data were combined from 
different sources. In this appendix we include a more detail presentation of 
the sources and what type of data were used. 
1.1. Official Statistics 
The majority of quantitative indicators used in this study derive from 
Hellenic National Statistics Agency (ΕΣΥΕ). Some of the sources were 
available and accessed from online databases. Also, a number of visits in the 
National Statistics were conducted (see final section in Appendix). The 
structural indicators reflect primary the economic system and the 
organisation of the Greek economy and the educational sector. Also, 
statistics from reports and online databases published by the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)10 were used in conjunction with 
statistical information obtained from the Greek Police, the Central Anti-drug 
Coordination Unit — National Intelligence Unit (SODN-EMP)11, the 
Greek Coast Guard and Bureau for Special Inspections (Yp.E.E, formerly 
SDOE)12. The aforementioned sources allowed us to have a picture of the 
seized quantities of cocaine from 1980 to 2006, as well as longitudinal data 
on retail and wholesale prices for cocaine and other illegal drugs in Greece. 
10 UNODC (2008) 
SODN/EMP, Ekthesi gia ta Narkotika sthn Ellada Etous 2001 (Athens: Typografeio 
ELAS, 2002); SODN/EMP, Ekthesi gia ta Narkotika sthn Ellada Etous 2002 (Athens: 
Typografeio ELAS, 2003); SODN/EMP, Ekthesi gia ta Narkotika sthn Ellada Etous 2003
(Athens: Typografeio ELAS, 2004); SODN/EMP, Ekthesi gia ta Narkotika sthn Ellada 
Etous 2004 (Athens: Typografeio ELAS, 2005); SODN/EMP, Ekthesi gia ta Narkotika sthn 
Ellada Etous 2005 (Athens: Typografeio ELAS: 2006); SODN/EMP, Ekthesi gia ta 
Narkotika sthn Ellada Etous 2006 (Athens: Typografeio ELAS: 2007). 
12 Data accessed via the Bureau’s website: http://www.ypee.gr/gr/enhmerosi.htm 
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1.2 Public Opinion Surveys 
Data on values, public attitudes and perceptions were accessed through 
various online databases containing survey results conducted by both 
National and International public and private organisations. The results of 
the World values survey and those of the European values survey were also 
accessed from their online database. Public surveys are very helpful in 
capturing issues related to trust in the state and the police as well as other 
cultural variables related to crime and deviance and political culture. 
Also, a number of online discussion forums were used (Facebook). Online 
blobs and forums can provide some indication of how people react to some 
forms of illegal social groupings. 
1.2 Court Files 
In 2007 I was granted permission13 to conduct an investigation into the 
archives of the Court of Appeal in Athens. The investigation lasted 
approximately 30 days and a large number of court cases (Αποφ�σεις) were 
photocopied. Only cases prosecuted for offences related to the formation 
and participation in ‘criminal organisation’ and with a final judgement past 
on them were retrieved, copied and used for the purposes of this study. 
Additionally, a small number of court cases on OC related activities have 
been licked into the press were also consulted. 
1.3 Police Files 
We collected a number of case summaries from various law enforcement 
agencies related to cocaine trafficking, drug trafficking, protection and 
assassinations. Unlike the bulky court decisions that provide exclusive 
details to the operations, composition and structure of cocaine smuggling 
13 The 13841/24.10.07 permission by the Court of Appeal in Athens and the 
6658/2.10.2007 permission by the Greek Data Protection Authority were given to the
author to conduct investigation and reproduce hard copies of court files. 
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schemes, case summaries are significantly shorter in length (1-4 pages) and, 
therefore, allowed a larger study of cases. Thus, we were able to cover a 
broad range of ‘actors’ and groups, and identify patterns of social 
organisation across a large number of cases. 
1.4 Telephone Interceptions 
Following the kidnapping of a prominent Greek businessman and shipowner 
in the summer of 2009, the Greek Police dismantled what appears to be a 
criminal network, which is part of the so called Godfathers so of the night. 
The network was dismantled following extensive telephone interceptions 
and monitoring and analysis of the conversations its members. Audio and 
text (transcribed) files from these interceptions were liked to the press. 
1.5 Newspapers and historical documents 
A number of national newspaper articles are used in this study. Articles 
from nationally and locally circulated newspapers published from 1996 to 
September 2008 were selected. A number of articles from historical 
newspapers such as Skrip were accessed from the online database of the 
National Library of Greece.14 In addition, a number of financial 
newspapers were used. Again, we used these articles to obtain information 
on ‘actors’ and their practices as well as, on issuer linked to the origin and 
structure of the criminal groups. In particular older newspaper were a 
valuable source of both qualitative information as well as accounts on the 
origin, description of activities and organisation of criminal groups. The 
aforementioned media reports were complemented by press releases from 
the Ministry of Mercantile Marine and the Bureau for Special Inspections. 
14 National Library of Greece and e-library database, 
http://www.nlg.gr/digitalnewspapers/ns/main.html 
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1.6 Police Reports 
We have also utilised the Annual Reports on Organised Crime for the years 
1999, 2003, 2004 and 2005 published by the Greek Ministry of Public Order 
(MPO)15. These reports are based on the compilation of information and 
data on ‘organised crime’ by various Greek law enforcement agencies. 
There have been serious reservations expressed as to the validity of the 
annual reports on ‘organised crime’ as well as their capacity to effectively 
identify ‘organised crime’ cases. Our investigation of archived court cases 
in the Court of Appeal, for instance, revealed significant flaws in the 
methodology followed by the Greek police. We regard these flaws to be 
related to a lack of communication between the courts and the police as well 
as poor archiving. In this article we use the annual reports only to 
triangulate statistical data obtained from other sources as well as to collect 
part of the information about sources, methods and routes of transportation 
of cocaine. Also, a number of EU, UN and Europol reports were used. 
1.7 Interviews 
A number of interviews were conducted with law enforcement officers at all 
ranks, senior and junior analysts, civil servants working in drug treatment 
programmes (such as of the Greek Organisation Against Drugs – 
O.KA.NA), guards and civil personnel working in the Judicial Prison of 
Korydallos and the Juvenile Prison of Avlonas, as well as with a well-
known, knowledgeable Greek MP, in order to identify key trends of cocaine 
smuggling and protection rackets in Greece and to receive further 
clarification on the structure of the markets. After consulting our sources, it 
became evident that the role of legal entrepreneurs and networks linked to 
the shipping industry were central when considering large-scale smuggling 
15 MPO, Etisia Ekthesi gia to Organomeno Eglima stin Ellada, 1999 (Athens: MPO, 2000); 
MPO, Etisia Ekthesi gia to Organomeno Eglima stin Ellada, 2003 (Athens: MPO, 2004); 
MPO, Etisia Ekthesi gia to Organomeno Eglima stin Ellada, 2004 (Athens: MPO, 2005); 
MPO, Etisia Ekthesi Perigrafis gia to Organomeno Eglima stin Ellada, Etous 2005 
(Athens: MPO, 2006). 
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schemes. The same conclsion applies to the groups involed in the night-life 
economy. 
Also, participants from the shipping industry and the wider ‘port 
community’ of a major port in Greece and several islands were interviewed 
to gain their perspective on the cocaine business. The form of these 
interviews was unstructured and informal. The professional occupation and 
social networks of the actors interviewed gave them the ability to provide 
in-depth and detailed information on the motives of smugglers as well as the 
structures that facilitate or even protect this illicit trade. From these 
encounters it was sensed that there is a general lack of morality in these 
professional circles that often serve strong profiteering motives. Our general 
feeling is that much of what is happening in the ‘ports’ receives no publicity 
and that court cases and official statistics provide only a partial picture of 
the extent of the problem. In numerous occasions we were told stories about 
cocaine busts, amongst other activities, by reliable sources; busts and 
activities that did not appear in media sources. The following is a list of all 
the professionals and informants interviewed for this study: 
Mrs. Gouli, Prosecutor on Human Trafficking; Mr. Kampanakis, head of 
crime intelligence Unite; Mr. Maspero, Senior analyst in the crime 
intelligence Unite; Mr Saxionis, Head of Drug enforcement agency; Mr. 
G.X, Head of Intelligence, people smuggling unite, Greek Coast Guard. ; 
Mr. Aravadinos, head of Avlonas prison Guards, former convict; Mr, 
Koubelis, MP with left/liberal Party (SIRIZA), criminal lawyer; Mr. 
Kokkoris, Director of drug rehabilitation program; Informant on 
smuggling/shipping (P); Informant on smuggling/shipping (B); Customs 
Officers, Port of Durres, Albania; Head of Customs, Port of Durres, 
Albania; Head of security, Port of Durres, Albania; Middle rank Greek drug 
dealer-pusher (Nio); Greek Bar/restaurant owner, Athens (ALBA); High 
ranking officer (Rt.d), Hellenic Police, anti-terrorist unite; Greek Police 
Officers from Europol and Interpol. 
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1.8 Field Trips 
A number of field trips were conducted over the past years in search of 
information and informants for this study. Besides the actual information 
gather from these visits, the observation of the working habitat of my 
informants was crucial is gaining a better perspective on my topic. 
1.8.1 Avlonas Juvenile Prison - Summer of 2009 
A visit in the Juvenile prison of Avlonas (Αβλ�νας) took place in the 
summer of 2009, which is situated close to Athens. The particular prison 
was selected because the main jail (Korydallos) witch is situated near 
Athens and has a much larger population arrested and convicted for more 
serious crimes, refused access to prisoners. The visit to Avlonas lasted about 
6 hours and I had the chance to talk to male inmates (in their cells or in the 
main yard) as well as with prison guards. What also attracted my interest in 
visiting the Avlonas prison is also the fact that the head of the prison guards 
Mr. Aravadinos, who has also served as the head of prison guards in 
Korydallos, was accused, imprison and later acquitted for assisting an 
inmate (convicted for drag trafficking) fraud his early released papers. My 
visit to Avlonas however, was more about observing the ‘habitat’ provided 
by the political system for offenders as well as observing their daily 
routines. This was very helpful in understanding the political role of the 
prison. 
1.8.2 Police Headquarters 
A number of visit at the unit of criminal analysts in Athens were carried out 
between 2006-2010. The purpose of these visits was to conduct interviews 
with the officers in charge of the OC unite but most importantly to observe 
how analysis is conducted, how information is stored and how a case is put 
together. Given that the police is a bureaucracy with very limited resources, 
it is very interesting to see how these resources are been allocated and what 
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crimes receive more attentions and why. I was also able to have a much 
better and objective view on what data are available for analysis, how the 
different police agencies cooperated with each other and other factors that 
may affect the work of law enforce in the case of organised crime. 
Observations were supplemented by views expressed by those in-charge of 
the analysis. My visits in the analysis Unit in the Police headquarters on a 
frequent bases, allowed me to observe how the mode of analysis changes 
with the introduction of new analytical skills and long interviews and group 
discussions with the analysts also allowed me to observe how changing 
perceptions and definition of OC have real results in terms of who is been 
prosecuted and why. 
1.8.3 National statistics Archives 
A detail search in the National Statistics Archives was conducted in the 
summers of 2008 and 2009 in order to access information that was not 
available online. Three sets of data were copied from the library with the 
use of digital camera, totalling about 700 photographs (one page per frame). 
The three electronic archives generated contain indexes on crimes recorded 
from 1928-1990; election results 1926-2004; and economic values for the 
construction industry, public spending and volume of the number of 
building registered over the past twenty years. Subsequently, all the photos 
were organised in an electronic folder and managed using the appropriate 
computer software (iphoto).   
